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Abstract
This dissertation addresses the labor market performance and consumption dynamics
of different socioeconomic groups. The first part examines the connection between
cyclical variations in skilled and unskilled labor markets. Using a business cycle
model with search frictions in skill-specific markets, I find that imperfect substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor creates an important channel for variations in the
skill-specific markets. Together with a skill-neutral or -biased technology shock, the
model generates downward-sloping Beveridge curves in aggregate and skill-specific
labor markets.
I extend the study to allow for a dynamic link between the skill-specific labor mar-
kets. Human capital investment is determined endogenously and idiosyncratic shocks
shift the skilled labor share and change tightness in both skilled and unskilled mar-
kets. Upon a neutral shock, the decrease of total unemployment is two-staged: Firstly
with a reduction in unskilled unemployment, and then with a sharp decline of skilled
unemployment when skill substitution dominates. A larger elasticity of substitution
between the two types of labor leads to higher volatility of the model variables and
higher correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
The second part studies the link between group-specific consumption growth and
its volatility in a framework of heterogeneous agents, under the assumption of a con-
sumption externality. Household preferences are related to the consumption growth
volatility through asset holding decisions: The volatility decreases with groups’ pa-
tience, and increases with the eagerness to keep up with the group average. More-
over, consumption growth is expected to be positively related to its volatility. This last
hypothesis is tested using household data imputed from the German Socio-Economic
Panel and the German Income and Expenditure Survey, where a U-shaped relation-
ship is found between nondurable consumption growth and its volatility.
Keywords: business cycle, search frictions, skill substitution, skill-specific labor
markets, human capital investment, idiosyncratic shocks, consumption growth,
within-group inequality, SOEP, EVS
JEL Codes: D31, D64, D91, E21, E24, E32, J24, J63
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit Arbeitsmarkterfolg und Konsum sozioökonomi-
scher Gruppen. Die ersten zwei Kapitel untersuchen konjunkturelle Auswirkungen
auf Arbeitsmärkten für Hoch- und Niedrigqualifizierte. Zunächst wird ein qualifi-
kationsspezifisches Konjunkturmodell mit Suchkosten entworfen. Es zeigt, dass im-
perfekte Substitution zwischen hoch- und niedrigqualifizierter Arbeit ein Grund für
Veränderungen auf den Teilmärkten ist. Gemeinsam mit qualifikationsneutralen und -
verzerrten Technologieschocks ist das Modell in der Lage, fallende Beveridge-Kurven
zu generieren.
Das zweite Kapitel erweitert diesen Ansatz um eine Verbindung zwischen qua-
lifikationsabhängigen Arbeitsmärkten mit endogenen Investitionen in Humankapi-
tal. Idiosynkratische Schocks wirken auf den Anteil qualifizierter Arbeit und verän-
dern die Arbeitsmarktdichte auf den Teilmärkten. Neutrale Schocks wirken zweistu-
fig auf die Gesamtarbeitslosigkeit: Zuerst reduzieren sie geringqualifizierte Arbeitslo-
sigkeit, und dann verringern sie rapide hochqualifizierte Arbeitslosigkeit. Eine hohe
Substitutions-Elastizität zwischen den beiden Qualifikationen führt zu einer höheren
Volatilität und einer höheren Korrelation zwischen Arbeitslosigkeit und freien Stellen.
Das dritte Kapitel untersucht die Verbindung zwischen Gruppen-
Konsumwachstum und dessen Volatilität, wenn die Agenten heterogen sind und eine
Konsumexternalität vorliegt. Die Präferenzen der Haushalte hängen mit der Konsum-
wachstumsvolatilität insofern zusammen, als diese Vermögensentscheidungen treffen
müssen: Die Volatilität verringert sich mit der Geduld und steigt mit dem Wunsch,
das Konsumniveau der Vergleichsgruppe zu halten. Darüber hinaus sollten Konsum-
wachstum und dessen Volatilität positiv korrelieren. Diese letzte Hypothese wird mit
Daten aus dem Sozio-oekonomischen Panel und der Einkommens- und Verbrauchs-
stichprobe überprüft, wobei sich ein U-förmiger Zusammenhang zwischen Konsum-
wachstum kurzlebiger Güter und dessen Volatilität ergibt.
Schlüsselbegriffe: Konjunkturzyklen, Suchkosten, Qualifikationssubstitution, quali-
fikationsspezifische Arbeitsmärkte, Humankapitalinvestitionen, idiosynkratische
Schocks, Konsumwachstum, gruppenspezifische Ungleichheit, SOEP, EVS
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1 Introduction
Unemployment is one of the key indicators of economic performance. It is a well-known
business cycle stylized fact that unemployment is countercyclical and lagging behind out-
put. Meanwhile, volatility of unemployment over the cycle is an important element in
welfare analysis, especially when more detailed aspects of unemployment, such as the
skill context, are explored. Empirical evidence shows that skilled and unskilled workers
are exposed to different levels of unemployment risks and thus endure different durations
of unemployment. In addition to a higher level of unemployment, unskilled workers are
also subject to higher employment volatility than skilled workers (Kydland, 1984, Keane
and Prasad, 1993). Such discrepancies are at the focus of this dissertation.
In particular, this dissertation studies the labor market performance and consumption
dynamics of different socioeconomic groups. Chapter Two and Three are based on two pa-
pers on skill-specific labor markets where the effects of imperfect skill substitutability and
skill training on unemployment are examined separately. Chapter Four analyses the con-
sumption behavior of heterogeneous households in an environment where the well-being
of households is affected not only by their own consumption but also by the consump-
tion of others. There, household preferences and the degree of patience co-influence the
equilibrium group consumption growth and volatility.
Previous studies on the long-run trend in the labor market identify the deteriorating
position of unskilled workers due to permanent technological shifts. My dissertation
complements this research by adding a business cycle perspective of skill-specific unem-
ployment. Its results confirm the inferior situation of the unskilled workers in the labor
market.
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1.1 Skills and the Labor Market
As a result of the 2008-2009 recession, the Beveridge curve in the U.S. labor market has
shifted outwards, generating a policy debate as to whether it was driven by insufficient
aggregate demand or structural problems related to the supply side (see, for example,
Mulligan, 2009, 2010, Rogerson and Shimer, 2010, Sterk, 2010 and Farber, 2010). While
the well-known negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies is captured
by the downward-sloping Beveridge curve, changes in the structural characteristics of
the economy can shift the curve inward or outward (summarized in Abraham and Katz,
1986). The unexpected outward shift at the lower end of the Beveridge curve, therefore,
could potentially be accounted for by both demand and supply reasons:
• A stagnation of real aggregate labor demand because of insufficient product de-
mand. Many companies posted vacancies in order to avoid net contraction, whereas
new vacancies addressing external recruits were limited (Farber, 2010).
• The extended duration of unemployment benefits, which may have encouraged
some of the unemployed to search longer (Farber, 2010).
• Weak geographical mobility of the workers. When posted jobs are located some-
where else, instead of directly moving to it, homeowners are bound to their current
location because of the low home equity level and the consequent inability to take
new mortgage loans for new accommodations (Sterk, 2010).
Can such reasoning also explain the differences between skilled and unskilled unem-
ployment? Does the interaction between the two types of labor and capital investment,
namely the skill substitutability, play a role in the diversity of the volatilities? If a channel
exists between the skilled and unskilled labor force, how does the transition contribute to
skill-specific and aggregate unemployment? Beyond the dynamics in the aggregate labor
market, these questions are discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this disserta-
tion, where the internal structure of the skill-specific markets and the connection between
them are elaborated upon.
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The connection between unemployment and skill substitution is worth studying, because
skilled and unskilled workers appear to be imperfect substitutes in production. A good
example is the work load allocation between a technician and a layman in the construc-
tion sector. The technician is proficient in the relevant skills and techniques and has a rel-
atively practical understanding of the theoretical principles. He can operate highly com-
plex equipment. In contrast, without systematic training, a layman fulfills his job mostly
without sound technical or theoretical understanding. As there could be some overlap-
ping work between the technician and layman, their different technical backgrounds en-
sure that they cannot fully substitute for each other in production. The measurement of
the degree of substitutability, also known as the elasticity of substitution, has been a task
for many empirical studies. Katz and Murphy (1992) find an elasticity about 1.41, while
Angrist (1995) estimates this elasticity to be 2. The majority of empirical findings suggests
that the elasticity of substitution between skills lies between 1 and 2.
Chapter Two analyzes the theoretical background and consequences of this imperfect
substitutability. The constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)-nested Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function implies that, from the perspective of labor demand alone, skilled and
unskilled employment depend on each other. Note that, at this stage, no transition be-
tween the skilled and unskilled labor force from the labor supply perspective is allowed
for yet. Employing a stylized business cycle model with search frictions in the respective
sub-markets, Chapter Two concludes that the imperfect skill substitution creates a channel
for variations in the sub-markets. Upon a positive technology shock, demand increases for
both skilled and unskilled workers. Initially, more vacancies are created for skilled labor
rather than for the unskilled, due to the higher marginal productivity of skilled labor. At
a given level of search frictions, the resulting change of skilled labor input is higher than
that of the unskilled. Meanwhile, since the unemployment stocks stay unchanged from
last period, the relative surplus of skilled vacancies leads to higher market tightness in the
skilled market, creating a positive impact upon the skill premium. In total, this positive
impact dominates the negative effect from rising relative skill supply, thus slightly increas-
ing the equilibrium skill premium. After reaching the maximum point, the deviation of
the skill premium returns slowly to the steady state as firms, being highly cost-sensitive,
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are induced to return, at least partly, to unskilled labor. The substitution of skilled over
unskilled goes further in recessions, when the skill premium is lower and skilled workers
are easier to acquire than in booms. For given search frictions in skilled and unskilled la-
bor markets and without applying the assumption of capital-skill complementarity (such
as in Lindquist, 2004 or in Balleer and van Rens, 2009), the model reproduces counter-
cyclical relative employment and can generate second-moments consistent with those of
monthly data from the U.S. Census Burea’s Current Population Survey. The substitution
effect is even stronger at a larger elasticity of substitution, where unskilled workers suf-
fer to a greater extent from the business cycle turbulence, showing higher volatility in
unemployment.
1.3 Endogenous Human Capital Formation
The model in Chapter Two succeeds at generating downward-sloping Beveridge curves
in skill-specific labor markets without introducing interaction between the skilled and
unskilled labor on the labor supply side. The interaction, through endogenous decisions
on human capital investment, is crucial because the skill share in the labor force is affected,
and so are the participation, tightness and job finding rates in skill-specific markets. These
issues are discussed in Chapter Three, where labor force skill composition is determined
by the households endogenously.
The importance of the effect of labor supply can be analogously seen in the long-run
labor market performance. Although according to a popular hypothesis, the increase of
relative unemployment of the unskilled results from the demand shift toward skilled la-
bor, this shift is too small to explain the unemployment and wage dynamics in Europe
and the U.S. from the 1970s to the 1990s, especially when the trends in relative wages and
relative employment are somewhat different between the U.S. (as well as the U.K.) and
continental Europe.
As in the U.S. and the U.K., both employment and wage situations of the unskilled
have been deteriorating during this period, while the trends are much less clear-cut in
continental Europe. A consensus has been formed that labor and skill supply play at least
as important a role as technology change in determining labor market outcomes. In the
4
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case of the U.S., an acceleration in skill supply in the 1970s as a result of the expansive
college enrollment seemed to create profit incentives and induce research and develop-
ment investments. Skill-biased innovation created such excessive demand for skills that
the trends in relative skill supply did not keep pace with relative demand shift, and col-
lege premiums rose again in the 1980s. A similar case during the same period in the U.K.
shows that government policy can make the relative skill supply less elastic and affect the
labor market performance and skill premium. Moreover, such acceleration in the skills
bias, as a response to the rapid increase in skill supply, is assumed to be responsible for
the rising unemployment of low-skilled workers.
While consensus regards technological progress as the potential cause for real wage dif-
ferences in Europe, social welfare benefits and labor market institutions such as the wage
compression and collective bargaining seem to play a more significant role in determin-
ing the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate (Bean, 1994 and Krugman, 1994). It is
generally agreed that a more compressed wage structure leads to an increase in unskilled
unemployment. However, an increase in the share of skilled workers is found to be nega-
tively correlated with the unemployment of the more educated (Biagi and Lucifora, 2005),
suggesting a high relevance of education and training policy. Most importantly, the in-
centives to acquire skills should be strong enough so that human capital investment and
accumulation can be achieved. For many observers Germany presents a positive exam-
ple because of its strong emphasis on the school system and a comprehensive vocational
training system. As a result, the portion of the labor force with middle-level qualification
is far higher in Germany than in the U.S., which forms a more flexible basis for the upcom-
ing biased technology change and demand shift. This flexibility enables endogenous skill
upgrade much more efficiently and thus, despite the wage compression, there is a much
lower unskilled unemployment rate than in the U.S. and the U.K. (Nickell and Bell, 1996,
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, Pischke, 2001).
As the evidence points to the important role of education and training systems in deter-
mining aggregate and skill-specific unemployment, especially in a demand-shift environ-
ment, it is gratifying to observe that training for the unemployed has become more preva-
lent in many industrialized countries and has been embedded in the framework of active
labor market (ALM) policies. Moreover, different types of training vary in the timing of
5
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effects: Job search assistance programs appear to have relatively favorable short-run im-
pacts, whereas classroom and on-the-job training programs tend to show better outcomes
in the medium-run than in the short-run (Card, Kluve and Weber, 2010). Comparatively,
subsidized public sector employment programs have the least favorable impact estimates
– a finding confirming earlier studies from Boone and Van Ours (2004) and Kluve (2006).
Above all, training is key to human capital flows between the labor markets because
of its effect upon the skilled and unskilled labor forces and market structure. Dellas and
Sakellaris (2003) find that formal schooling is significantly countercyclical, while Sepul-
veda (2004) finds training after formal schooling (both on- and off-the-job) to be weakly
countercyclical and leading the cycle. If training is countercyclical, as these studies indi-
cate, there is a force pushing human capital flow into the skilled labor force; that is, the
expected wage premium given current job finding rates in both markets. Together with
the realization of shocks to human capital and the outcome of learning-by-doing on the
job, the human capital flow impacts the market tightness of both skilled and unskilled,
thus changing the equilibrium wage and relative unemployment of skilled and unskilled
workers.
In previous human capital related studies unemployment is mostly assumed to be vol-
untary. For example, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007a, 2007b, 2008) compare the impact of
unemployment insurance and employment protection on the unemployment rate and du-
ration in different model setups. However, in their framework, no endogenous decisions
are made by the workers on their own skill accumulation. Observing ALM policies gain-
ing popularity in Europe and the U.S. (starting from the 1980s in Scandinavian countries),
one may inquire their potential effects on unemployment, given workers’ decision in at-
tending training programs. Admittedly, recent data shows that unemployed workers are
engaged far too little in training and hence suffer from severe loss of human capital. A
more encompassing way to approach the problem is to allow for different degrees of hu-
man capital depreciation and examine workers’ investment in their own education. Even
if there may be little change to the total labor force, the aggregation of single workers’
choices in human capital investment would change the shares of skilled and unskilled la-
bor forces, and subsequently their market tightness. This is exactly the goal of Chapter
Three: To explore the role of human capital formation and skill differences in explaining
6
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unemployment. Households’ endogenous decisions on skill accumulation are realized
through general training and learning-by-doing and, correspondingly, the volume of the
skill-specific labor force and the respective market tightness vary. As the immediate reac-
tion to a positive human capital shock includes a surge in skilled unemployment and a re-
duction in unskilled unemployment, the changes of relative wage and market tightnesses
induce firms to post more skilled vacancies so that at the second stage of the positive
human capital shock, skilled workers substitute unskilled workers.
1.4 Consumption Growth and its Volatility
While the incidence of unemployment is skill-relevant, household income and consump-
tion are also affected by the skill level of households. This observation motivates Chapter
Four, where the consumption dynamics of heterogeneous households are studied. In-
deed, empirical evidence drawn from German data shows that not only the consumption
distribution but also household consumption growth and its volatility are significantly re-
lated to household head occupation, as well as to household size, age, education level and
nationality. This is because households in various socioeconomic groups, defined by the
aforementioned characteristics, differ in consumption preferences, be it patience toward
future consumption or attitudes toward the associative references. Compared to patience,
only until the recent decade has the latter preference, sometimes called “consumption
externality”, gained more attention in mainstream economics. Before that, neoclassical
reasoning has been typically based on the hypothesis of self-interest; i.e., people are ex-
clusively motivated by their material well-being.
The idea of relative consumption is not new in other scientific fields such as psychology
and sociology. As early as 1899, Veblen discussed conspicuous consumption; i.e., lavish
spending on goods and services acquired mainly for the purpose of displaying income or
wealth. Such purchases are not any more limited to materialistic consumption, but serve
as a means of attaining or maintaining social status. In a similar spirit, Duesenberry put
forward the Relative Income Hypothesis (1949), which states that individual attitudes to
consumption and saving are dictated more by income in relation to others than by the
abstract standard of living. Again, the purpose of consumption goes beyond the original
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utilization of goods and extends to the signaling of social status.
Psychological and economic studies often show that both absolute and relative con-
sumption matter for individual well-being and behavior (see, e.g., Duesenberry, 1949, Di-
ener et al., 1999, Luttmer, 2005). Individuals’ satisfaction derived from being better than
their peers can be interpreted as envy, inequity aversion, aversion of relative deprivation,
or a propensity to judge one’s achievement relative to that of others. The “others” here
are reference groups, a concept brought about in social psychology early in the 1940s (Hy-
man, 1942). Depending on the situation, they can be coworkers, relatives, neighbors, or
members of clubs and organizations. Moreover, they can also be people who are geo-
graphically distant and do not interact with the actor physically. According to Shibutani
(1955), reference groups can be: (1) those serving as comparison points, (2) those to which
individuals aspire, and (3) those sharing the same perspectives with the individuals. The
last category requires common communication channels, each of which gives rise to a
separate world or a socioeconomic group. The social worlds can be ethnic minorities, the
social elite, a medical association, a theater audience, readers of certain periodicals, or,
in today’s context, groups in online social networks such as Facebook. In a word, these
associative reference groups realistically represent the individuals’ current equals or near-
equals; i.e., they are from the same socioeconomic background. This will be the definition
of groups in Chapter Four.
If reference groups matter, households regard the current average consumption of their
group as the local norm to set realistic consumption goals. For example, consider in-
equity aversion: Inequity-averse persons want to achieve an equitable distribution of ma-
terial resources; i.e., they want to neither surpass nor fall behind others in the reference
groups. Therefore, the group mean becomes their benchmark. This setup is slightly dif-
ferent from the case wherein individuals would like to emulate the top households of
the group, which coincides with the “aspiring” case in Shibutani’s (1955) definition and
would result in a larger deviation from an externality-free economy.
While other peoples’ income can hardly be detected, households can relatively easily
observe the lifestyles and infer the consumption levels of others with similar socioeco-
nomic status. Their optimal security holding will adapt accordingly and their consump-
tion smoothing path is different from that in an externality-free world. As a result, their
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evaluation of other peoples’ consumption affects group consumption growth inequality.
The direction of this effect depends on how exactly households react to their peers’ well-
being. Alternatively, this reaction can be interpreted as individuals’ life satisfaction upon
the change of their peers’ income. While such an attitude can hardly be identified in
empirical data, happiness is often used as a proxy to capture an individual’s utility. Stud-
ies based on developed countries find that subjective welfare depends positively on one’s
own consumption but negatively on the average consumption level of others nearby (East-
erlin, 2001, Blanchflower et al., 2004, Luttmer, 2005). Knies (2010) finds comparable evi-
dence that West Germans are significantly unhappier with their lives if their neighbors
are getting richer, implying an urge of the West German households to avoid lagging be-
hind their neighbors, or alternatively, the urge to keep up. This effect is slightly more
marked in neighborhoods with presumably more social interactions, so that households
may be able to assess more accurately the change of their neighbors’ financial position.
Conversely, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) find that in Nepal, households in isolated areas
care more about what their neighbors consume. Their reasoning is that neighbors in iso-
lated communities can more accurately approximate the relevant reference group than in
more mobile urban communities. These observations require economic models to take the
social environment into account, whose effects on aggregate consumption dynamics and
distribution are heterogeneous according to agents’ socioeconomic background.
The preference for relative consumption can be regarded as a special form of physical
consumption or a conceptual consumption separate from physical consumption. Long
discussed by sociologists and anthropologists in the field of consumer behavior, it is sum-
marized in Ariely and Norton (2009a) that “physical consumption is used not just to sat-
isfy basic needs but also to signal to ourselves and others our beliefs, attitudes, and social
identities”. Therefore, conceptual consumption strongly influences physical consump-
tion, and the possession of a BMW convertible is often only partly due to the need for
transport. The concept consumed is the (relative) social status, which dates back to Ve-
blen’s (1899) discussion of conspicuous consumption and Duesenberry’s Relative Income
Hypothesis (1949), and accords with the “inequality aversion” in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and the “social preferences” in Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).
The discussion and confirmation of the importance of relative consumption suggest
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modeling household preferences in a more general way, including both absolute and rela-
tive consumption. Chapter Four shows that one direct result from households’ optimiza-
tion is that households deviate from their original consumption smoothing path because
they are keen to consume the same as the majority in the group. In the case of keeping up
with the Joneses, mean and median of group consumption are regarded as the same. The
equilibrium result suggests that less patient groups and groups with stronger eagerness
to keep up appear to have higher volatility in consumption growth. Moreover, a positive
association between group consumption growth and volatility is found; i.e., fast growing
groups may also experience high uncertainty. This latter hypothesis can be tested using
micro data on household consumption.
Combining two supplementary German micro datasets, the Socio-economic Panel
(SOEP) and the Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure (EVS), and exploiting the panel
structure of the former and the rich consumption information in the latter, I impute con-
secutive household consumption and construct consumption growth and volatility. Non-
durable consumption appears to have a more significant relationship between growth
and volatility than durable consumption, which may be due to better data quality. Over-
all, household nondurable consumption growth appears to have a U-shaped relationship
with volatility. Across the groups, young households experience both high growth and
high volatility, while older, larger, and better educated households seem to be exposed
to low uncertainty and limited growth. Those with relatively low growth and medium
volatility are the older households and those whose heads are foreign-born. The results in
Chapter Four therefore help to provide an insight to the divergent consumption patterns
of various socioeconomic groups.
1.5 Politicy Implications
As the studies in this dissertation outline the weak welfare position of certain social
groups, the question for the social planner’s role and the function of welfare redistribu-
tion through effective taxation systems should be raised. In the end, aggregate economic
indicators can only tell part of the story. As many studies have found, business cycle vari-
ation can have a far-reaching effect on some households, especially when they start from
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inferior initial conditions.
Likewise, the simulation experiments in Chapter Two and Three have also shown a
variation of the vulnerability of unskilled workers over the business cycle. Skill substi-
tution is persistent and especially strong during recessions, leading to a high unskilled
unemployment both in level and volatility. The volatility of labor market variables are
subject to the differentiation between the skilled and unskilled and the persistence of the
human capital shock.
Training programs provide skill upgrade opportunities to the lower-skilled workers,
and consequently preserve the average skill level of the total labor force. The positive
effects implied are not only on the skill-specific, but also on the aggregate labor market
variables. As found in Card, Kluve and Weber (2010), various ALM programs appear
to need different time frames so as to come into effect, while their impacts are highly
heterogeneous. The challenging tasks in reality therefore include at least two points: How
to identify an effective combination of active labor market policies that help achieve the
short-run and longer-run goals simultaneously? And how to set the correct incentive
schemes so as to encourage workers, and especially unemployed workers, to participate
in training?
Looking at the whole range of ALM policies from a skill-specific perspective enables me
to draw additional conclusions as compared to an aggregate approach:
(1) Training marginal unskilled workers has obvious beneficial welfare effects for this
special group. The increase of market tightness in the unskilled labor market raises the
chance to find a job. In the medium- or long-run, the high-skilled share increases as a
consequence, which reduces the tightness on the skilled labor market and accordingly
the skill premium. Given the substitutability between skilled and unskilled, this induces
a demand shift toward the skilled. Therefore, in aggregate, total unemployment would
decline responding to an improvement in training programs.
(2) Investing in training for skilled workers offsets skill depreciation and therefore keeps
up the human capital level in both skilled and aggregate labor markets. This can also
maintain the human capital potential for innovation and the ability to apply new tech-
nologies in production.
(3) A relevant policy question would be: What is the return of a unit investment in train-
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ing in skilled workers compared to that in unskilled workers? While this question cannot
be answered within the present framework, I have shown that the skill-specific approach
matters, especially in a business cycle context. Future research may therefore extend the
present work and compare the marginal returns to training investment in skilled and un-
skilled labor markets.
(4) My results deliver some hands-on recommendations for the policy maker. Consider-
ing the implementation of ALM policies in a skill-specific and business cycle context can
improve policy design and performance. Business cycle effects are different for skilled
and unskilled workers. Because unskilled workers are especially sensitive to business cy-
cles and undergo more severe conditions in recessions, programs with medium-run effect
such as classroom training can prepare them with necessary skills for the time when the
labor market recovers. Programs like job search assistance, however, may play a more
effective role at the end of recessions. If possible, on-the-job-training programs should
be applied to the whole labor force and over the full business cycle, since such can most
efficiently make up for the ever present human capital depreciation.
To conclude, coherent social policies are needed to help vulnerable groups to smooth
their consumption and partially compensate the loss of permanent income due to long-
term inactivity or unemployment. Nonetheless, unemployment and other social subsidies
should not be too generous since they can run into the danger of discouraging workers
from active job searching and lead to long-term unemployment. Helping the poor but
not discouraging them from helping themselves is one of the fundamental tradeoffs of
economic policy. There is no “one and only” optimal approach for every country, and
successful policies stem mostly from years of experience and practice. Skill-specific, or
in a broader context, socioeconomic-group-specific welfare conditions thus require more
attention in future economic research and an extension of this dissertation can be studying
the optimal taxation policies regarding various socioeconomic groups.
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2 Cyclical Skill-Specific Unemployment with
Imperfect Substitution of Skills
2.1 Introduction
Over the past three and a half decades, one of the defining characteristics of the U.S. labor
market has been the inferior position of low-skilled workers. In addition to the long-run
stagnation or even deterioration of real wages and unemployment, lower-skilled groups
also seem to be more vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations. As shown in Kydland (1984) and
Keane and Prasad (1993), employment of skilled workers is less cyclical than its counter-
part for unskilled workers.
Figure 2.1 shows the unemployment rates of “college equivalents” and “high school
equivalents” in the U.S. between 1977 and 2005. In line with Autor, Katz and Krueger
(1998), college equivalents are defined as those with a college education plus half of those
with some college. High school equivalents are those with twelve or fewer years of school-
ing (or high school diploma or less) plus half of those with some college. Here skill levels
are proxied by educational attainment, since skills are difficult to measure. Unemploy-
ment rates by educational attainment are only available since 1977 in the census data. The
upper panel of Figure 1 shows the persistently higher unemployment level of less edu-
cated workers. In the lower panel, where also GDP trend deviation is plotted, it can be
seen that the unemployment rates of both groups are clearly countercyclical, while the
unemployment rate of high school equivalents is much more volatile than that of col-
lege equivalents1. The exact means, coefficient of variation and standard deviations of
detrended data are reported in Table 2.1.
1The unemployment rate series and log of real GDP were detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a
lambda of 100.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate and Education-Specific Unemployment Rates, U.S., 1977-2005
It is commonly acknowledged that the lower skilled group has endured a worsening
trend, with decreasing real wages and a consistently rising unemployment rate. Autor,
Katz and Kearney (2005) report that after a slight increase in the 1970s, real wages of high
school graduates fell by nearly 10 percent. Between 1979 and 1995 real wages of high
school dropouts fell by an even more shocking 19 percent, with a modest recovery period
between 1995 and 2003. The unemployment rate of males aged 25-64 with less than 4 years
of high school (comparable to high school dropouts) was at 4 percent in 1970, peaked at
11 percent in the early 1990s, and was still 8 percent in 2003. The unemployment rate of
high school graduates developed only slightly better, but overall similarly.
Studies on the difference between skill groups have mostly focused on the long-run
trend. Different approaches to explain the inferior position of unskilled workers have
been employed in the rich literature available on the subject. One focus is on the skill-
premium. Acemoglu (1998) notes increasing skill supply as a reason for a change in the
job composition. The larger supply of more skilled workers since the 1970s facilitated tech-
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Table 2.1: Level and Volatility of Education-Specific Unemployment, U.S., 1977-2005
Total College
Equiv.
High School
Equiv.
Mean* 5.53% 3.11% 6.98%
Std./mean** 0.271 0.204 0.266
Std. of detrended data*** 0.90% 0.55% 1.12%
* Mean of annual unemployment rate in levels. ** Coefficient of variation. *** Standard deviation of HP(100)-detrended annual
unemployment rate. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract.
nological inventions favoring skills. Once such inventions come into production, skilled
workers have a better position in the labor market than unskilled workers. Capital-skill
complementarity is considered another possible explanation for the skill-premium evo-
lution in the three decades after 1960. Arguing that capital equipment is more comple-
mentary to skilled workers than unskilled workers, Krusell et al. (2000) relates the in-
creasing demand for skilled workers to increasing stock of capital equipment. Their study
shows that the variation of the skill-premium during these three decades can be decom-
posed into relative skill supply effect and capital-skill complementarity effect. Another
focus is on the variance of the unemployment rate. Based on a similar idea of Acemoglu
that the endogenous technology change is a response to the increasing skill supply, Gau-
tier (2002) and Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) emphasize the mismatch of skills and job
types or the “crowding-out” effect as the reason of the increasing unemployment rate of
unskilled workers. Supposing all workers can do simple jobs and only skilled workers
are able to perform complex jobs, when the skill supply increases, more skilled workers
enter the competition for simple jobs and unskilled workers are thus affected. Another
approach is chosen by Cuadras-Morató and Mateos-Planas (2006) who assume imperfect
skill-education correlation. Their model aims at examining both wage premium and un-
employment rates. They find that a substantial share of the increases in these two in the
U.S. between 1970 and 1990 can be explained by skill-biased technology shifts and labor
market frictions.
While the studies focusing on skill-premium assume a Walrasian labor market and flex-
ible labor supply, the latter two papers which analyze unemployment use the framework
of the stylized Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) search and matching model (Mortensen and
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Pissarides, 1994). In this popular model agents are risk neutral and technology of pro-
duction is unspecified. Partly for these reasons the MP model is very practical for the
homogeneous workers setup. However, if there are different skill levels in the labor force,
relying on the MP model neglects the link between skilled and unskilled workers in the
production process. Indeed, they are proven empirically as imperfect substitutes to each
other (Katz and Murphy, 1992, Card and Lemieux, 2001). Moreover, as the firms in such
economies are single-worker firms and all produce with the same technology, capital is
not considered and thus it is impossible to examine the effects of investment on wages
and unemployment.
These two aspects may play important roles in the relative skill supply and demand as
well as skill-specific unemployment, and thus a micro-founded propagation mechanism
is needed where the households’ choice for education investment and the firms’ problem
are endogenized and specified.
Aiming at both unemployment rates and skill-premium, this chapter provides such a
mechanism by using a multi-worker firm setup and a nested CES production function
with two types of labor as imperfect substitutes, while physical capital joins as comple-
ment to produce. Compared to Lindquist (2004) who uses a capital-skill complementarity
assumption to examine wage inequality over the cycle, I use a standard labor economic
setup. While his model bears the Walrasian property which implies a perfect labor market,
I include search frictions so that both unemployment and skill-premium can be studied
and wage rigidities can be captured by this model.
Focusing on the “between-group” differences, this chapter makes the same assumption
as Greiner, Rubart and Semmler (2004) which states that skilled and unskilled workers
search and match within the skilled and unskilled markets respectively. This simplifica-
tion is supported by empirical evidence: The proportion of college-educated workers in
“non-college” occupations has been small and is declining (Gottschalk and Hansen, 2003),
and so is the proportion of less educated workers in white-collar jobs. Until 2001, only 13.6
percent of all managerial/professional jobs were taken by non-college workers.
The approach taken in the current chapter is based on the stylized RBCM models (real
business cycle with matching). Early papers by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) aimed
at embedding labor market frictions in real business cycle models in order to improve
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the cyclical properties. The ability of such models is later questioned (Shimer, 2005, Hall,
2005b) on generating the observed cyclical volatility in key variables (such as job vacan-
cies, unemployment, market tightness and job finding probability) under common pa-
rameter values. Such critique is based on the assumption of low workers’ cost of work-
ing compared to their productivity, which leads to large match surplus and strong wage
movements upon productivity shocks. A variable wage dampens the hiring incentive and
eliminates the fluctuation in unemployment and vacancies in the model. Responding to
Shimer (2005) and Hall’s (2005a, 2005b) critiques, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) em-
ploy another calibration strategy where the nonmarket returns are high and firm surplus
is small. Consequently, firms react strongly in posting new vacancies upon a technol-
ogy shock and both vacancies and unemployment are more volatile. Though innova-
tive, their calibration strategy can not fundamentally solve the unemployment volatility
puzzle, since if the nonmarket returns are high, the response of unemployment to labor-
market policy (in particular unemployment insurance) is too large (Costain and Reiter,
2008). Further focus of the discussion on the effectiveness of the RBCM models is thus on
reconciling the trade-off between policy effects and cyclical volatilities. Various solutions
range from considering wage stickiness (Hall, 2005a), assuming match-specific productiv-
ity shock (Costain and Reiter, 2008), differentiating wage formation of new jobs and on-
going jobs (Pissarides, 2009), exploring the labor participation margin (Ebell, 2008), exam-
ining the role of payroll taxes and social insurance (Burda and Weder, 2010), to including
labor heterogeneity and nonlinearities in the production function (Hagedorn, Manovskii
and Stetsenko, 2008).
The last variation is also the perspective taken by the current chapter, whereas the main
differences are that Hagedorn et al. (2008) emphasize the complementarity between capi-
tal and skilled labor, whereas I focus on the importance of substitutability between skilled
and unskilled workers. Another minor difference is that I start with the assumption of
variable search intensity by the unemployed, and analyze its effect in the equilibrium.
Moreover, while in total the skilled and unskilled labor forces sum up to a fixed number,
the shares of the skill-specific labor forces can vary in the future study, which allows skill
transition through human capital investment and depreciation.
I study the separate effect of a skill-neutral and a skill-biased technology shock in the
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model so as to compare their respective effects. Another possible shock could be a supply
shock to skill, or a permanent structural change of the labor force. However, on the basis
of the recent finding of Balleer and van Rens (2009) that such a shock has little effect on the
impulse responses to technology shocks, I do not include the shock to supply of skill in this
chapter. Calibrated to U.S. data from 1977 to 2004, my model replicates certain stylized
facts: Wages are less volatile than labor productivity, and output is more persistent, while
a skill-biased shock generates results of better cyclical properties. This finding implies
the biasedness of the technology shocks in the last decades. Due to the time-consuming
matching process, productivity leads employment over the cycle. The model is able to
produce higher volatility of unskilled unemployment, as well as of unskilled vacancies.
Downward-sloping Beveridge curves result in each sub-market although the resulting
negativity is weaker than the data shows.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the model
and the equilibrium, while section 2.3 contains the calibration. Numerical results and
discussions can be found in section 2.4 whereas Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
In this section a decentralized equilibrium is derived. The large homogeneous households
are composed of skilled and unskilled workers, and each type searches for jobs in the
segmented skill-specific labor market i, where i = s denotes the skilled market and i = u
the unskilled market. There is no mismatch of skills and job types. Households own the
capital and rent it to the firms. Firms post vacancies to hire workers and produce with
capital, where skilled and unskilled workers substitute for each other imperfectly. The
structure of the model is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Structure of the Model
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θit is the market tightness, v
i
t denotes the vacancies in the respective markets and u
i
t−1
the unemployment stocks. As is shown in Figure 2.2, it’s in firms’ production that skilled
and unskilled labor interact with each other again. Firms produce with physical capital
kt−1, skilled labor nst−1 and unskilled labor n
u
t−1. Exogenous technology shocks occur to
the production process, one skill-neutral (via At) and the other skill-biased (via Bt).
Since the focus of this model is on the business cycle horizon, a balanced growth path is
assumed. The labor force structure, which is subject to long-run educational investment,
is assumed to be constant. Furthermore, the contemporary gain and loss of aggregate
skills of the households are assumed to be equal, and so is the portion of skilled labor.
2.2.1 Labor Market: Search and Matching
The labor market is composed of two separate sub-markets for skilled and unskilled work-
ers. Both sub-markets are characterized by the standard search and matching framework,
and i stands for (s, u). In the sub-labor market i aggregate stocks of unemployed skilled
workers uit−1 at search intensity s
i
t match with vacancies v
i
t for new jobs by a constant
return to scale matching function Mit = m
i (νit)$ (situit−1)1−$, where $ is the matching elas-
ticity and 0 < $ < 1. mi measures the efficiency of matching. Defining the respective labor
market tightness as θit =
νit
uit−1
, workers find jobs at rate pit =
Mit
situ
i
t−1
= mi
(
θit
)$ (sit)−$ , and
vacancies are filled at rate qit =
Mit
vit
= mi
(
θit
)$−1 (sit)1−$. Therefore, it holds that pitsit = θitqit.
Within the skilled and unskilled labor markets, respectively, a skilled worker earns
wage wi when employed, and searches for a job when unemployed. In the next period,
she can become unemployed because either her firm has exited the market with proba-
bility κ or she loses her previous job in the firm with probability χ˜i. Suppose there is no
correlation between these two sources of unemployment. Finally, workers lose their jobs
and become unemployed at the rate χi = κ + χ˜i − κχ˜i. The skill-specific unemployment
rates evolve as
u¯it = χ
i
(
1− u¯it−1
)
+
(
1− sit pit
)
u¯it−1.
2.2.2 Household
Assume there is a continuum of mass one of identical, infinitely-living households. Each
household consists of a large number of individuals who pool their income so as to be in-
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sured over consumption in each period. Supposing all members are able to provide labor,
a representative household has a portion ∆ of skilled labor force and 1− ∆ of unskilled
labor force.
Among the skilled members, nst−1 ones work and earn a high wage w
s
t , while the rest
∆− nst−1 are unemployed and receive value from non-market activities bs. Obviously the
contemporary unemployment rate of skilled workers is then 1− nst−1/∆. Similarly, among
the 1− ∆ unskilled labor force, nut−1 work and earn a corresponding wage wut , while the
rest 1− ∆− nut−1 are unemployed and generate value from non-market activities bu. The
unemployment rate of unskilled workers is then 1− nut−1/ (1− ∆). Households also own
the capital and rent it out to firms at a market rate rt.
The representative household chooses consumption ct, capital investment it, labor sup-
ply and search intensity for both types of labor in order to maximize the sum of the dis-
counted future utilities,
max
{ct,sst ,sut ,nst ,nut ,it}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt [H (ct)− G (nst−1, nut−1, sst ust−1, sut uut−1)] (2.1)
where ct is consumption, nst−1 and n
u
t−1 are skilled and unskilled labor supply respec-
tively, ust−1 and u
u
t−1 are unemployed stocks, s
s
t and s
u
t are search intensities, and β is the
common discount factor in the economy. H is an increasing and concave function and G
is convex so that their difference is concave in labor inputs:
H (ct) = ln ct,
G (nst−1, n
u
t−1, s
s
t u
s
t−1, s
u
t u
u
t−1) =
(
nst−1 + n
u
t−1 + s
s
tu
s
t−1 + s
u
t u
u
t−1
)1+ 1ψ
1+ 1ψ
.
The parameter ψ roughly measures the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Being unem-
ployed alone does not harm agents’ utility, but once the unemployed searches intensively,
it is similar to doing a job and thus causes disutility. Therefore the “effective” unemploy-
ment enters the utility function in the same way as working.
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The period-to-period budget constraint of the household is given as
wst n
s
t−1 + w
u
t n
u
t−1 + b
sust−1 + b
uuut−1 + rtkt−1 = ct + it. (2.2)
There is no government in this model. Instead of pecuniary unemployment compensa-
tion, the households receive bi (i = s, u), non-tradable productivities from activities such
as home production. The left-hand side is inflow to the households, including wages,
capital rental income and the value of being unemployed. Meanwhile, the households
consume and invest in physical capital. The assumption is that non-market production
(household production) could also contribute to consumption.
Other constraints are
capital evolution kt = (1− τ)kt−1 + it, (2.3)
skilled labor stock nst = (1− χs) nst−1 + pst sst ust−1, (2.4)
unskilled labor stock nut = (1− χu) nut−1 + put sut uut−1. (2.5)
τ in constraint (2.3) is the capital depreciation rate. Constraints (2.4) and (2.5) display the
intertemporal labor market transitions. While the existing job matches could be destroyed
at rate χi, the unemployed search for jobs at intensity si and would be employed with
probability pit. Note when deciding on the optimal search intensity, the household takes
the corresponding probability as given. The remained matches and newly formed jobs
make up the new labor employment stocks.
The representative household’s problem can be solved by setting up a Lagrangian,
where the solutions are characterized by the following Euler equations: The first is the
standard intertemporal condition to allocate physical capital investment optimally.
Hct = βEtHct+1 [rt+1 + (1− τ)] . (2.6)
The last two Euler equations reflect the households’ optimal searching decisions that
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equate the marginal cost of search to the expected payoff.
Gsit︸︷︷︸
disutility from
job search
= βpitu
i
t−1Et{ Gnit︸︷︷︸
disutility from
working
+ Hct+1
(
wit+1 − bi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from
net wage income
+
Gsit+1
pit+1u
i
t+1
(
1− χi − pit+1sit+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
avoided future
disutility in searching
}.
(2.7)
Take equation (2.7) for example: The left-hand side represents the current disutility caused by
searching, while the right-hand side shows the compound effect in the next period. With this
optimal search intensity the skilled part of the household experiences an increase in employment,
which leads to additional work in the next period and thus disutility from working, but also to
increased utility from net wage surplus and saved future search effort. The expected payoff is
conditioned on the job realization of the additional search effort, i.e., with probability pst .
The dynamic surpluses of current employment and unemployment are defined asΩE,it andΩ
U,i
t ,
and evolve as the following unique Bellman equations show:
ΩE,it = w
i
t + β˜tEt
[
χiΩU,it+1 +
(
1− χi
)
ΩE,it+1
]
whereas ΩU,i, the value of being unemployed is
ΩU,it = b
i + β˜tEt
[
pits
i
tΩ
E,i
t+1 +
(
1− pitsit
)
ΩU,it+1
]
.
β˜t is the household’s stochastic discount factor and is defined as
β˜t = β
EtHc(ct+1)
Hc(ct)
.
The unemployed worker receives value from non-market productivities bi. In unit time she
expects to move into employment with probability pit if she searches with intensity s
i
t.
Defining Ωit = Ω
E,i
t −ΩU,it as the expected gain from change of the employment state, I reach
the following recursive law of motion:
Ωit = w
i
t − bi +
(
1− χi − pitsit
)
β˜tEtΩit+1. (2.8)
This difference between the current values of being employed and being unemployed is the
surplus which the worker uses to bargain with the firm.
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2.2.3 Products and Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms on the unit interval. Firms are perfectly competitive and
have the following production function, where physical capital kt−1 and labor Lt−1 enter in a con-
stant return to scale Cobb-Douglas manner:
f (·) = yt = Aat k1−at−1 Lat−1.
Lt−1 is a CES aggregate of two types of labor, the skilled nst−1 and unskilled n
u
t−1, which are imper-
fect substitutes to each other and are augmented by a skill augmenting technology shock:
Lt−1 =
[
α
(
Btnst−1
) σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut−1) σ−1σ ] σσ−1 .
Note that labor employment here is regarded as a result of last period’s search and matching
and therefore counted as a state variable. Two shocks occur to the production process, one skill-
neutral (via At) and the other skill-biased (via Bt). Parameters α and 1− α measure the specific
productivity level of the skilled and unskilled workers whereas σ is the elasticity of substitution
between the two types of labor. This setup imposes a unit elasticity of substitution between capital
and each type of labor, and allows later in the calibration to use different values of the elasticity of
substitution between the skilled and unskilled labor.
In each period firms rent the capital from the households and pay the market rate. Meanwhile
firms open as many vacancies vit as necessary in order to hire in expectation the desired number of
workers for the next period, taking into account that the real cost to opening a vacancy is κi. Wages
for both skilled and unskilled workers are the outcome of wage bargaining. Firms maximize the
sum of discounted future profits by choosing physical capital and vacancies to be posted for skilled
and unskilled labor:
max
{vst},{vut },{kt}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β˜ttΠt,
where the firm makes profit Πt from selling their output yt at a price that is normalized to one,
less wages payment for both types of labor, the costs associated with new vacancies, as well as the
rents for capital. As mentioned above, β˜t is the stochastic discount factor. It is imposed on the
profit and capital utilization of the firm,
Πt = yit −∑
i
witn
i
t−1 −∑
i
κivit − rtkt−1.
This maximization problem is subject to:
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yt = Aat k
1−a
t−1
[
α
(
nst−1
) σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut−1) σ−1σ ] σaσ−1 , (2.9)
nit =
(
1− χi
)
nit−1 + q
i
tv
i
t, (2.10)
ln At = ρA ln At−1 + et, (2.11)
ln Bt = ρB ln Bt−1 +ωt. (2.12)
Equation (2.10) captures the employment evolution for skilled and unskilled labor. Equation
(2.11) and (2.12) show the autoregressive process for skill-neutral and skill-biased technology evo-
lutions and the exogenous shocks et ∼ i.i.d.
(
0, σ2e
)
and ωt ∼ i.i.d.
(
0, σ2ω
)
. Here I also assume
independence of the neutral and biased shocks in order to examine the separate effects of the two
shocks. Firms maximize their profits taking the wage curves as it would be given from bargaining.
Note that for wage realization it matters what the firm perceives the wage to depend on. Once
the firm takes into consideration that wage is based on the amount of labor and capital inputs, the
firm would make a different decision of vacancy posting and capital employment, and as a result
hire more workers and employ less capital.2 Since in reality we observe neither frequent wage re-
negotiations at any time nor evidences for firms’ overhiring, I stay with the assumption that firms
simply take wages as given from Nash bargaining.
Since capital is owned by the households, firms only have to decide on capital employment at
each period, which is the standard first order condition for the capital market:
∂yt
∂kt−1
= rt. (2.13)
The Euler equations concerning labor demand are:
κi
qit
= β˜tEt
{
∂yt+1
∂nit
− wit+1 +
(
1− χi
) κi
qit+1
}
. (2.14)
The cost of posting a vacancy would be compensated by discounted future profits conditioned
on the vacancy filling probability. Once the job match succeeds, the firm profits from the marginal
product of extra labor input net of the wage payment. Furthermore, if the match remains with
probability (1− χs), the firm also saves the future cost to post a new vacancy.
Regarding the individual wage bargaining, what concerns the firm is the contribution of an extra
2More details about this overhiring effect can be found in the appendix.
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worker to its value. The marginal value of a skilled/unskilled worker is
∂Vit
∂nit−1
=
∂yt
∂nit−1
− wit +
(
1− χi
) κi
qit
. (2.15)
These marginal values are also the surpluses the firm uses in the bargaining.
The timing in the short-run is as follows: The representative firm treats each worker as
a marginal worker and bargains with her for the wage; taking wages from bargaining, the house-
holds choose the search intensity, labor supply and capital investment, while firms choose the
number of vacancies so as to maximize their discounted sum of future utilities.
2.2.4 Wage Setting
In this subsection the bargaining process is explained in detail. The representative firm treats each
worker as a marginal worker and bargains with her for the wage. Nash bargaining is assumed
where firm and worker choose wage in order to maximize the (log) geometric average of their
dynamic surpluses from a successful job match, whereas employment is ex post chosen by the firm
to maximize profits given the bargained wage (also known as the “right to manage” bargaining
model). Free-entry condition on the product market drives firm’s outside option down to zero.
wit = arg max(1− η) ln(
∂Vit
∂nit−1
) + η lnΩit,
subject to the firm’s surplus (2.15) and the respective worker’s surplus (2.8). The parameter
η indicates the bargaining power of the worker, and 1 − η is the firm’s weight. Obviously, the
higher η is, the more power the worker has when negotiating. The firm knows the skill level of
the worker or can use the educational and experience background as proxy, thus always using the
right marginal contribution of the worker when bargaining.
The bargaining solutions take the following form:
wit = η
[
∂yt
∂nit−1
+
(
1− χi
) κi
qit
]
+ (1− η)
[
bi −
(
1− χi − pitsit
)
β˜tEtΩit+1
]
(2.16)
where the future surplus of workers being employed is still included and can be further refined.
Nonetheless, these intermediate wage equations can already help to refine the firm’s Euler equa-
tions. Differentiating equation (2.16) and substituting it into the firm’s Euler equation for labor
demand yields a more explicit form:
κi
β˜tqit−1
+ wit −
(
1− χi
) κi
qit
=
∂yt
∂nit−1
. (2.17)
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The left-hand side of equation (2.17) is the cost of the firm to employ an extra worker. Compared
to a perfectly competitive labor market where wage as the only labor cost equals the marginal
product of labor, in an imperfect labor market the firm also takes into consideration the posting
costs incurred and future posting costs saved.
As more skilled labor is hired its marginal product declines due to the law of diminishing
marginal returns, while the marginal product of unskilled worker increases, since skilled and un-
skilled labor enter the Cobb-Douglas-CES production function in a complementary manner. As
shown in equation (2.16), wages contain a fraction of the corresponding marginal products of la-
bor. Therefore the skilled wage decreases and unskilled wage increases with an extra unit of skilled
labor.
In order to find the final form of the solution, I still need to combine the optimality condition
and the bargaining result for wage. Plugging the semi-final wage equation (2.17) back into the
bargaining result and combining it with equation (2.8) I can solve for the value of employment,
Ωit =
η
1− η
κi
β˜tqit−1
. (2.18)
Take (2.18) one period ahead, and recall that in the labor market pits
i
t = θ
i
tq
i
t holds,
EtΩit+1 =
η
1− η
κi
β˜tqit
=
η
1− η
κiθit
β˜t pits
i
t
. (2.19)
Using this result with equation (2.16), I can obtain the final wage curves for skilled and unskilled
labor:
wit = η
[
∂yt
∂nit−1
+ θitκ
i
]
+ (1− η) bi. (2.20)
A fixed part of the wage comes from worker’s backup position, the value of non-market activi-
ties, and wages are more rigid than their counterparts in an RBC model. In the “flexible” part, only
a certain portion of the wage reflects the marginal product of labor, while the worker also shares
part of the rent generated from matching.
2.2.5 The Model Equilibrium
The model equilibrium consists of
• the representative households’ optimal intertemporal decisions (2.6) and (2.7)
• the firm’s capital choice (2.13) and labor demand (2.14)
• the wage curves (2.20)
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• as well as the characteristic equations from both labor markets.
The endogenous variables are
{ust , uut , vst , vut , wst , wut , sst , sut , pst , put , qst , qut , θst , θut , nst , nut , it, yt, ct, rt, kt}.
This complex system of nonlinear equations is solved by Dynare.
2.3 Calibration
As Merz (1995) proves, if search intensity were endogenized, the negative relationship between
vacancies and unemployment would be blurred. Therefore she fixes the search intensity and ex-
amines the effect. Following her procedure, I calibrate the model in two cases. In the first case, I
set γ, the weight of search activity in utility, equal to 1 and let si be endogenously determined. In
the second case, γ is set to zero. Not surprisingly, only if the search intensity is exogenously given
I can expect the model to replicate business cycle properties and downward-sloping Beveridge
curves.
2.3.1 Aggregate Economics
I use and target quarterly data from the U.S. economy between 1975 and 2003. The quarterly
depreciation rate for capital is set as 2.6 percent so that the long-run investment-output ratio in the
post-war era roughly equals to 0.25 (Francis and Ramey, 2005). The depreciation rate is about 10
percent annually. Based on this result, I can calculate the quarterly net rate of return on capital,
which is 3.6 percent, and consequently a, which is approximately 0.64. Note that due to the non-
Walrasian market structure wage is smaller than the marginal product of labor alone so that a is
not exactly the labor share. These macroeconomic variables and parameters are in line with the
calibration by Krueger and Perri (2006).
2.3.2 Labor Market
The first question is if I am allowed to treat the separation rate as a constant parameter. Hall (2005a)
estimates the separation rate for the past 50 years and finds it almost constant over the business
cycle. I use this result and calibrate χi targeting at a proper skill-specific unemployment rate.
Together with an effective monthly job finding rate 0.47 for skilled worker and a slightly lower rate
0.45 for the unskilled workers, I can pin down the search intensity. Note that the unemployment
rate used here is the expanded unemployment rate (Hall, 2005a), which is an alternative measure
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and larger than the official unemployment rate. Table 2.2 shows the reason for including people
in the expanded measure who are classified as out of the labor force but with high likelihood of
job-seeking. The table gives the transition matrix in the CPS among the three states of “not in labor
force”, “unemployed” and “working”.
Table 2.2: Transition from and into Unemployment
PPPPPPPPTo
From
Not in LF Unemployed Working
Not in LF 92.8 22.7 3.2
Unemployed 2.5 49.6 1.5
Working 4.7 27.6 95.4
Transaction matrix for the CPS, 1967-2004, percent per month, Shimer’s tabulations of raw data from the CPS, used by Hall (2005a).
Each month, 2.5 percent of the workers who were out of the labor force in the previous month
enter unemployment this month, while almost twice so many become employed directly. This
astonishing result shows that those out of the labor force do not enter labor force first as an unem-
ployed, but rather start seeking for a job during the time when they are classified as “out of the
labor force”. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, this group includes the discouraged
workers and marginally attached workers who have been included in the expanded unemploy-
ment rate U-6 from 1994 onwards.3 I use U-6 as a basis for the “expanded unemployment rates”.
The number of workers who are out of the labor force is massive, especially in the lower skilled
group. According to census data for the civilian noninstitutional population 25 to 64 years of
age, while the college graduates’ participation rate increased slowly but steadily from 82.3 per-
cent in 1970 to 88 percent in the middle 1980s and stood around this level until 2001, high school
dropouts’ participation rates were much lower during the same period, oscillating between 60− 63
percent. Consequently, the stock of out-of-labor-force workers who actually seek for jobs is espe-
cially large in the unskilled group. I take Hall’s approximation of the “expanded unemployment
rates” between 1977 and 2004 and use it as my calculation basis. Together with the ratios between
aggregate and education-specific unemployment rates, I can obtain 5 percent for the skilled and 9
percent for the unskilled as expanded education- or skill-specific unemployment rates.
Skilled and unskilled labor interact with each other in firm’s production, where they are imper-
fect substitutes. Parameter α represents their respective weight in the production and is closely
related to the value of worker’s bargaining power. All parameter values are reported in Table 2.3.
3Discouraged workers are those who want to work but believe no work is available for a variety of reasons.
Marginally attached workers are those who give reasons such as transportation or child-care responsibili-
ties. Both types choose to exclude themselves temporarily out of the labor force but have high likelihoods
of return to the labor force in the near future.
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Table 2.3: Calibration
Symbol Case 1* Case 2** Symbol Case 1* Case 2**
γ 1 0 l 0.31 0.35
α 0.5 0.5 ∆ 0.42 0.42
a 0.64 0.64 τ 0.014 0.026
δ 0.99 0.99 $ 0.7 0.7
η 0.14 0.14 σ 1.4 1.4
χs 0.10 0.10 χu 0.05 0.05
bs 0.55 0.5 bu 0.4 0.55
κs 0.1 0.1 κu 0.1 0.1
ψ −1.14 −1.25
* Endogenous search intensity, with γ = 1. ** Exogenous search intensity, with γ = 0.
2.4 Results and Discussion
Table 2.4: Correlation Coefficients for the U.S. Data and the Model
Correlation Endo s* Exog s_neu** Exog s_bias***
ρ(vs, us) 0.87 −0.33 −0.47
ρ(vs, uu) 0.86 0.58 0.54
ρ(vu, us) 0.84 0.05 0.22
ρ(vu, uu) 0.93 −0.18 −0.40
ρ(us, y) −0.74 −0.23 −0.04
ρ(uu, y) −0.57 −0.15 −0.10
ρ(θs, y) 0.90 0.96 0.92
ρ(θu, y) 0.62 0.97 0.96
* Endogenous search intensity with a skill-neutral shock. ** Exogenous search intensity with a skill-neutral shock. *** Exogenous
search intensity with a skill-biased shock. The benchmark is U.S. data (CPS, 1951-2003): ρ(v, u) = −0.894.
I summarize the results from the model simulation in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. In the case of
exogenous search intensity, a skill-neutral shock and a skill-biased shock are separately added,
while the result of endogenous search intensity case is only reported upon a skill-neutral shock.
Concerning the elasticity of substitution between two types of labor, Katz and Murphy (1992) find
it about 1.41 while Angrist (1995) uses Palestinian data and estimates this elasticity as 2. The
majority of empirical findings suggest that the elasticity of substitution between skills is between
1 and 2. I use different values (1.4, 1.7 and 2) to calibrate the elasticity of substitution. It turns out
that even though correlation statistics are rather robust, the volatilities of the model vary regarding
different elasticities (also captured in Figure 2.3, the impulse responses of relative labor input and
relative wage). Table 2.4 reports the correlation statistics for endogenous si and exogenous si with
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Table 2.5: Ratios between Standard Deviations of U.S. Data and the Model
Statistic Data Endo s Exog s_neu Exog s_bias
σc/σy 0.61 1.13 0.72 0.67
σi/σy 3.79 0.96 5.51 7.7
σws /σy 0.42∗ 1.01 0.51 0.49
σwu /σy 0.42∗ 0.82 0.46 0.43
σus /σy 6.1∗ 0.39 1.29 3.01
σuu /σy 6.1∗ 0.67 1.69 4.16
σvs /σy 7.31∗ 0.12 1.38 3.17
σvu /σy 7.31∗ 0.49 1.83 4.21
* Due to the lack of skill-specific data, values of aggregate variables, taken from Ebell (2006) and Merz (1996), are presented here.
σ = 1.4. The correlations are similar when σ takes the value of 1.7 or 2.
Firstly, the simulation results confirm those of Merz (1995); i.e., the model with endogenous
search intensities fails to generate stylized facts, while once si is fixed the model can replicate the
real economy in the aggregate level adequately well and generate negative Beveridge curves in
the respective sub-markets. Market tightness is always strongly procyclical while unemployment
is countercyclical (even though the countercyclicality is not very strong). When the scales of neg-
ativeness of the vacancy-unemployment ratio are compared, the skill-biased shock can generate
results closer to the benchmark ratio 0.8634. Skilled vacancies correlate positively to unskilled un-
employment and vice versa, which could be a result of the substitution effects between the skilled
and unskilled in production.
As is shown in Table 2.5, the model with exogenous si and biased shock can generate higher
volatilities in the labor markets which are observed from the data and are the main reason for
Shimer’s (2005) critique on the MP model. Wages are less volatile than output as a result of the
search frictions, and the volatility of wages matches the data better under a biased shock. Con-
cerning the skill-specific labor market, the result shows more volatility of unemployment on the
unskilled market whether the shock is skill-neutral or skill-biased. This confirms the observation
in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1. What’s more, the result of relative volatility here shows again that a
skill-biased shock leads to results that better mirror the data.
Interestingly, a skill-neutral technology shock does not have neutral effects on skilled and un-
skilled labors. Furthermore, even though relative skill supply increases after the shock, skill-
premium is increased, especially given a larger elasticity of substitution between the two types
of labor. Impulse responses of the relative wage deviation and relative labor input deviation to a
skill-neutral shock are shown in Figure 2.3.
4I have not found data for vacancy-unemployment ratio for different skill levels and therefore use this gen-
eral ratio as benchmark.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse responses of relative wage and labor deviation, where relative
wage deviation is the difference between the log-linearized skilled wage and unskilled wage (wˆs−
wˆu)5, and relative labor deviation is the difference between the log-linearized skilled and unskilled
labor input (nˆs − nˆu). A positive neutral shock induces demand for both skilled and unskilled
workers, while more vacancies are created for skilled labor at the first moment than for the un-
skilled due to the higher marginal productivity of skilled labor. By given search frictions the re-
sulting change of skilled labor input is higher than that of the unskilled. This relative surplus
peaks immediately after the shock and declines slowly within 6 quarters.
We know from the available literature on trend of skill-premium that a relative increase of skilled
labor reduces the skill-premium. This negative effect on wage also holds here. However, relative
surplus of skilled vacancies also leads to relative higher market tightness in the skilled market
(while unemployment stocks stay unchanged since last period). Wage equation 2.20 shows that
wage is a weighted average of marginal product of labor, value of non-market activities, and the
matching rent which includes the market tightness. Relative higher market tightness in the skilled
market thus casts a positive impact on the skill premium, which dominates the negative effect from
5Hats over variables mean deviations from steady state.
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relative skill supply and causes skill-premium to increase. This increase will be slowly adjusted
back since this relative factor price change induces firms to use unskilled labor to substitute the
skilled. Labor structure converges slowly back to the initial level.
Note that this dominating result becomes especially strong when σ increases. Therefore in
booms, when skilled workers become relatively more expensive, unskilled labor substitutes the
skilled to a higher degree given a larger σ, while during recessions, relatively cheaper skilled la-
bor would be hired to substitute unskilled labor given a larger σ. As a result, the volatility of the
unskilled unemployment increases with the elasticity of substitution.
In the case of a skill-biased shock, the biased nature of the technology shock contributes to addi-
tional positiveness to the relative marginal product of labor and thus the wage premium increases
as well. Following the same argument on volatility of unemployment above, we can conclude that
unskilled workers are more sensitive than the skilled to a skill-neutral business cycle shock. This
higher volatility in the unskilled market also corresponds to the observation that the duration of
lower-paid unskilled jobs is notably shorter than that of skilled jobs and thus more new unskilled
vacancies are opened. While unskilled jobs are technically less demanding, skilled jobs require
more job-specific human capital, providing an incentive for employers to keep skilled workers for
a longer period of time.
2.5 Conclusion
The key idea of this chapter is to examine the effect of substitutability between skilled and un-
skilled workers on skill-specific unemployment rates over the business cycle. I use a stylized
business cycle model with search frictions, and set up a decentralized economy with risk-averse
agents. The large households include two types of labor, which is convenient for future research
if I would like to include the household’s investment in education in order to endogenize the skill
structure of the total labor force. Firms produce with two types of labor substituting each other
which creates an additional channel between the (un)employment of differently skilled workers.
In the equilibrium, households and firms meet in two skill-specific labor markets, where search
and matching occur and wages are determined.
As a general labor augmenting neutral shock occurs, my model is able to capture certain busi-
ness cycle properties: Rigid wages and volatile unemployment rates and vacancies. However, a
skill-biased shock can generate even better results than a skill-neutral shock when the model is
calibrated to U.S. data, which offers some evidence of the skill-biased nature of the technology
shock in the past decades. My simulation also generates downward-sloping Beveridge curves
between vacancies and unemployment in their respective sub-markets. I examine the elasticity
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of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers and find that unemployed are more sensi-
tive to business cycle shocks once σ is larger because of firm’s decision on vacancies and layoffs.
While some cyclical properties of the model are weaker compared to the data (such as the weak
countercyclicality of unemployment), one future area of work would be to employ capital-skill
complementarity which allows for different degree of substitution between capital equipment and
both types of labor. Another future task would be to endogenize the household’s investment in
education and add labor supply shocks to the model.
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3 Human Capital Formation in Skill-Specific
Labor Markets
3.1 Introduction
The cyclicality of aggregate labor market variables and the related performance of Mortensen-
Pissarides (MP) type search and matching models came into heavy debate in recent years. Early
papers by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) aimed at embedding labor market frictions in real
business cycle models in order to improve the cyclical properties. Shimer’s (2005) seminal paper
points out, that a standard MP model generates relatively low volatility of unemployment and
vacancies compared to post-war U.S. data. Many research efforts afterwards focus mainly on how
to fix this problem. Among others, Hall (2005a) and Costain and Reiter (2008) propose setting
wages sticky as a modification, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) focus more on the calibration
strategy and suggest a combination of low bargaining power and high home production value
as the possible numerical solution, while Ebell (2008) emphasizes the participation margin and
inelastic labor force participation to improve the model results.
Observing that wages in new matches are more volatile than the ongoing jobs, Pissarides (2009)
examines a setup where the Nash sharing rule only holds in new jobs. While keeping the wage
elasticities, he proposes to add a fixed component to the matching cost. Such modification can de-
liver more volatility in the job finding rate, unemployment and vacancies. Other efforts to provide
an adequate explanation for observed volatility in labor-market aggregates include supplementing
the model with payroll taxes and social insurance (Burda and Weder, 2010), resurrecting Calvo’s
(1983) staggered multiperiod price setting model (Gertler and Trigari, 2009), incorporating sepa-
ration rate shocks and adjusting the value of the elasticity of the matching function (Mortensen
and Nagypál, 2007), and modeling a strategic wage bargaining process where the relative costs of
delays to the bargaining parties are taken into account (Hall and Milgrom, 2008).
The current chapter goes beyond the dynamics in aggregate labor market by exploring the rela-
tionship between skilled and unskilled labor market variables. There are two channels connecting
them, one on the labor demand and the other on the labor supply side. Similar to my Chapter Two
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and Hagedorn, Manovskii and Stetsenko (2008), demand for skilled and unskilled labor is incor-
porated in the production function with heterogeneous labor inputs1. Hagedorn et al. (2008) argue
that the reasons for high volatility differ in skilled and unskilled unemployment. While unskilled
workers experience volatility because of the small difference between their productivity and home
production value, skilled workers are subject to high volatility due to capital investment shocks
and the consequent changes in their productivity. They do not allow endogenous skill transition
between the two markets, shutting down one important mobility channel between the skilled and
unskilled labor force. If one aims to study the important variance of unemployment caused by the
inter-market movement, it is necessary to allow for human capital investment and skill acquisition.
This is not only highly relevant for current labor market policies, but can also help investigate ag-
gregate unemployment from more specific angles, namely the short- and long-run effects bolstered
by changes in skilled and unskilled unemployment separately.
Skilled and unskilled workers are subject to different costs over the business cycle. Krusell and
Smith (1999), Mukoyama and Sahin (2006) report on considerable heterogeneity in the welfare
cost of cycles among agents with different levels of wealth. The differences result from the higher
unemployment risk among the unskilled and their lower ability to self-insure due to less wealth.
Because this normative study aims at evaluating the welfare cost of business cycles on skill-specific
workers, unemployment is modelled for simplicity as an exogenous random process and so is the
flow between workers’ skill status.
In the long-run, the relative unemployment rate of the unskilled increases, which, according to
many, results from a demand shift toward skilled labor. This relative demand shift, however, is
not adequate to explain unemployment and wage dynamics in Europe and the U.S. in the 1970s-
1980s. It explains only a modest but significant part of the large rise in unemployment in some
European countries. Germany presents a good example of the European training system; i.e., a
strong emphasis in the schooling system and a comprehensive vocational training system. The
portion of labor force with middle-level qualification is far higher in German than in the U.S.,
which forms a more flexible basis for the upcoming biased technology change and demand shift.
This flexibility enables endogenous skill upgrade much more easily and thus even given the wage
compression, there was much a smaller unskilled unemployment rate (Acemoglu and Pischke,
1999, Pischke, 2001). Pischke’s (2001) study also reveals that most workplace training seems to be
general and free for the workers to participate.
Training for the unemployed is prevalent in many industrialized countries and is embedded in
the framework of active labor market (ALM) policies. Different types of trainings vary in the tim-
1One difference is that Hagedorn et al. (2008) emphasizes the capital-skill complementarity while I take
the perspective of a conventional CES-nested Cobb-Douglas function where the elasticity of substitution
between capital and unskilled labor is equal to that between capital and skilled labor.
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ing of the effects. A recent meta-analysis by Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) evaluating ALM poli-
cies finds that job search assistance programs have relatively favorable short-run impacts, whereas
classroom and on-the-job training programs tend to show better outcomes in the medium-run than
the short-run. Across the countries, short-term program impacts appear to be relatively unfavor-
able in the German-speaking countries, but relatively favorable in the English-speaking countries.
In the medium term the differences across country groups are smaller, and in the long term the
relative position of the German-speaking and English-speaking countries is reversed. Moreover,
subsidized public sector employment programs have the least favorable impact estimates - a find-
ing that confirms earlier studies from Heckman et al. (1999), Boone and Van Ours (2004) and
Kluve(2006).
In all, training is key to human capital flows between the skill-specific labor forces by affecting
the skilled and unskilled labor market structure. Several papers contribute to exploring the cyclical
behavior of skill acquisition. DeJong and Ingram (2001) model training time as the representative
households’ endogenous decision so as to boost subsequent labor productivity. As aggregate data
other than training is used to estimate the parameters of the model, the simulation results suggest
skill acquisition activities to be distinctly countercyclical. Perli and Sakellaris (1998) introduce
human capital into RBC type models to improve the model’s ability to produce persistent output.
It is due to the human capital accumulation process that labor input continues to increase after a
positive technology shock, resulting in persistent output growth. A similar smoothing effect can be
achieved by assuming labor adjustment costs in order to propagate shocks over time (Sepulveda,
2004). Krebs (2003a, 2003b) developed an incomplete asset market model to examine uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor income risk on capital investment decisions, growth and welfare.
More recent attempts explore the role of human capital formation and skill difference in explain-
ing labor market institution and unemployment. While in previous human capital related studies
unemployment is mostly assumed voluntary, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007a, 2007b, 2008) com-
pare the impact of unemployment insurance and employment protection on unemployment and
duration in different model setups. However, no endogenous decisions are made by the workers
on their own skill accumulation. Observing ALM policies gaining popularity in Europe and the
U.S. (starting from the 1980s in Scandinavian countries), one may inquire their possible effects on
unemployment given workers’ decision in attending training programs. Admittedly, data shows
that unemployed workers are engaged much too little in skill trainings and hence suffer from se-
vere loss of their net human capital. This can raise questions on the effectiveness of existing ALM
policies but does not rule out the potentials of optimal policies. The key point, in fact, is how to de-
sign good training programs, communicate the message to the unemployed workers and motivate
them to take part.
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A broader way to set up the problem is to allow for different degrees of human capital depre-
ciation and examine workers’ corresponding decision in human capital investment. Even if there
may be little change in total labor force, the aggregation of single workers’ choice in human cap-
ital investment would change the shares of skilled and unskilled labor forces, and subsequently
their market tightness. This is exactly the idea of the current chapter: Households’ endogenous
decisions regarding skill accumulation are implemented though general training and learning-
by-doing, and the volume of skill-specific labor force and the respective market tightness vary
correspondingly.
The theoretical model shares similarity with Krebs (2003a, 2003b) in the sense that households
own and invest in two types of capital, namely physical and human capital, and human capital is
subject to idiosyncratic shocks. As in Krebs (2003a, 2003b), households’ labor supply is regarded
in the same manner as human capital, consequently the quantity and quality of labor can not
be disentangled. In the current chapter these two concepts are separated into labor supply (as
quantity) and skill share (as quality of labor).
My results confirm the effect of relative price and skill substitution on aggregate unemploy-
ment. Model simulation shows that aggregate unemployment is countercyclical. Given a positive
human capital shock, firstly the unskilled unemployment declines, and then due to skill substi-
tution skilled unemployment decreases dominantly. Total vacancies also experience a two-stage
response toward the shock, which sink firstly due to the dominant deduction of the unskilled va-
cancies, and recover shortly afterward because of the strong skilled vacancy creation and unskilled
vacancy recovery. Further parameter variation shows that the elasticity of substitution plays an im-
portant role in the model dynamics. When skilled and unskilled workers are more likely to replace
each other, the impulse responses upon the shock are enhanced and subsequently the volatilities
of the variables increase. Unemployment-vacancy correlation also increases in absolute value and
approaches the correlation in U.S. data.
In both skilled and unskilled labor markets, technology shocks induce changes similar to that in
a single type labor model. Vacancies respond more strongly to the positive productivity shock than
unemployment, and consequently market tightness and job-finding rates increase. The immedi-
ate positive impact response of unemployment is quickly reversed so that on average both skilled
and unskilled unemployment remain countercyclical. Comparatively, skilled vacancies and unem-
ployment react more intensively than their unskilled counterparts, suggesting higher sensitivity in
the skilled labor market to a technology shock. Directly after the shock, human capital investment
reacts positively, just as physical capital investment. Physical capital builds up gradually as a re-
sult of increasing output, which is consistent with the result in standard RBC models. The initial
response of human capital, represented by the share of skilled population, is also positive but at a
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much smaller scale.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the theoretical model and
equilibrium; Section 3.3 specifies the calibration strategy; Section 3.4 carries out the simulation and
impulse response analysis; Section 3.5 discusses related policy implication on ALM policies and
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
In this section a decentralized equilibrium is derived. Households are ex ante homogeneous until
the idiosyncratic human capital shock occurs. The large household assumption applies and each
household is composed of skilled and unskilled members, with each type searching for jobs in the
segmented skill-specific labor market i (i = s denotes the skilled market and i = u the unskilled
market). Through skill depreciation and households’ investment in human capital, relative skill
share changes. There is no mismatch of skills and job types. Households own the capital and rent
it to the firms. Firms post vacancies to hire workers and produce with capital, where skilled and
unskilled workers substitute each other imperfectly. The structure of the model is shown in Figure
3.1.
Figure 3.1: Structure of the Model
θit is skill-specific market tightness, v
i
t denotes vacancies in the respective markets and u
i
t the
unemployment stocks. As shown in Figure 3.1, it’s in firms’ production that skilled and unskilled
workers interact with each other again. Firms produce with physical capital kt−1, skilled labor
nst−1 and unskilled labor n
u
t−1. Exogenous technology shocks occur to the production process.
More details of this CES nested Cobb-Douglas production function will be discussed in subsection
3.2.3.
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3.2.1 Search and Matching in the Labor Markets
Skilled and unskilled workers look for jobs in separate labor markets. Firms can observe the exact
skill level of the worker and workers only look for vacancies within their own skill level. Therefore
there is no mismatch of skills and job types. Both skilled and unskilled labor markets follow the
standard search and matching structure. With i = s, u, vacancies vit and stock of unemployed
workers uit jointly form new job matches through a constant return to scale matching function
m
(
uit, v
i
t
)
= mi
(
uit
)1−$ (vit)$. mi is the scaling parameter in the matching functions and can be
interpreted as the efficiency of matching. $ is the matching elasticity. Labor market tightness is
defined as
θit =
vit
uit
, (3.1)
the probabilities that firms meet proper unemployed workers are
qit = m
i
(
θit
)$−1
, (3.2)
while the unemployed meet proper vacancies at rates
pit = m
i
(
θit
)$
. (3.3)
Within the skilled and unskilled labor markets, respectively, an employed worker can become
unemployed in the next period because either her firm has exited the market with probability κ or
she loses her current job in the firm with probability χ˜i. Suppose there is no correlation between
these two sources of unemployment. Thus, workers lose their jobs and become unemployed at the
rate χi = κ + χ˜i −κχ˜i.
3.2.2 Households
A large household is composed of skilled and unskilled members. When the total household is
normalized as 1, the share of skilled population is ∆t−1, and 1−∆t−1 is the unskilled. The structure
of the labor force can change over time through natural skill depreciation and skill upgrading from
training. Both skilled and unskilled workers can have three statuses: Working, being unemployed
(but search for jobs) and enjoying leisure. The time constraints are summarized in the following
equations:
∆t−1 = nst−1 + u
s
t + l
s
t , (3.4)
1− ∆t−1 = nut−1 + uut + lut (3.5)
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where nit−1 is labor supply, u
i
t denotes unemployment and l
i
t−1 stands for leisure for type ‘i’ house-
hold members.
Under such an assumption, there is a natural limit of human capital investment, and accord-
ingly, a genuine difference to Krebs (2003a, 2003b). In Krebs’ setup, households have a portfolio of
risk-free physical capital and risky human capital investment. When the uninsurable idiosyncratic
labor income risk declines, households (in the steady state) are induced to possess more human
capital and less physical capital. As a result, the return on human capital decreases and that on
physical capital rises. The total investment interest, however, increases as the expected return on
risky human capital investment exceeds the return on the risk-free physical capital investment. In
comparison, in the current model labor is a hybrid of conventional labor form and human capital,
in the sense that labor complements capital but due to the comparatively small amount, “human
capital premium” is even more substantial. Still the quantity and quality of labor can be taken
apart, with labor supply representing the former, and skill share embodying the latter.
The representative household chooses consumption, human capital investment, labor supplies
and search intensity for both types of labor, in order to maximize the sum of the discounted future
utilities,
max
{ct ,lst ,lut ,∆t}
Et
∞
∑
t=0
βt [H (ct) + G (lst , l
u
t )] (3.6)
where ct is consumption, lst and l
u
t are skilled and unskilled leisure respectively, and β is the
common discounting factor in the economy. Both H and G are increasing and concave functions:
H (ct) = ln ct,
G (lst , l
u
t ) = ς
s (l
s
t )
1+ 1
ψs
1+ 1ψs
+ ςu
(lst )
1+ 1
ψu
1+ 1ψu
.
Parameters ψs and ψu are rough measures of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. ςs and ςu repre-
sent weights of utility gained from leisure. The period-to-period budget constraint is given as
wst n
s
t + w
u
t n
u
t = ct + xt. (3.7)
The left-hand side is households’ income, including wages of both labor types. Meanwhile,
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households consume ct and invest in human capital xt. Other constraints are:
skill evolution ∆t = (1− δ+ ξt)∆t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
skill depreciation
+ xt︸︷︷︸
general upskill training
+ F
(
nst−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
learning by doing
, (3.8)
skilled labor transition nst = (1− χs) nst−1 + pst ust , (3.9)
unskilled labor transition nut = (1− χu) nut−1 + put uut . (3.10)
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) summarize the intertemporal transitions in skilled and unskilled labor
markets separately. Equation (3.8) captures how human capital evolves. Skill loss happens to the
skilled population at a constant rate δ. ξt is the shift in human capital level. The current share of
skilled population, which can be interpreted as the human capital level of the household, stems
from the undepreciated previous skilled share, human capital investment xt and new human cap-
ital formation from skilled labor activities. Note that the difference between xt and F
(
nst−1
)
is that
the former investment is valid for the whole population, while the latter, “learning by doing”, is
assumed to be particular for the skilled worker and differentiates them from the unskilled. This
is also found in Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles (2009)2. xt induces new skills gained from on-
the-job training and compulsory training for the unemployed, and hence lumping together specific
human capital (on-the-job training) and general human capital (from unemployment training as
part of the active labor market policy). Similarly, although F
(
nst−1
)
depicts the skill accumulation
on the job, the skill gained can also be both general and specific. This assumption is theoretically
and empirically justified. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) argue that wage compression due to mar-
ket imperfection provides firms the incentive to invest in general human capital. Pischke (2001)
finds no evidence in SOEP data on how firm-specific the trainings are in Germany, while Loewen-
stein and Spletzer (1999) find surprising information from U.S. data (NLSY) that a large part of
training paid by the employers are general.
As Burdett et al. (2009) argue, learning-by-doing is relevant to the wage distribution in equilib-
rium. Similar to DeJong and Ingram (2001), I assume that F
(
nst−1
)
= µ
(
nst−1
)ϑ. The parameter ϑ
can be either greater or smaller than 1, implying convexity or concavity of F (·) respectively. ξt can
be interpreted as either a change in the population or a household-specific shift in human capital
stock à la Krebs (2003a, 2003b). A positive shift could be improvement of agent’s health condition
or having a good teacher in the training course, helping human capital stock formation so that the
2Using a non-competitive labor market model with search frictions, Burdett et al. (2009) study the impact
of human capital accumulation on equilibrium market outcomes. Their model emphasizes the impor-
tance of experience, and reveals that learning-by-doing increases equilibrium wage dispersion. Moreover,
their numerical simulation shows that the equilibrium sorting implied by their model, namely more ex-
perienced workers also tend to find and quit to better paid jobs, may more than double the impact of
learning-by-doing on measured wage inequality.
42
3.2 The Model
household has a better chance to be upgraded to a higher-skilled job market in next period. In
contrast, a negative shift, such as a sudden loss of firm-specific human capital due to job termina-
tion, can downgrade the household to a less-skilled job market. Following Krebs (2003a, 2003b), I
assume that ξt follows an AR(1) process:
ξt = ρξξt−1 + et (3.11)
where the unpredictable residual et is i.i.d. distributed across households and across time. The
coefficient ρξ can be understood as the persistence of the human capital shock. One can find
the counterpart of this idiosyncratic income shock in the micro studies on labor income, and the
setup here mirrors the permanent income shock, in the sense that agents can effectively self-insure
against transitory shocks through borrowing or their own savings, and the welfare effects of such
shocks are quite small (Heaton and Lucas, 1996, Levine and Zame, 2002), while permanent income
variances are hardly insurable (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004).
Under this assumption human capital shocks can accumulate to a permanent labor income
shock. Because equation (3.8) is the core to the structure of the labor market, how human cap-
ital exactly evolves, affects not only the steady state value but also the second moments. More
detailed discussion on this issue can be found in section 3.4.2.
The first Euler equation resembles the standard intertemporal condition to allocate human cap-
ital investment optimally
1
ct
= βEt
[
(1− δ+ ξt+1) 1ct+1 + ς
s (lst+1)− 1ψs − ςu (lut+1)− 1ψu ] . (3.12)
The utility forgone today for human capital investment is compensated by the additional human
capital gain minus the difference between future utility in skilled leisure and unskilled leisure,
since a few unskilled workers have been upskilled into the skilled labor share.
The Euler equations for skilled and unskilled labor participation are:
ςu (lut )
− 1
ψu
1
put
= βEt
{
wut+1
ct+1
+ ςu
(
lut+1
)− 1
ψu
1− χu − put+1
put+1
}
, (3.13)
ςs (lst )
− 1
ψs
1
pst
= βEt
{[
µϑ (nst)
ϑ−1 + wst+1
] 1
ct+1
+ ςs
(
lst+1
)− 1
ψs
1− χs − pst+1
pst+1
}
. (3.14)
Current leisure forgone for the worker imposes a compound effect in the next period, where
the expected payoff is conditioned on the job realization of the additional search effort; i.e., with
probability pst . With this optimal labor participation the corresponding part of the household ex-
periences an increase in employment and thus sacrificing leisure but gaining extra wage income.
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The last part of the marginal benefit of employment is the saved search cost once the match sur-
vives. What’s special of skilled workers is that through “learning by doing”, they can accumulate
and utilize new human capital in the next period. The wage gain therefore reflects this late skill
accumulation.
The values of current employment and unemployment are defined as ΩE,it and Ω
U,i
t , and evolve
as the following Bellman equations show
ΩE,it = w
i
t + β˜tEt
[
χiΩU,it+1 +
(
1− χi
)
ΩE,it+1
]
,
whereas ΩU,i, the value of being unemployed is
ΩU,it = b
i + β˜tEt
[
pitΩ
E,i
t+1 +
(
1− pit
)
ΩU,it+1
]
.
Though there is no direct pecuniary unemployment compensation, unemployed workers can carry
out more home production bi, such as gardening work or cooking, which de facto creates value to
be unemployed and relaxes households’ budget constraint. β˜t is household’s stochastic discount
factor and is defined as
β˜t = β
EtHc(ct)
Hc(ct)
.
Defining Ωit = Ω
E,i
t −ΩU,it as the expected gain from change in the employment state, we reach
the following recursive law of motion
Ωit = w
i
t − bi +
(
1− χi − pit
)
β˜tEtΩit+1 (3.15)
With this surplus, worker i will enter the wage bargaining with the firm.
3.2.3 Products and Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms on the unit interval. Firms are perfectly competitive and
produce with physical capital, skilled and unskilled labor. All factors enter production in a CES-
nested Cobb-Douglas manner:
f (·) = yt = exp (zt) k1−at−1
[
α
(
nst−1
) σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut−1) σ−1σ ] aσσ−1 ,
nst−1 and n
u
t−1 are imperfect substitutes to each other and are augmented by a technology shock zt.
Within the compound labor input, parameters α and 1 − α measure the specific productivity
level of the skilled and unskilled workers whereas σ is the elasticity of substitution between the
two types of labor, and a is the output elasticity of labor.
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In each period firms open as many vacancies vit as necessary in order to hire in expectation the
desired number of workers for the next period, taking into account that the real cost to opening a
vacancy is κi. Wages for both skilled and unskilled workers are the outcome of wage bargaining.
Firms own capital and maximize the sum of discounted future profits by choosing optimal capital
investment and vacancy posts for skilled and unskilled labor:
max
{vst},{vut },{kt}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β˜ttΠt
where the firm makes profit Πt from selling their output yt at a price that is normalized to one,
less new capital investment and wage payment for both types of workers, as well as the costs
associated with new vacancies. As mentioned above, β˜t is the stochastic discount factor. It is
imposed on the profit and capital utilization of the firm.
Πt = yit − it −∑
i
witn
i
t−1 −∑
i
κivit.
This maximization problem is subject to:
yt = exp (zt) k1−at−1
[
α
(
nst−1
) σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut−1) σ−1σ ] aσσ−1 , (3.16)
kt = (1− τ) kt−1 + it, (3.17)
nit =
(
1− χi
)
nit−1 + q
i
tv
i
t, (3.18)
zt = ρzt−1 + et. (3.19)
Capital stock evolution follows (3.17) where τ is the capital depreciation rate. Employment for
skilled and unskilled labor develops as shown in equation (3.18), and the technology evolution is
summarized by equation (3.19). The exogenous shock to technology is et ∼ i.i.d.
(
0, σ2e
)
. Firms
maximize their profits taking the wage curves as it is given from wage bargaining.
The Euler equation for capital investment is
1 = β˜t
[
(1− a) yt+1
kt
+ (1− τ)
]
. (3.20)
The ones concerning labor demand are:
κi
qit
= β˜tEt
{
∂yt+1
∂nit
− wit+1 +
(
1− χi
) κi
qit+1
}
. (3.21)
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The cost of posting a vacancy would be compensated by discounted future profits conditioned on
the vacancy filling probability. Once the job match succeeds, the firm profits from the marginal
product of extra labor input net of the wage payment; furthermore, if the match remains with
probability (1− χs), the firm also saves the future cost to post a new vacancy.
Regarding the individual wage bargaining, what concerns the firm is the contribution of an
extra worker to its value. For a vacancy of total value Vit , the marginal value of a skilled/unskilled
worker is
∂Vit
∂nit−1
=
∂yt
∂nit−1
− wit +
(
1− χi
) κi
qit
. (3.22)
These marginal values are also the surpluses the firm uses in the bargaining.
3.2.4 Wage Setting
In this subsection the bargaining process is explained in detail. The representative firm treats each
worker as a marginal worker and bargains with her for the wage. Nash bargaining is assumed
where firm and worker choose wage together in order to maximize the (log) geometric average
of their surpluses from a successful job match, whereas employment is ex post chosen by the firm
to maximize profits given the bargained wage (also known as the “right to manage” bargaining
model). Free-entry condition on the product market drives the firm’s outside option down to zero.
wit = arg max (1− η) ln(
∂Vit
∂nit−1
) + η lnΩit,
subject to the firm’s surplus (3.22) and the respective worker’s surplus (3.15). The parameter
η indicates the bargaining power of the worker, and 1− η is the firm’s weight. The firm knows
the skill level of the worker or can use the educational and experience background as proxy, thus
always using the right marginal contribution of the very worker when bargaining.
The bargaining solutions take the following form:
wit = η
(
∂yt
∂nit−1
+
(
1− χi
) κi
qit
)
+ (1− η)
[
bi −
(
1− χi − pit
)
β˜tEtΩit+1
]
(3.23)
where the future surplus of workers being employed is still included and can be further simpli-
fied. Nonetheless, these intermediate wage equations can already help to refine the firm’s Euler
equations. Differentiating equation (3.23) and substituting it into the firm’s Euler equation for
labor demand help express the marginal product of labor more explicitly:
κi
β˜tqit−1
+ wit −
(
1− χi
) κi
qit
=
∂yt
∂nit−1
. (3.24)
46
3.2 The Model
The left-hand side of equation (3.24) is the cost of the firm to employ an extra worker. Compared
to a perfectly competitive labor market where wage as the only labor cost equals the marginal
product of labor in an imperfect labor market the firm also takes into consideration the posting
costs incurred and future posting costs saved.
As more skilled labor is hired its marginal product declines due to the law of diminishing
marginal returns, while the marginal product of unskilled worker increases, since skilled and un-
skilled labor enter the CES production function in a complementary manner. As shown in equa-
tion (3.23), wages contain a fraction of the corresponding marginal products of labor. Therefore
the skilled wage decreases and unskilled wage increases with an extra unit of skilled labor.
In order to find the final form of the solution, we still need to combine the optimality condition
and the bargaining result for the wage. Plugging the semi-final wage equation (3.24) back into the
bargaining result and combining it with equation (3.15) we can solve for the value of employment,
Ωit =
η
1− η
κi
β˜tqit−1
. (3.25)
Take (3.25) one period ahead, and recall that in the labor market pit = θ
i
tq
i
t holds,
EtΩit+1 =
η
1− η
κi
β˜tqit
=
η
1− η
κiθit
β˜t pit
. (3.26)
Using this result with equation (3.23), we can attain the final wage curves for skilled and un-
skilled labor:
wit = η
(
∂yt
∂nit−1
+ κi
pit
qit
)
+ (1− η) bi. (3.27)
These two wage curves enter the model equilibrium, which is defined as sequences of prices
and labor market tightness which solve the firm’s, the household’s and the bargaining problems
and clear the capital and labor markets. Other equilibrium equations include households’ Euler
equations (equations (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14)), human capital evolution ((3.8) and (3.11)), labor
transition equations ((3.9) and (3.10)), time constraint ((3.4) and (3.5)), labor market transitions
((3.1)-(3.3)), firms’ Euler equations ((3.20) and (3.21)), production function (3.16), capital evolution
(3.17) and technology evolution (3.19), as well as the aggregate budget constraint:
yt = ct + kt − (1− τ) kt−1 + xt + κsvst + κuvut . (3.28)
The equilibrium is a system of 24 equations in 24 unknowns (∆t; xt; nst ; n
u
t ; l
s
t ; l
u
t ; u
s
t ; u
u
t ; v
s
t ; v
u
t ;
θst ; θ
u
t ; q
s
t ; q
u
t ; p
s
t ; p
u
t ; w
s
t ; w
u
t ; yt; ct; kt; it; zt; ξt). With the help of Dynare, this non-linear system can
be simulated around given steady state values, which will be the task of the next section.
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3.3 Calibration
I choose the model period to be one quarter, and as a robustness test I also use monthly data to
calibrate and then aggregate the results to a quarterly frequency. The results are not exactly the
same due to the specific persistence of technology shocks at different time frequencies and minor
changes in steady state values. In order to keep the results comparable to available data and avoid
the possible imprecision from time aggregation, the simulation results at quarterly frequency are
reported.
The parameters related to the aggregate economy are set to match post-war quarterly U.S. data,
except some alterations due to the model structure. Exploiting the steady state equation of (3.20),
the discount factor β is chosen to match an annual risk free rate of 4 percent. Francis and Ramey
(2005) report that the investment share of income in the post-war data, iy , is 0.25. To match this and
a labor share of 70 percent3, the quarterly physical capital depreciation rate is about 4 percent (15
percent annually).
According to the 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS), the labor hours performed by workers
with 12 years of education or less had fallen to less than 45 percent. I correspondingly use it as
the steady state value of ∆. The weight of non-participation or leisure is set as 0.6 for all workers,
as main time use data shows that on average people spend more than 60 percent of their time for
leisure and home production, and this ratio even increased in the last decades (Aguiar and Hurst,
2007). The technology parameter in production function α is set as 0.5 for neutrality4.
The parameterization of labor market variables follows Ebell (2008), even though her model is
calibrated to a weekly frequency. As Shimer (2005) has estimated an average monthly separation
rate as 0.026, I choose 0.07 and 0.09 for skilled and unskilled workers respectively, which leads to
the monthly χs and χu to be 0.024 and 0.031 separately. Targeting a skilled unemployment rate of
0.07 and unskilled unemployment rate of 0.1, I set the job finding rates (ps and pu) as 0.875 and
0.833 for skilled and unskilled respectively. Again, their monthly value, 0.5 and 0.45, are based on
Shimer’s estimation from monthly data, 0.45. The job-filling rate qs and qu are set to 0.976 (or 0.71
monthly), which are in line with Den Haan, Ramey and Watson’s (2000) finding. Consequently,
tightness for the skilled and unskilled labor markets (θs and θu) are 0.897 and 0.855 respectively.
The scaling parameters of the matching functions ms and mu can also be pinned down as 0.92 and
0.9 each.
The next pair of parameters to fix are the vacancy posting costs, κs and κu. Combining the wage
3In this numerical exercise, the choice of the labor share, which is higher than what’s often used in RBC liter-
ature (see Kydland and Prescott, 1982, who estimated the capital share to be around 0.36, and labor share
is 0.64), is to mitigate the human capital depreciation problem in the human capital formation equation.
4This renders skilled-unskilled wage ratio to be 1.2. This number is relatively small compared to Card and
DiNardo’s (2002) estimate using average hourly earnings data from the March CPS.
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curves and firms’ Euler equations, a relationship between the κi, workers’ bargaining power η, and
the value of non-market activity bi can be found. As Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) calibration
strategy aims at and succeeds in generating large fluctuations of vacancies and market tightness,
there is hardly any empirical evidence to support the extremely high value of non-market activity,
or the little bargaining power of workers. Furthermore, Cheron (2005) has shown that, if hiring
costs are merely borne to the firms and workers’ quasi-rents are protected by contract so that the
hold-up problem is avoided, the Hosios condition delivers efficiency when workers’ bargaining
power equals elasticity of the matching function. A conventional choice is to set both η and $ as
0.5 (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989). b
i
wi , the ratio of non-market activity to wage, is chosen to be
0.6, as a compromise of the extremely high values in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and the small
value in Shimer (2005). I show later that the variation of these ratios does not appear to change the
final result to a large extent. The κs take the values 0.28 and 0.23.
The key parameters left to be decided are the two in the human capital transition equation: The
human capital depreciation rate δ and the coefficient µ in new human capital formation through
on-the-job-training (learning by doing). The two equations concerned are (3.12), the Euler equa-
tion in optimal human capital investment, and (3.8), the human capital formation equation. The
elasticity of human capital formation, ϑ, revealing how fast human capital is accumulated dur-
ing work, can lie between 0 and 1, so that F
(
nst−1
)
is an upward-sloping concave curve with a
relatively small slope. The choice of ϑ within this range is not so strict, unless one targets at a
reasonable value of δ. The proper target of δ is often under discussion.
In reality, human capital can depreciate due to either voluntary reasons (mostly family-related)
or involuntary (unemployment, sick leave) career interruptions. The depreciation in the former
case, mostly occurs to workers still on the jobs and is rather difficult to observe due to wage rigidity
and the lack of proper measurement of productivity. As a result, the wage depreciation rate after
unemployment is estimated as a proxy for human capital depreciation rate. For example, Keane
and Wolpin (1997) use NLSY data and (structurally) estimate an annual wage depreciation rate for
white U.S. males during unemployment of between 9.6 percent (for blue collars) and 36.5 percent
(for white collars). Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) use plant closing data and find wage
depreciation rates between 10 percent and 25 percent. However, wage is more rigid than human
capital, in the sense that due to contract issues the wage does not correspondingly decrease as
an immediate response to human capital declining. Consequently, the aforementioned estimation
results turn to underestimate the human capital depreciation. By setting ϑ = 0.1, δ takes the
value of 0.065, corresponding to an annual depreciation rate (0.23). This is still within the range
mentioned above. This depreciation rate is almost the same as that of physical capital, making
both types of capital stock more comparable.
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The elasticities of leisure in households’ utility function are key for the participation volatility.
The assumption of flexible labor force is introduced into the RBC version of the MP model in Trip-
ier (2004) and Veracierto (2008). Their model specifications fail to reproduce, most importantly, the
countercyclical unemployment rate observed in U.S. data. Moreover, the resulting unemployment-
vacancy correlation is strongly positive (Tripier, 2004) and unemployment fluctuates as much as
output (Veracierto, 2008). One of the possible reasons for the poor performance of the models
is how they parameterize the participation elasticity. Both papers choose the parameter value
to reproduce the observed standard deviation of employment, implying relatively high elasticity
(Tripier’s choice implies a value of about 3). Comparatively, Ebell (2008) novelly uses the relative
volatility of the participation rate to pin down this elasticity. Since the data shows low relative
volatility of the participation, the elasticity pinned down is small, which, consequently, discour-
ages worker’s entering search from non-participation in response to a positive technology shock.
Therefore, ψs and ψu in the current model are assumed to be identical and are set following Ebell
(2008), aiming at forming a very inelastic labor supply and thus market entering of the inactive
workers.
The resulting labor supply elasticities are smaller than unity, which is consistent with many mi-
croeconomic studies. I choose the elasticity parameter value as 0.05, yielding the relative volatil-
ities of participation as σpsσy = 0.07 and
σpu
σy
= 0.08. The model’s recursive law of motions further
reveal that a 1 percent increase in total factor productivity leads to a 5 percent increase in skill
labor participation, and a slightly less than 4.7 percent increase of unskilled labor participation.
Exploiting the steady state Euler equations of households concerning labor participation, I obtain
the values of the utility parameters representing the weights of leisure.
The model structure in the current chapter deviates from that in Krebs (2003a), but the concept of
human capital being substitute of physical capital investment stays the same. However, due to the
natural constraint that human capital lies within range of (0, 1), its absolute level is much smaller
than that of capital stock. Therefore I cannot directly use Krebs’(2003a) method to pin down the
parameters of labor income risks5. Instead, I borrow the result from microeconometric studies on
labor income (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004 and Krishna and Senses, 2009), and set the estimated
variance of the permanent income shock to 0.008 (annualized to 0.031). The standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic shock is thus 0.089, which seems to be extremely high for the current model and
does not fit the model structure. Instead, I calibrate the ση to be half of the standard deviation of
5See Krebs (2003a), equation (12). There the optimal choice is expressed as 1− θ = (rh − rk) /σ2η , whereas
θ = kk+h . After simple alteration, it becomes the following equation:
σ2η =
(k + h) (rh − rk)
h
.
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the productivity shock.
Concerning the persistence of the human capital shock (ρξ in equation (3.11)), Krebs (2003a)
chooses this coefficient to be one and allows human capital shocks to amount to permanent labor
income shocks, whereas the latter is often empirically found highly autoregressive (and perhaps
having even a unit root). The result of this specification is that the individual labor income process
in equilibrium follows (approximately) a logarithmic random walk, which would lead to over-
estimated cross-sectional dispersion and variance of labor income. Meanwhile, a recent study by
Huggett and Kaplan (2010) using data on male annual labor earnings from the PSID finds the per-
sistence of the permanent component of labor income risk to be 0.934 (0.835 for high school equiv-
alents and 0.915 for college equivalents separately). The magnitude of these estimates, according
to the authors, could be overstated because much of the large rise in the log-earning variance
observed over the working lifetime can actually be accounted for by learning ability differences
across individuals (Huggett, Ventura and Yaron, 2006).
I thus calibrate ρξ , the persistence of the human capital shock at a high (0.95) and a low value
(0.85) and study the effect of the human capital shock persistence. For the technology shock, I
follow what’s widely used in the RBC literature (e.g. Hansen, 1985), to set the coefficient ρ = 0.95,
and the standard deviation of the residual as 0.01.
Finally, what’s also important for the heterogeneous skills story, the choice of elasticity of sub-
stitution comes into sight. As summarized by Acemoglu (2002), the majority of micro studies esti-
mate this elasticity, through the behavior of skill premium, to be between 1 and 2. Autor, Katz and
Krueger (1998) argue that a consensus estimate is a value around 1.5, when the two skill groups are
college and high school workers (e.g. 1.4 by Katz and Murphy, 1992 for the 1963-87 period using
March CPS). Consequently I set σ = 1.4 in the benchmark model, and further examine the effect of
a high elasticity of 2, the value implied in Angrist (1995). All simulation results will be compared
with the second moments of U.S. data summarized by Shimer (2005) in Table 3.1.
3.4 Simulation and Impulse Response Analysis
3.4.1 Simulated Results of the Benchmark Model (σ = 1.4, ρξ = 0.85)
Due to the participation margin and low participation elasticity, the model can generate nega-
tive Beverage curves in both skilled and unskilled markets. The reasoning is well-argued in Ebell
(2008). Under a positive productivity shock, workers respond latently in participating in the la-
bor force (exiting non-participation) and start searching. The impact on unemployment is small
compared to that on vacancy creation, thus tightness and job-finding rates increase strongly. The
strong increase of job-finding rates speeds up workers’ leaving unemployment and thus unem-
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Table 3.1: Shimer’s Summary Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1951-2003
Variable ∗ u v v/u z
Standard Deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.020
Relative std. deviation σ∗σz 9.5 10.1 19.1 1.0
Autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.878
Correlation u 1 −0.894 −0.971 −0.408
v − 1 0.975 0.364
v/u − − 1 0.396
z − − − 1
Source: Shimer (2005, Table 1); Relative standard deviation σ∗σz is own calculation.
ployment decreases soon after the shock. As shown in Table 3.2, skilled and unskilled unemploy-
ment has a positive correlation of 0.314, as a result of unbiased technology shocks and biased hu-
man capital shocks. The correlations between unemployment and vacancies are negative in both
markets (−0.22 and −0.46 for skilled and unskilled respectively), while the cross-correlations are
even higher (ρvs ,uu = −0.87, ρvu ,us = −0.83). In total, the correlation between total unemployment
and vacancy is −0.83, which is quite a good match compared to Shimer’s (2005) data summary
(−0.894).
Table 3.2: Baseline Results: Cyclicality of Labor Market Variables in Skill and Unskilled
(σ = 1.4, ρη = 0.85)
Variable ∗ us uu vs vu vs/us vu/uu u v v/u y
Relative std. dev. σ∗σz 6.45 5.98 7.48 6.80 10.90 10.92 5.03 6.32 10.87 4.85
Autocor. 0.539 0.708 0.617 0.722 0.975 0.977 0.948 0.865 0.977 0.979
Corr. us 1 0.314 −0.219 −0.832 −0.743 −0.690 0.764 −0.625 −0.717 −0.723
uu − 1 −0.867 −0.458 −0.781 −0.833 0.852 −0.72 −0.813 −0.81
vs − − 1 0.586 0.816 0.839 −0.71 0.866 0.832 0.828
vu − − − 1 0.895 0.873 −0.77 0.913 0.887 0.886
vs/us − − − − 1 0.985 −0.94 0.964 0.995 0.997
vu/uu − − − − − 1 −0.946 0.963 0.997 0.995
u − − − − − − 1 −0.833 −0.947 −0.948
v − − − − − − - 1 0.967 0.965
v/u − − − − − − - - 1 0.999
z − − − − − − - - - 1
All variables reported are log deviations from an HP trend.
Another quantitative benchmark usually discussed in related literature is the correlation be-
tween unemployment and output. As the data shows this correlation to be −0.88, the model gen-
erates even higher (more negative) correlation, −0.95. The skill-specific unemployment rates are
less correlated with output (−0.72 and−0.81 respectively). As Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) re-
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cently find, exploiting the Current Population Survey (CPS), the total labor productivity, defined as
output over total labor, is strongly correlated with employment (correlation: ρp,n = 0.719), unem-
ployment (ρp,u = −0.633), vacancies (ρp,v = 0.719), and market tightness (ρp,θ = 0.703). My model
generates much higher values (subsequent correlations: 0.99, −0.94, 0.96, 0.99), which is common
in related literature, and as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) point out, this discrepancy can be
alleviated by adding two new model features, namely “time to build” (lags in vacancy posting)
and a stochastic value of home production. Finally, training investment (xt) responds positively to
the technology shock, but negatively to the human capital shock. In total, the negative response
dominates and xt negatively correlates with output, even though the correlation is small (−0.03).
This result matches well with several empirical findings on the cyclicality of training (Sepulveda,
2004, Bassanini and Brunello, 2007).
The model can generate volatile standard deviations of labor market variables. Relative to the
standard deviation of the productivity shock, the standard deviation of the total market tightness
is 10.87 times higher. Total unemployment is 5 times and total vacancy is 6.32 times more volatile
than productivity. Specifically, relative standard deviation of the skilled unemployment (6.45) is
slightly higher than the unskilled (5.98), while that of the skilled vacancy creation (7.48) is higher
than its unskilled counterpart (6.8). The standard deviation of human capital investment is very
large compared to output (33 times), which is in line with Sepulveda’s (2004) finding, that training
is highly volatile over the cycle.
3.4.2 Impulse Responses
The Effect of a Technology Shock (et)
Both skilled and unskilled unemployment reacts first positively to the technology shock, and de-
creases strongly after two periods (Figure 3.2).
The immediate positive responses of both types of vacancies contribute to their high procyclical-
ity. The response of skilled vacancies slightly exceeds that of unskilled labor, which corresponds
to the difference of their coefficients in the policy functions (skilled vacancies react 7 percent more
strongly than unskilled vacancies). Consequently, the skilled tightness also exceeds the unskilled
tightness by 4.5 percent in the policy function and compared to θu, θs is slightly higher correlated
with y. Small as these differences are, they indicate that the neutral technology shock is in fact
skill-biased, in the sense that the skilled labor market situation improves more due to the tech-
nology shock. The underlying quantitative reason is the smaller share (less than 50 percent) of
skilled workers in the total labor force. Skilled labor productivity (average and marginal) are ac-
cordingly higher than their unskilled counterpart. A positive technology shock, therefore, benefits
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock, Skilled and Unskilled (σ = 1.4)
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skilled labor more than unskilled. In contrast, a negative shock induces a larger proportional loss
for a marginal skilled worker than for a marginal unskilled worker, resulting in a declining skill
premium. The firms would naturally prefer an additional skilled worker to an unskilled worker
under such circumstances, and therefore the unskilled workers suffer even more from losing the
market power and being replaced in recessions.
Figure 3.3 shows that aggregate labor market variables behave similarly to Ebell (2008). Due to
small participation elasticity, the uptick in unemployment is more modest than vacancies so that
tightness increases strongly. The sharp drop of unemployment after the initial moment insures its
countercyclicality and the negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock, Aggregate (σ = 1.4)
The Effect of a Human Capital Shock (et)
The inclusion of human capital formation and transition allows for examining the crucial con-
tribution of active labor market policy to decreasing aggregate unemployment upon a positive
technology shock. The effect of a human capital shock is in both short-run and long-run. As a
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prompt reaction to a positive shock, there is a surge of supply of skilled workers. Unable to find
jobs immediately, these workers flow into skilled unemployment , whereas their shift away from
unskilled labor market mitigates unskilled unemployment. Therefore we observe a positive imme-
diate response of skilled unemployment and a negative reaction of the unskilled unemployment.
Skilled vacancies also react positively to the shock, and the amplitude is smaller than that of
skilled unemployment. Comparatively, as unskilled vacancies react negatively to the shock just
like unskilled unemployment, the percentage deviation of vacancies is smaller than that of unem-
ployment. On the one hand, market tightness and job finding rates decrease in the skilled labor
market and increase in the unskilled market. The vacancy filling rate, on the opposite, responds
positively in the skilled market and negatively in the unskilled market. Since it becomes relatively
easier to recruit skilled workers, and more difficult to hire unskilled, firms post fewer skilled vacan-
cies and more unskilled vacancies. This explains the change in direction of the impulse response
of vacancies. On the other hand, the wage difference between the skilled and unskilled declines,
meaning that skilled workers become relatively cheaper. The natural reaction of the firms is to
adjust their labor input share to the change in the labor market structure, using more productive
workers to replace less productive ones. In equilibrium, skilled workers’ participation increases
more than that of the unskilled workers, because of the larger margin between participation and
non-participation.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 report the effect of a positive human capital shock, which contemporaneously
increases the skilled and decreases the unskilled labor force. As an example, one can consider one
effective training course in the scheme of active labor market policy, through which a small share
of unskilled workers are upgraded into the skilled labor force. As the skilled labor participation
extends, the newly-trained skilled workers cannot find jobs instantly but enter skilled unemploy-
ment directly, thus at once the skilled unemployment responds positively. The reaction of skilled
vacancy posting is also very prompt, even though its percentage deviation is slightly lower than
that of skilled unemployment. Thus the skilled labor market tightness reacts negatively to the
shock. Declining market tightness pushes the firm into a better position, since for every posted va-
cancy there are more applicants. This instant over-supply and under-price of skilled labor induce
firms to use skilled labor to substitute the unskilled, so that the deviation of the skilled unemploy-
ment soon returns to the steady state and becomes negative.
There is a small drop of unskilled participation due to those up-skilled workers. Meanwhile,
unemployment of the unskilled workers decreases first due to the sudden contraction of labor
force, which is accompanied by a smaller reduction of unskilled vacancies. Unskilled labor market
tightness increases accordingly, and afterwards returns slowly to the steady state. As vacancies per
searching worker increase, unskilled wage also rises, and the relative price of unskilled worker
56
3.4 Simulation and Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to a Human Capital Shock, Skilled (σ = 1.4)
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses to a Human Capital Shock, Unskilled (σ = 1.4)
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becomes higher. As discussed above, unskilled workers are partly replaced by the skilled, and
unskilled unemployment converges quickly toward the initial level.
In aggregate, total unemployment reacts at first negatively to the human capital shock (Figure
3.6). This is mainly due to the reduction of unskilled unemployment. The response returns to
the steady state quickly, but experiences a second negative impulse. This second unemployment
reduction is mostly fuelled by the decreasing skilled unemployment because of the skill substitu-
tion. Total vacancies also observe a two-stage response toward the shock, which sink firstly due to
the dominant deduction of the unskilled vacancies, and recover shortly afterward because of the
strong skilled vacancy creation and unskilled vacancy recovery. The response of aggregate market
tightness, which is positive and shows a smooth hump, can also explain the second-stage decline
of total unemployment, since on average workers can find jobs more easily.
Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses to a Human Capital Shock, Aggregate (σ = 1.4)
An increase in ρξ increases the persistence of human capital shock, and therefore multiplies the
shock effect on the variables. Relative standard deviations of the skilled and unskilled variables all
increase, while, at an aggregate level, unemployment, employment, vacancy and market tightness
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increase too, only to a smaller extent. Because the initial response of total employment is more
negative and that of capital stock does not increase sufficient, total output decreases in the first
two periods, and the response becomes positive from the third quarter on.
Skill-specific vacancies and unemployment increase by the same amount, so that correlation
within- and across markets declines. The aggregate u− v correlation, nonetheless, does not vary
much.
3.4.3 The Importance of the Elasticity of Substitution
The elasticity of substitution indicates how well the two labor factors can substitute each other.
For a given change in relative prices, a higher σ implies a larger change in the labor inputs. The
statistics of the simulation results are summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Cyclicality under Higher Elasticity of Substitution (σ = 2.0, ρη = 0.85)
Variable ∗ us uu vs vu vs/us vu/uu u v v/u y
Relative std. dev. σ∗σz 7.77 6.99 8.74 7.57 11.18 11.69 5.3 6.6 11.44 5.09
Autocor. 0.349 0.619 0.475 0.639 0.977 0.979 0.954 0.876 0.979 0.981
Corr. us 1 0.036 0.088 −0.847 −0.627 −0.57 0.633 −0.51 −0.587 −0.603
uu − 1 −0.900 −0.288 −0.729 −0.785 0.796 −0.697 −0.771 −0.759
vs − − 1 0.333 0.721 0.753 −0.644 0.783 0.749 0.738
vu − − − 1 0.849 0.82 −0.736 0.847 0.83 0.836
vs/us − − − − 1 0.986 −0.944 0.967 0.995 0.997
vu/uu − − − − − 1 −0.953 0.965 0.998 0.995
u − − − − − − 1 −0.848 −0.952 −0.953
v − − − − − − - 1 0.97 0.968
v/u − − − − − − - - 1 0.999
z − − − − − − - - - 1
All variables reported are log deviations from an HP trend.
The relative standard deviations increase for all variables. The aggregate correlation becomes
more negative to −0.85. As the u − v correlation across the markets rise to ρvs ,uu = −0.90 and
ρvu ,us = −0.85, the within-market correlation decreases. ρvu ,uu declines to −0.29, and ρvs ,us even
becomes positive (0.09).
Skilled participation, on the opposite, becomes more procyclical, implying more workers enter-
ing the labor market searching for skilled jobs. The uptick of unemployment becomes larger and on
average the quarterly countercyclicality of unemployment is now weaker (ρus ,y = −0.60 v.s. −0.72
in the benchmark case). Meanwhile, as skilled vacancies becomes less pro-cyclical (ρvs ,y = 0.74)
than before (0.83), the correlation between skilled unemployment and vacancies becomes positive.
On the unskilled market, even though the cyclicality of both unemployment and vacancies be-
come weaker than the benchmark, the changes are to a similar degree (Figure 3.7). The impulse
response of unskilled participation shows that the initial positive reaction is lower, and the re-
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versed further reaction is larger than the baseline. As a result, on average fewer inactive unskilled
workers’ enter search and unskilled participation becomes countercyclical. In aggregate, the vari-
ables react more intensively to the shock (Figure 3.8).
Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock, Skill and Unskilled (σ = 2)
Given a high σ, the substitution between two types of labor becomes larger upon a change of the
relative factor price than the baseline. Key labor market variables react more strongly to human
capital shocks. In the impulse response graphic of the total unemployment to a positive human
capital shock, even though the first-stage downtick is similar, the second-stage downtick is much
more prominent than the baseline, which contributes to the higher correlation (in absolute value)
between total unemployment and output (Figure 3.9). On the opposite, aggregate vacancies react
to a smaller extent to the same shock than the baseline. As aggregate unemployment becomes
much more countercyclical, and total vacancies experience smaller changes, the u− v correlation
becomes higher in absolute value and thus closer to the data.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock, Aggregate (σ = 2)
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Figure 3.9: Impulse Responses to a Human Capital Shock, Aggregate (σ = 2)
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3.5 Policy Implication
The simulation experiments have shown that the weak position of unskilled workers varies over
the business cycle. Skill substitution is persistent and especially strong during recessions, leading
to high unskilled unemployment both in level and volatility. The previous section has shown that
skill-specific labor markets become more volatile and the vulnerability of the unskilled workers
rises with the differentiation between the skilled and unskilled (an increase in σ), as well as with
the persistence of the human capital shock.
Associated with such observations, what can be done to alleviate the inferior situation of the un-
skilled workers? Let’s return to the active labor market policy discussions at the beginning of this
chapter. As found in Card, Kluve and Weber (2010), classroom and on-the-job training programs
appear to be particularly likely to yield more favorable medium-term than short-term impact es-
timates. This coincides with the observation above, that aggregate unemployment experiences a
two-stage decline: Firstly with a reduction in unskilled unemployment due to the skill upgrade of
marginal workers through active training, and then with a sharp decline of skilled unemployment
when skill substitution dominates. Training programs provide skill upgrade opportunities to the
lower-skilled workers, and consequently preserve the average skill level of the total labor force.
The positive effects implied are not only on the skill-specific, but also on the aggregate labor mar-
ket variables. Therefore, the challenging tasks in the real world include at least two points: How to
set the correct incentive schemes so as to encourage workers, and especially unemployed workers,
to participate training, and how to identify an effective combination of active labor market policies
that help achieve the short-run and longer-run goals simultaneously.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the rationale of skill-specific labor market variables in a framework where
labor force structure is endogenized and the flow between skill types is allowed through training
decisions. Skilled and unskilled workers are not only connected due to their substitutability in
production, but also through the skill-training system. As labor, also interpreted as human capital
here, can experience skill-downgrade due to human capital depreciation, it can also be accumu-
lated and upgraded through sufficient training, be it on the job or general training.
By modeling the transmission between skilled and unskilled labor force, this framework allows
the study of the effect of human capital shock on the dynamics in skilled and unskilled markets.
This trait is important not only due to its direct relevance to the highly debated active labor mar-
ket policy, but also because of the decomposition of aggregate unemployment into skill specific
and term specific. As a consequence, idiosyncratic shocks in human capital formation, in conjunc-
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tion with the technology shocks, produce high volatility and downward-sloping the Beveridge
curves in skill-specific labor markets. Inelastic labor participation also contributes to these results.
Moreover, in aggregate, unemployment and vacancies display data-resembling high negative cor-
relation.
In the current setup allowing for skill substitution and transition between two types of labor, the
negative slope of the Beveridge curve is a result of two-staged effects on unemployment on vacan-
cies. Particularly, upon the human capital shock, total unemployment reacts negatively due to the
reduction of unskilled unemployment; a second unemployment reduction results from the over-
whelmingly decreasing skilled unemployment, since skilled labor substitutes out the unskilled.
Active labor market policy can therefore reinforce the unemployment reduction caused by tech-
nology shocks, especially at higher elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor. Total
vacancies also observe a two-stage response toward the shock, which sink firstly due to the dom-
inant deduction of the unskilled vacancies, and recover shortly afterward because of the strong
skilled vacancy creation and unskilled vacancy recovery.
This model setup can be used to explore the skill-specific market dynamics and cross-
connections between the key variables. What’s worth studying further includes the exact form
of the human capital accumulation. A more specified setup can help evaluate the effects of specific
training program on unemployment and other labor market indicators.
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4 Consumption Growth and Volatility with
Consumption Externalities
4.1 Introduction
Consumption inequality is a direct measure for the well-being of a population, while consumption
growth and volatility are alternative welfare measures at higher orders. Various socioeconomic
groups, defined by age, household size, occupation etc., have diverse preferences and are sub-
ject to heterogeneous shocks. The modification of the trade-off between consumption and saving
differs, which further affects consumption fluctuations and the growth trend to different extents.
Consequently, not only consumption patterns but also their growth and fluctuation are divergent
across groups. Groups subject to large shocks and lacking a smoothing possibility appear to have
on average lower growth and higher fluctuations, indicating that they are at disadvantageous wel-
fare positions. For example, income and consumption growth inequality for different age groups
can vary widely (Figure 4.1). As younger groups have higher consumption growth, their con-
sumption volatility is also higher.
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Figure 4.1: Income and Consumption Growth Inequality, at Different Age
The contribution of this chapter is three-fold: (1) providing a theoretical framework of hetero-
geneous agents with consumption externality in order to examine the link between group-specific
consumption growth and volatility, (2) finding empirical evidence on the aforementioned relation-
ship using matched household data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the Ger-
man Income and Expenditure Survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, or EVS in later
text), and (3) examining the empirical relationship between growth and within-group inequality.
Aiming at examining the relationship between consumption growth and volatility, I use a frame-
work stemming from the literature studying income shocks and consumption inequality. Com-
plete market hypothesis is not used here for two reasons. First, the perfect insurance against id-
iosyncratic shocks implied by the complete market theory is rejected by empirical evidence (At-
tanasio and Davis, 1996, Attanasio and Pavoni, 2007). Moreover, the complete market assumption,
often resembled by a complete set of Arrow-Debreu security for each state, suggests that, given
identical preferences, there should be no consumption volatility because everyone is insured sim-
ilarly. This, however, is also strongly rejected by the data (Fisher and Johnson, 2006, Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2000). According to Lucas (1992), “if the children of Noah had been able and willing to
pool risks, Arrow-Debreu style, among themselves and their descendants, then the vast inequality
we see today, within and across societies, would not exist.”
In contrast, incomplete market models are generally adopted to study the diverse evolution of
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income and consumption inequality (Blundell and Preston, 1998, Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston,
2008). Be the reason of market incompleteness limited enforcement of contracts (Krueger and Perri,
2006) or private information problems (Attanasio and Pavoni, 2007), risk-sharing exists but is not
perfect. In fact, a model with one single asset and heterogeneous household preferences can offer
partial but relatively good insurance against income shocks (Krusell and Smith, 1999), whereas
under certain assumptions it can match the real-world wealth distribution relatively well. More
discussion and literature review on incomplete markets model can be found in Heathcote et al.
(2009). For simplicity, while not losing generality, the theoretical framework of the current chapter
is reduced to a “standard incomplete market” model in an endowment economy, where a large
number of agents draw idiosyncratic realizations of endowment, and make independent choices
for consumption and asset holding. Their choices determine, in aggregate, the total amount of
capital for production and the equilibrium rental rate for capital.
Households from various socioeconomic groups differ in patience and attitude toward their
reference; i.e., the group average consumption. This is different from the neoclassical economic
reasoning, which is typically based on the self-interest hypothesis; i.e., people are exclusively mo-
tivated by their material self-interest. Indeed, both absolute and relative consumption matter for
households in the current model, whereas the idea of relative consumption associates with con-
ceptual consumption (Ariely and Norton, 2009a, 2009b) and “social preferences”(Fehr and Fis-
chbacher, 2002), and can go back to Veblen’s (1899) discussion of conspicuous consumption and
Duesenberry’s Relative Income Hypothesis (1949).
Acknowledging consumption growth inequality as a result of income uncertainties (permanent
and transitory) and consumption innovation, I approximate the Euler equation of heterogeneous
households with group externalities in general equilibrium to study the link between two key
features of consumption evolution: Growth and volatility. Comparative statics show that volatility
decreases with groups’ degree of patience, and increases with household eagerness to keep up
with the group average. The strength of the effects varies over the business cycle. Moreover, the
correlation between the group average growth and volatility indicated by the model is positive
once parameters take consensus values. Due to data limitation, only the last proposition is able to
be examined empirically for distinct socioeconomics groups.
The grouping method forming the heterogeneous preferences, indeed, is crucial for studying
the link between growth and volatility of the economy. Cross-country estimates using aggregate
data and cross-sector studies using sector level data can generate opposite results. For example,
in the case of output growth, as Ramey and Ramey (1995) find higher volatility accompanied by
lower growth in two samples of countries, Imbs (2007) re-examines the issue at sector level and
presents evidence of positive correlation.
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The procedure taken in this chapter is adjusted to the availability and structure of the data.
Studies on consumption inequality in Germany are less prevalent than on income inequality due
to the limited availability of survey data. Recently, Fuchs-Schündeln, Krueger and Sommer (2010)
look into both income and consumption inequality in Germany. They document an upward in-
equality trend of wage income after reunification, and finds a more modest rise of consumption
inequality over the same period1. The analysis of the current chapter focuses on consumption
growth and volatility, and complements a number of studies that use micro data to document the
evolution of income or wage inequality in Germany in the last 25 years (among others, Biewen,
2000, Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg, 2009).
Two data sets are under investigation, the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) and
an imputed sample from EVS and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). There are two ap-
proaches to impute consumption: One by using the estimated coefficients, and the other through
matching cells in EVS and SOEP. The imputed consumption is used to construct consumption
growth, volatility and within-group variance. The resulting consumption measure incorporates
the well-documented consumption and income information in EVS and the panel structure in
SOEP.
Although it is impossible to identify the direction of households’ attitude toward peers’ well-
being with the current data, the finding of Knies’ (2010) using income and life satisfaction data
appears to support the “relative income” hypothesis in West Germany. The empirical focus of the
current chapter lies in identifying the correlation between growth and volatility, which is found
positive and significant in fixed-effect estimates using EVS data. A more complex nonlinear rela-
tionship is found when the data sets are matched so as to explore the panel structure. Moreover,
group growth also appears to be positively linked to within-group variances, implying higher in-
equality as the welfare cost for faster growing groups regardless of the driving factors of growth.
Household size, age and nationality of the household head turn out to be significantly relevant
to individual consumption growth and volatility, whereas community size and heads’ occupation
are only related to volatility. Heads’ education appears irrelevant. Figure 4.1 shows in detail how
strong the age effect is not only in growth, but also in volatility.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the theoretical model and
derives four propositions; Section 4.3 introduces the data and specifies the grouping strategy; in
Section 4.4 proposition four is tested and the estimate results are discussed; Section 4.5 concludes.
1Evidences on the trend of consumption inequality are mixed for other developed countries. Blundell and
Preston (1998) document substantial differences in inequality growth over the 1980s across birth cohorts
in the U.K., while Crossley and Pendakur (2002) notice that overall consumption inequality in Canada has
fallen slightly over the period 1969 to 1999. Barrett et al. (2000) find much lower inequality in consumption
than in income in Australia. The disjuncture between income and consumption inequality, also found in
the U.S. over the 1980s, can be explained by changes in the persistence of income shocks (Blundell et al.,
2008) or by predictable income shocks (Primiceri and van Rens, 2009).
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4.2 Consumption Growth and Volatility
4.2.1 Social Interaction and Relative Consumption
Among the extensions added to the incomplete market setup in the asset pricing literature, one
special aspect is to include relative consumption into household utility as a consumption external-
ity.
Psychological and economic studies often show that both absolute and relative consumption
matter for individual well-being and behavior (see, e.g. Duesenberry, 1949, Diener et al., 1999,
Luttmer, 2005). Individuals’ satisfaction derived from being better than their peers can be in-
terpreted as envy, inequity aversion, relative deprivation or a human propensity to judge one’s
achievement relative to that of others. The “others” here are the reference groups of actors, a con-
cept brought about in social psychology early in the 1940s (Hyman, 1942). Depending on the situa-
tion, they can be coworkers, relatives, neighbors or members of clubs and organizations. Moreover,
they can also be people who are geographically away and do not interact with the actor physically.
According to Shibutani (1955), reference groups can be: (1) those who serve as comparison points,
(2) those to which men aspire and (3) those sharing the same perspectives with the individuals.
The last category requires common communication channels, each of which gives rise to a sepa-
rate world, or, a socioeconomic group. The social worlds can be ethnic minorities, the social elite,
medicine association, theater audience, readers of certain periodicals, or, in today’s context, groups
on facebook. In a word, these associative reference groups realistically represent the individuals’
current equals or near-equals; i.e., they are from the same socioeconomic background, which is the
definition for groups in the current chapter.
While others’ income can hardly be detected, households can relatively easily observe the life
styles and infer the consumption levels of others with similar socioeconomic status. Their optimal
security holding will adapt accordingly and their consumption smoothing path is different from an
externality-free world. As a result, their evaluation of others’ consumption affects the group con-
sumption growth inequality. The direction of this effect depends on how exactly households react
to their peers’ well-being (whether they are “altruistic” or meant to “keep up with the Joneses”).
Alternatively, this reaction can be interpreted as individuals’ life satisfaction upon the change of
their peers’ income. While such attitude can be barely identified in empirical data, happiness is
often used as proxy to capture individual’s utility.
Studies based on developed countries find that subjective welfare depends positively on one’s
own consumption but negatively on the average consumption level of others nearby (Easterlin,
2001, Blanchflower et al., 2004, Luttmer, 2005). Knies (2010) finds comparable evidence in West
Germany where West Germans are significantly unhappier with their lives if their neighbors are
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getting richer, implying an urge of the West German households to avoid being lagging back from
their neighbors, or alternatively, the urge to keep up. This effect is slightly more marked in neigh-
borhoods with presumably more social interactions, so that households may be able to assess more
accurately the change of their neighbors’ financial position. On the opposite, Fafchamps and Shilpi
(2008) find that in Nepal, households in isolated areas care more about what their neighbors con-
sume. Their reasoning is that in isolated communities, neighbors can more accurately approximate
the relevant reference group than in more mobile urban communities. These observations require
economic models to take social environment into account, whose effects are heterogeneous accord-
ing to agents’ socioeconomic background.
The preference on relative consumption can be regarded as a special form of physical consump-
tion or a conceptual consumption besides the physical consumption. Long discussed by sociolo-
gists and anthropologists in the field of consumer behavior, it is summarized in Ariely and Norton
(2009a) that “physical consumption is used not just to satisfy basic needs but also to signal to our-
selves and others our beliefs, attitudes, and social identities”. Therefore conceptual consumption
strongly influences physical consumption, and the possession of a BMW convertible is often only
partly due to the need for transport. The concept consumed is the (relative) social status, which
dates back to Veblen’s (1899) discussion of conspicuous consumption and Duesenberry’s Relative
Income Hypothesis (1949), and accords with the “inequality aversion” in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and “social preferences” in Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).
As a special type of consumption externalities, relative consumption serves as powerful non-pe-
cuniary motives. The model setup of the current chapter borrows the spirit of Galí (1994). How
this externality exactly matters for individuals can be captured in individuals’ utility in relative
well-being comparing to their reference groups, which, as stressed in sociological literature, tends
to consist of others who are similar in terms of background variables such as age, education and
household size (see, for example, Merton and Kitt, 1950, and Festinger, 1954). Household prefer-
ences are assumed to be heterogeneous accordingly. As Shibutani (1955) emphasizes, culture, a
perspective that is shared by those in a particular group, may also constitute the frame of the ref-
erence and matter for the direction of their preference. This is indeed documented in Knies (2010),
where compared to West Germans’ becoming unhappier on their neighbors’ increasing wealth,
East Germans’ life satisfaction positively, though insignificantly, correlates with neighborhoods’
income.
As previous sociologists and psychologists emphasize the role of positional goods (a similar
concept to the aforementioned conspicuous consumption) in relative consumption, it was assumed
that higher income groups care more about it since a larger part of their consumption is composed
of positional goods. However, relative consumption is also found to be important for vacations
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and insurance, which are typically seen as non-positional goods (Alpizar et al., 2005). Besides,
evidence shows that poorer groups care no less about the relative consumption than their richer
counterparts do (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008). It seems that the effect of relative consumption
prevails over the economy.
What to keep up with are the associative references, or, the group mean. In a world of uncer-
tainty, the current group mean serves as the local norm for households to set realistic goals, which
is the third type of reference summarized by Shibutani (1955). As mentioned above, the incentive
to keep up can be interpreted as envy, inequity aversion, relative deprivation, or a human propen-
sity to judge one’s achievement relative to that of others. Take inequity aversion for instance,
inequity averse persons want to achieve an equitable distribution of material resources; i.e., they
want to neither surpass nor fall behind others in the reference groups, but keeping up with those
above them and staying the same with those below them. Therefore, the group mean becomes
their benchmark. This setup is slightly different from the case when individuals would like to
emulate the top households of the group, which coincides with the “aspiring” case in Shibutani’s
(1955) definition and would cause more deviation from an externality-free economy.
There is a subtle difference if agents take past or current average consumption as benchmark.
The former, which is a variation of the habit formation setup, is the case of “catching up with
the Joneses” (Mehra and Prescott, 1985, Abel, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and the lat-
ter “keeping up with the Joneses” (Galí, 1994). While the former involves the interdependence
between the agents’ past, present and future well-being, the latter setup emphasizes contempora-
neous trade-offs and generates simpler results2. Since the true task is to study contemporaneous
consumption distribution in a cross-sectional panel setting, the current chapter imposes “keeping
up with the Joneses” assumption so as to avoid more complex intertemporal considerations.
4.2.2 A Heterogeneous Agent Model
The setup follows Galí (1994) where households regard contemporary group average consumption
as an external benchmark (“keeping up with the Joneses”). While Galí’s (1994) model describes the
homogeneous households in the whole economy, the current chapter takes the perspective of each
group, and the “keeping up” mechanism bounds the agents within the group. The heterogeneity
of agents between groups is captured as the different preferences, namely patience and attitude
toward the benchmark. Using a heterogeneous agent model enables the contemporaneous exami-
nation of consumption growth inequality within the group, while still allowing for comparison in
2In fact, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) discuss optimal tax policies using these two differentiated cases and
find procyclical taxes for the former and a flat tax rate for the latter to be optimal. Guo (2004) elaborates
the latter case by adding capital accumulation and imperfect competition in the goods market and finds a
similar result.
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the time dimension and/or group-to-group dimension.
There is a continuum of households of measure 1 in this economy. Households belong to dif-
ferent groups i ∈ {1, ...M}, where the level of patience (βi) and the attitude toward group average
consumption (κi) differ. These differences capture the socioeconomic heterogeneity in the popu-
lation. In the empirical part of the chapter later groups are defined according to household size,
community size, household heads’ nationality, age, education level and job type. One can also
intuitively interpret a group as a highly similar neighborhood. pi denotes the number of house-
holds in each group. Households belong to certain groups because of the aforementioned features
but are still subject to small idiosyncratic shocks, either from income or consumption innovation.
Although households in a given group do not observe the exact income of other group members,
they can observe their consumption patterns. If they would like to be identical with the others in
a similar socioeconomic class, it is the case of “keeping up with the Joneses”. Otherwise, if they
also benefit when others are doing well, we have “altruistic” households. I label the result of this
additional externality a group effect on household consumption decisions.
Households receive idiosyncratic endowment every period3. One household in group i has
a stochastic endowment process {ΥtΥi,tyt}, where Υt and Υi,t are the stochastic economy-wide
and group-specific income endowment respectively, and {yt} is the idiosyncratic component for
each household in the economy. This implies that, within one group, households’ endowments
share a common group-specific element while differing in being subject to idiosyncratic shocks
in each period. {yt} follows a Markov process with initial probability distribution Π0 (·) and
transition probabilities pit (y′|y). yt = (y0, y1...yt) captures the history of endowment shocks,
such that the compound probability of a history yt given an initial endowment y0 is pit
(
yt|y0
)
=
pit−1 (yt|yt−1)pit−2 (yt−1|yt−2) ...pi0 (y1|y0) . At date t households are distinguished jointly by their
group i, their initial asset holdings αij,t, and their initial endowment shock yt. Intertemporally,
households transfer their resources by trading one single asset economy wide. The borrowing,
however, is subject to a household-specific debt limit Aij,t
(
Υt,Υi,t, yt
)
; i.e., a pre-specified credit
line is contingent on the economy, group and household-specific endowment histories up to pe-
riod t.
For simplicity it is assumed that households have zero mobility across groups at a point in time.
The reason is two-fold. On the one hand, SOEP data shows that mobility is not the dominant issue,
since more than half of the households in the samples (56.8 percent) between 1984 and 2005 have
never changed their groups, while among the group switchers over half of them (51.8 percent) have
changed only once, among which over half happened due to aging. In a word, these heterogeneous
households appeared to stay relatively persistently in their group. On the other hand, the later
3This is a simplified version of a model with stochastic labor endowment, such as in Krueger and Perri
(2006). Inclusion of labor supply in the current model is possible but not crucial.
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use of panel data is to examine consumption growth in sequential years, where cross-sectional
comparison is the final aim.
Define cij,t as the time t consumption of the jth household in ith group, with group average
consumption Xi,t. Since the purpose of this chapter is on the consumption dynamics, the model is
reduced to an endowment economy and the household problem is boiled down to consumption
and asset holding decisions. With a group-specific discount factor βi, which implies that groups
are different in patience, a household from group i of type (Υt,Υi,t, yt) chooses a consumption
stream and asset holding plans for one single asset to solve the following maximization problem:
max
{cij,t}∞t=0,{αij,t+1}∞t=0
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βti
[
u
(
cij,t, Xi,t
)]
subject to
cij,t + qtαij,t+1 ≤ ΥtΥi,tyt + αij,t. (4.1)
One unit asset is priced qt in period t and pays one unit of consumption good in period t + 1. In
econometric studies on consumption, household’s consumption cij,t are sometimes decomposed
of a principal part and an exogenous idiosyncratic shock which captures small consumption in-
novation of the household (such as Blundell and Preston, 1998, and Blundell et al., 2008). Parker
and Preston’s (2005) estimate shows that such change in consumption preference is crucial for the
variance of household consumption growth. Initial asset holding αij,0 is given and the borrowing
constraints hold in order to rule out Ponzi schemes:
−αij,t+1 ≤ Aij,t
(
Υt,Υi,t, yt
)
.
The utility function has the following isoelastic form:
u
(
cij,t, Xi,t
)
=
c1−γij,t X
−(1−γ)κi
i,t − 1
1− γ . (4.2)
γ is the risk aversion parameter and is usually larger than 14. Note that in absence of household-
specific idiosyncratic shock, cij,t equals Xi,t. (4.2) can be rewritten as
u
(
cij,t, Xi,t
)
=
c1−γiij,t − 1
1− γ ,
4Alternatively, to elaborate elastic labor supply, the utility function could take the form
u
(
ct, Xi,t, lt
)
=
c1−γiij,t X
−(1−γi)κi
i,t − 1
1− γi − χ
l1−ψt
1− ψ ,
where lt = ΥtΥi,tyt.
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where γ − (γ− 1) κi = γi. This transformation implies that the combination of economy-wide
identical risk aversion and group-specific attitude toward consumption externality is equivalent
to a neoclassical economy with no consumption externality but heterogeneous risk aversion. Both
cases lead to the same Euler equation, though.
Group consumption serves as an external benchmark, and κi <
γ
γ−1 as the attitude of group i
households toward this benchmark can be interpreted as “how important is my neighbors’ con-
sumption for me”. Taking log of the core of the utility function yields:
(1− γ) ln cij,t − (1− γ) κi ln Xi,t = (1− γ)
[
(1− κi) ln cij,t + κi ln
cij,t
Xi,t
]
.
Scaled by parameter κi, the household’s consumption preference is a weighted average of the
absolute and relative consumption (compared to group average). There is no restriction on κi to
be positive or negative, which allows us to examine three cases considering the group effect in
consumption:
1. When 0 < κi <
γ
γ−1 , the household would like to “keep up with the Joneses”. Average con-
sumption decreases the household’s utility level but increases household’s marginal utility of an
additional unit of consumption. This reflects exactly the economic implication of “keeping up with
the Joneses”, since “any given addition to his current level of consumption becomes more valu-
able”5. In the later part of the chapter, it will become clear that such partial preferences, keeping
up with the Joneses, could reduce contemporaneous consumption growth inequality but drive up
consumption volatility over the business cycle further from a model without consumption exter-
nalities.
2. When κi < 0, households do not take the group mean as benchmark, but rather gain utility
once the others in the group are doing well. For philanthropists this could be interpreted as altru-
ism. However, a more economic intuition is that the group-mean welfare acts as “substitute” for
the household’s own welfare. In the absence of government in the current model, one can imagine
the public good as good weather or air quality. Knies (2010) interprets it in another cultural con-
text. Comparing West and East Germany and being in line with the result of Senik (2004, 2008), she
conjectures that in East Germany this post-transition economy, positive changes in others’ circum-
stances can serve as a positive signal for possible improvements in one’s own financial situation.
As a result, a positive association is expected between neighborhood income and life satisfaction.
3. When κi = 0, the utility function is reduced to a typical self insurance version, where agents
are only concerned with their own consumption.
5Galí (1994).
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The resulting Euler equation is6:
qt = βiEt
( cij,t+1
cij,t
)−γ (
Xi,t+1
Xi,t
)−(1−γ)κi .
Since all households in group i have the identical optimization problem, through aggregation, it
holds for group i in general equilibrium:
qt = βiEt
[(
Xi,t+1
Xi,t
)−γ−(1−γ)κi]
, (4.3)
where qt is determined by demand and supply in the financial market and is exogenous for single
households. The aggregated Euler equation (4.3) implies that the degree of risk aversion, and the
group-specific discount factor as well as the attitude to neighbors’ consumption determine the
group consumption growth together. Group consumption growth is slow when households in the
group are less patient (small βi) and prefer current to future consumption, or when they put more
value on their current relative position in the group (κi is positive and increases) and would rather
“keep up” consumption than buying security (a similar effect to households’ being “impatient”).
If for most households the idiosyncratic shock yt turns out to be negative, implying a negative
income shock in the aggregate, net borrowing demand (sales of the security) increases and ceteris
paribus, the asset price qt will decrease, and the return for those households purchasing the secu-
rity increases. Needless to say, in a general equilibrium qt is also subject to the distribution of βi,
κi and γ.
4.2.3 Implication for Consumption Dynamics
The permanent income hypothesis states that periodical consumption is subject to lifetime re-
sources, instead of each period’s income. Household wealth is thus a better candidate as a con-
sumption constraint. However, while the change of household consumption is additionally trig-
gered by consumption innovations, the main shocks occurring to household consumption are often
identified as contemporaneous income shocks in the related literature7.
6In Abel’s (1990) model households compare themselves with the previous consumption of the group mem-
bers, so as to “catch up with the Joneses”. Households still buy one unit of risk-free bond at price qt
qt
(
Xi,t
Xi,t−1
)−(1−γ)κ
= βEt
( cij,t+1
cij,t
)−γ .
Taking logs gives the same result as above, since the growth rate of Xi,t is time invariant. This picture,
however, can be totally different if consumption growth is time-variant.
7According to Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), among others, the log of income growth is subject to permanent
and transitory income shocks. Once good panel data is available on income and consumption, one can
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Another way to look at the sources of consumption growth is to track the causes in a group
and individual level. This helps to bridge the individual level and group level variables, and
approximate equation (4.3). The decomposition is analogous to that in a macroeconomic study
on sectoral output growth and volatility in Imbs (2007), who disentangles the origin of sectoral
output growth into three orthogonal shocks: A global, a country-specific and a residual shock.
The consumption growth rate of household j in group i is therefore given by
gij,t = $ij + ηt + ηi,t + ηij,t. (4.4)
Household consumption growth can deviate from an average constant $ij because of three orthog-
onal zero-mean, independent shocks: An economy-wide shock ηt affecting all households in all
groups (think about a common technology shock to the economy-wide endowment Υt in equation
(4.1)), a group-specific shock ηi,t which is related to the stochastic group-specific endowment Υi,t,
as well as a residual specific to household j in group i, ηij,t. This last household-specific resid-
ual contains the idiosyncratic endowment yt and the consumption innovation shock. gij,t is thus
distributed i.i.d.∼ ($ij, θt + θi,t + θij,t) where θt = Et [(ηt)2], θi,t = Et [(ηi,t)2], θij,t = Et [(ηij,t)2].
The average consumption growth for group i is thus gi,t
gi,t =
1
J∑j
gij,t =
1
J∑j
$ij + ηt + ηi,t +
1
J∑j
ηij,t. (4.5)
with the mean and variance given by
Et
(
1
J∑j
gij,t
)
=
1
J∑j
$ij ≡ gi, (4.6)
Vt
(
1
J∑j
gij,t
)
= θt + θi,t +
1
J2∑j
θij,t ≡ σ2gi . (4.7)
The group average consumption growth rate is assumed to be stationary and (conditionally and
unconditionally) log-normally distributed gi,t+1 ∼
(
gi, σ2gi
)
8. With this information and the help
of a second order Taylor approximation, equation (4.3) turns out to be9:
qt ≈ βi exp
[
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) gi + (−γ− (1− γ) κi)
2
2
σ2gi
]
. (4.8)
The security price qt is determined in the general equilibrium as a product of the state of the
even identify the degrees to which permanent and transitory income shocks affect the change of consump-
tion (see Blundell et al., 2008).
8Once define Gi,t+1 = 1+ gi,t+1 =
Xi,t+1
Xi,t , ln
Xi,t+1
Xi,t = ln Gi,t+1 ≈ gi,t+1.
9See Appendix I for a detailed derivation.
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economy, and the aggregation of all groups’ saving and borrowing decisions, which in turn depend
on the group-specific endowment and the distribution of the idiosyncratic income shocks. As
consumption growth and its variance are also conditional on the aggregate economic condition
(business cycle properties), the following arguments are first valid for cross-sectional comparison
within one period. That is, holding qt unchanged.
A none-zero κi leads to the deviation from an externality-free case where the household opti-
mization problem is independent of others’ consumption behavior. This deviation could be one
way to mitigate the equity premium puzzle in asset pricing. Rearranging equation (4.8) gives:
σ2gi = 2
[γ+ (1− γ) κi] gi + ln qt − ln βi
[γ+ (1− γ) κi]2
. (4.9)
It yields a relationship between the group average consumption growth and volatility. Note that
once the group average plays no role for single households (κi = 0), the equation is reduced to the
externality-free model:
σ2gi = 2
γgi + ln qt − ln βi
γ2
> 0 (4.10)
Comparing these two equations tells the effect of the externality. Frank (1989) argues that, given
this externality, market conditions for Pareto optimal are violated because “each person’s con-
sumption imposes negative externalities on others”. The magnitude of these external effects is of-
ten very large because if any one person increases his consumption, he also raises the consumption
standard for others unintentionally. Consequently, the efficient outcome based on independent de-
cisions of self-seeking may not hold any longer. In an economy where goods vary in the degree
of being positional, there would be excessive resources devoted to the production and acquisition
of positional goods, insufficient resources devoted to non-positional goods (Frank, 1985a, 1985b).
Moreover, agents will consume more and save less than in an externality-free world (see more
discussion in Proposition 2). For a reasonable value of risk aversion, i.e., γ > 1 10, the following
propositions hold:
Proposition 1 For a given consumption growth rate, more patient groups have smaller volatility.
Proof: Taking partial derivatives of σ2gi in equation (4.9) according to group-specific discount
factor βi yields:
∂σ2gi
∂βi
= − 2
[γ+ (1− γ) κi]2 βi
< 0.
10Other than assuming the values of the key parameters, one can use maximum likelihood (MLE) to estimate
them, which will be the next step of the research. The further task of the current chapter is to examine the
empirical relationship between group average consumption growth and volatility.
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The implication is straightforward. Patient households tend to have a higher propensity to save,
which insures the households against income shocks in next period to a higher degree. As a result,
the volatility of growth is smaller.
This proposition is well shown in the data. The empirical study in the later part of the chapter
shows that consumption volatility is significantly related to age: Older households appear to have
smaller volatility. One of the possible reasons of such finding lies on the link between income
growth and degree of patience. Carroll (2001) has argued that, “positive income growth makes
consumers more impatient (in the sense of wanting to spend more than current income) because
forward-looking consumers with positive income growth will want to spend some of their higher
future income today”. On the opposite, older populations, with expected lower future income
growth, are thus more patient and have a weaker wish to discount future consumption, which,
consequently, leads to smaller consumption volatility.
Proposition 2 In presence of precautionary saving, volatility increases with household eagerness to keep
up.
Proof: Taking the partial derivative of σ2gi with respect to κi yields:
∂σ2gi
∂κi
=
2 (γ− 1)
[γ+ (1− γ) κi]2
[
gi + 2
(ln qt − ln βi)
γ+ (1− γ) κi
]
.
Using the steady state value of gi, which is derivable from equation (4.3), the equation above
can be written as
∂σ2gi
∂κi
=
2 (γ− 1)
[γ+ (1− γ) κi]2
ln qt − ln βi
γ+ (1− γ) κi . (4.11)
Rearranging equation (4.9) delivers
ln qt − ln βi = [γ+ (1− γ) κi]
2
2
σ2gi − [γ+ (1− γ) κi] gi. (4.12)
Under precautionary saving, i.e., agents attempt to ‘self-insure’ against consumption fluctua-
tions, prudent agents increase savings (here demand for the single asset) when growth is more
volatile. Greater demand of assets puts downward pressure on interest rates, and return of the se-
curity is slightly below the discount rate of patient agents. Accordingly, security price qt is larger
than the discount factor βi, so that ln qt > ln βi. Meanwhile, because
γ
γ−1 is the upper bound to κi,
γ+ (1− γ) κi > 0. Hence in equation (4.11),
∂σ2gi
∂κi
> 0.
Household preferences show a dislike of deviation from the group average. The faster the others
in your group are upgrading than you are, the larger is the “punishment” of not being able to keep
up with them. At a high degree of such dislike (the case of “keeping up with the Joneses” , with
a positive κi approaching 1), households prefer current consumption to security purchases, which
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leads to low insurance against future shock and higher volatility in consumption growth. Fol-
lowing the same argument, volatility is lower in the case when households weigh group average
well-being more heavily (regarding it as a public good) or lack the incentive to keep up.
Proposition 3 The effect of households’ eagerness to keep up on consumption volatility is strengthened
(weakened) in booms (recessions).
Proof: Recall the partial derivative
∂σ2gi
∂κi
in (4.11), taking derivative according to the security price
qt leads to:
∂σ2gi /∂κi
∂qt
=
2 (γ− 1)
[γ+ (1− γ) κi]2
1
γ+ (1− γ) κi
1
qt
.
As discussed above, γ > 1 and γ+ (1− γ) κi > 0, therefore
∂σ2gi
/∂κi
∂qt
> 0, implying that the effect
of households’ eagerness on consumption volatility increases in security price qt.
Comparing to the first two propositions with a particular group’s perspective, the business cy-
cle effects are general and apply to all groups (all κi). Because the economy-wide endowment Υt
is subject to a positive shock, most agents expect to experience income growth in booms and are
willing to lend out their resources (through buying more securities). Higher demand of securities
drives up the unit price qt in general equilibrium, which further intensifies the effect of household
preferences (degree of patience and households’ attitude toward external benchmark). In contrast,
when most agents are subject to negative income shocks in recessions, an overwhelming borrow-
ing wish leads to a decline of the security price and dampens the preference effect.
Proposition 4 There is a positive relationship between growth and volatility, unless agents have ex-
tremely high desire to “keep up with the Joneses” (κi >
γ
γ−1 ).
Proof: In equation (4.9), taking partial derivative of σ2gi with respect to gi shows
∂σ2gi
∂gi
=
2
γ+ (1− γ) κi . (4.13)
Under condition that κi is bounded by
γ
γ−1 , there is a positive relationship between σ
2
gi and gi,
which suggests that groups with higher consumption growth also have to bear the welfare cost of
larger volatility. Nonetheless, for a large κi, i.e., when it’s extremely important for agents to keep
up, they would short sell securities up to the liquidity constraints. By doing so, they indirectly
insure their consumption next period, achieving a small volatility at a given consumption growth
rate.
The current chapter does not aim at empirically identifying the direction of households’ attitude
toward group mean, whereas the “keeping up with the Joneses” hypothesis is indirectly confirmed
by Knies’ (2010) finding about West Germany; i.e., a negative neighborhood income effect on in-
dividual life satisfaction. In the following sections, the correlation between group consumption
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growth and volatility (Proposition 4) is the key hypothesis to be tested.
4.3 Bringing the Model to the Data
The partial equilibrium derived from the theoretical model suggests a relationship between aver-
age consumption growth and volatility for different socioeconomic groups, which can be exam-
ined cross-sectionally using micro data. Micro data with panel structure such as the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) or the British Family Expenditure Survey data would be ideal for this
study purpose. In a social democratic country like Germany, where conventional measures show
that inequality grows in recent years but is still lower than the Anglo-Saxon countries, the study
on consumption is rather scarce due to data limitation. An exploration of two main micro data
sets on households’ income and consumption, nonetheless, can help to reveal part of the story on
consumption inequality. These are the German Income and Expenditure Survey (Einkommens-
und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Both EVS and SOEP are related to the Micro Census. EVS is a quota sample with voluntary
participation to the annual Micro Census, while SOEP is annual longitudinal survey with strati-
fied random samples where Micro Census serves as weighting benchmark. EVS takes continuous
bookkeeping approach to record income and consumption in detail, whereas SOEP household in-
come is imputed from monthly household income on the survey month (“screener”), major gross
income components in the month of interview and the retrospective income data for previous
year. EVS recorded tax payment and deduction apart from the tax benefit, while SOEP estimates
tax payment based on households’ account on the previous year tax payment, and the possible tax
benefit is not included. More differences between EVS and SOEP are summarized in Becker et al.
(2002), and can be found in Table 4.1.
Before entering the discussion about group consumption patterns, the crucial question would
be, how to define groups so that it makes sense. Factor analysis using principal components is used
to distill the various household characteristics into the most informative ones in both data sets.
Regressions of the consumption growth and volatility on household demographics can further
reveal those significantly associated characteristics (Table 4.2).
With variables such as federal states discarded, the variables contributing most to group the
households in EVS are age, gender, and occupation of the household heads, as well as household
size, whereas the best grouping criteria for the imputed data are age, education, occupation and
nationality of household heads, and household size (see Table 4.3 and 4.4). Even though commu-
nity size does not account much for consumption difference between households, the theoretical
model implies an indirect impact of the comparison and attitude of group members on group av-
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Table 4.1: Methodological Characteristics of Household Income Surveys in EVS and SOEP
EVS SOEP
Survey repeated cross-section panel
Sampling method quota sample based on the mandatory
random Micro Census
stratified random sample
Sample size 1998: app. 60,000 households 1984-2000: app. 6,000 households; since
2001: app. 12,000 households
Collection of in-
come data
continuous bookkeeping by the partic-
ipants
monthly (net) household income; major
gross income components in the inter-
view month; retrospective income data
for the previous year
Foreign house-
hold head
Coverage since 1993 explicit over-sampling
Coverage of up-
per and lower
end
no homeless; non-coverage of house-
holds with monthly net income over
35,000 DM (1998)
no homeless; starting 2002 SOEP in-
cludes an additional sample of the very
rich
Tax and social
security contribu-
tion
payments during the response period
included in survey, but no allowance
for final tax assessment
imputation based on basic tax routines
and flat deduction for employees, pro-
visional lump sums, tax exemptions for
capital income, and child allowances
Table 4.2: Imputed Data: Nondurable v.s. Durable Consumption Growth and Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nond. Cons Growth Volatility Durab. Cons Growth Volatility
Community size 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.59) (-1.41) (1.00) (0.87)
Household size 0.002* -0.002** 0.000 -0.007***
(1.71) (-2.41) (0.01) (-3.25)
Age of hh head -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003***
(-4.75) (-6.83) (-4.47) (-12.51)
Non German -0.011*** 0.010** -0.014** 0.032***
(-3.14) (2.56) (-2.38) (3.39)
Higher education 0.005* -0.002 0.007 -0.003
(1.73) (-0.69) (1.50) (-0.49)
Skilled jobs 0.004 -0.015*** 0.009* -0.042***
(1.48) (-4.99) (1.89) (-5.90)
Constant 0.013 0.119*** 0.000 0.326***
(1.46) (10.20) (0.01) (13.42)
Observations 10842 10842 10841 10841
R2 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.026
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions use imputed data, where consumption is adjusted with equivalent scale.
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erage consumption growth and volatility. A reasonable deduction is that community size affects
the extent to which households can observe others with similar socioeconomic backgrounds, and
therefore community size is added as one grouping condition for both EVS and SOEP.
Table 4.3: EVS Grouping Criteria
EVS
Grouping Cri-
teria
Community
Size
Household
Size
Age of House-
hold Head
Gender of
Household
Head
Occupation of
Household Head
Number of
Categories
3 2 3 2 6
Definition 1 if less than
20000 res-
idents, 2
if between
20000-100000
residents,
3 if more
than 100000
residents
1 if fewer than
3, 2 if 3 or
more than 3
1 if no older
than 35, 2 if
between 35-
55, 3 if older
than 55
1 if male, 2 if
female
1 if self-employed
farmer, 2 if other
self-employed, 3
if civil servants,
4 if dependent
employee, 5
if worker, 6 if
unemployed or
inactive
Table 4.4: Imputed Data Grouping Criteria
Matched sample
Grouping
Criteria
Communi-
ty Size
Household
Size
Age of
Household
Head
Education
of House-
hold Head
Occupation
of House-
hold Head
Nationality
of House-
hold Head
Number of
Categories
3 2 3 2 2 2
Definition 1 if less
than 20000
residents, 2
if between
20000-
100000 res-
idents, 3 if
more than
100000
residents
1 if fewer
than 3, 2 if
3 or more
than 3
1 if no
older than
35, 2 if
between
35-55, 3 if
older than
55
1 if one
has at
least post-
secondary
non-tertiary
education
(higher
educated), 2
if otherwise
1 if more
skilled
(high/low
level service,
routine non-
manual, self-
employed,
manual su-
pervision,
and skilled
manual
jobs), 2 if
otherwise
1 if German
native, 2 if
not
4.3.1 EVS: Data and Methodology
EVS is one of the major surveys containing personal and households’ income and consumption
distributions in Germany11. The Federal Statistical Office delivers a cross-sectional survey every
11EVS is not a random sample but a quota sample with voluntary participation. However, it takes as bench-
mark for recruiting participants the annual Current Population Survey of Germany (Mikrozensus), which
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five years starting from the early 1960s. Until 2008 there are surveys in 1962/1963, 1969, 1973, 1978,
1983 and 1988 for West Germany, and thereafter extended to East Germany in 1993, 1998 and 2003.
The purpose of bringing in the EVS is to use its information on the consumption-income ratio on
SOEP’s panel environment. Therefore I choose the public-use micro data sets from 1983 until 2003.
The EVS data has several advantages. Besides the rich information on consumption and income
it contains, it includes a large number of households (defined as consumer units), and even more
observations when individuals are concerned. While individual samples are comparatively easy to
be extracted from the household observations, they contain dependent employees, self-employed,
unemployed as well as citizens who are out of labor force. This large variety of occupational
status enriches the objects of the study to the general population and makes it possible to examine
consumption and welfare effects over time.
As Cutler and Katz (1991) take a “top-down” approach to construct nondurable consumption
out of total expenditure, data structure in EVS allows for constructing nondurable, durable and
total consumption (the sum of nondurable, durable consumption plus rent) in a “bottom-up”
manner. In all, this chapter takes the same point as Cutler and Katz (1991) to exclude housing
costs, vehicle purchases, spending on major appliances, insurance premia and expenditures for fi-
nancial services from nondurable consumption. Specifically, I construct nondurable consumption
of households using the existing detailed account on Classification of Individual Consumption
by Purpose (COICOP), in line with Fuchs-Schündeln, Krueger and Sommer (2010). What are in-
cluded in the nondurable consumption are expenditures for food, clothes, energy, health, body
care, travel, communication, education, rent, and household services, while part of leisure and
miscellaneous also belong to nondurables. Exceptions such as electric appliances, photo cameras,
sport equipment or other high-valued durable goods join furniture, car repairs, garage rental fees,
and large electric device maintenance to be counted as durable consumption. Summing up the
durable, nondurable consumption as well as the rent, yields the total consumption. One should
note that the every-five-year data collection in EVS may cause a little bias to nondurable consump-
tion due to its smooth feature. However, since durable consumption is much more sensitive to
the business cycle than the nondurables and may vary much from year to year (Mankiw, 1985),
the reported durable consumption in EVS sample years may not be representative over the study
years. The imputation of durable consumption is thus less justified than the nondurables. This
may be one of the reasons why the later estimations concerning the imputed data are significant
for nondurables but insignificant for durable consumption (Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
is a mandated random survey of large size. Consequently, the household net income brackets in the EVS
are defined identically to those in the Mikrozensus.
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Table 4.5: Imputed Data: Nondurable Consumption Growth and Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σnd -0.366*** -0.349*** -0.331***
(-4.93) (-4.32) (-4.08)
σ2nd 0.815*** 0.764*** 0.757***
(5.13) (4.60) (4.54)
Lag nond. consumption -0.182*** -0.194***
(-6.56) (-6.55)
Time effect significant**
(2.49)
Constant 0.026*** 1.633*** 1.716***
(6.25) (6.67) (6.56)
Observations 2567 2423 2423
F 14.113 27.840 8.586
R2within 0.063 0.110 0.130
R2between 0.074 0.001 0.000
R2overall 0.064 0.055 0.068
Inequality
∆nd -0.217*** -0.240*** -0.237***
(-3.91) (-4.03) (-3.86)
∆2nd 0.300*** 0.311*** 0.317***
(3.64) (3.83) (3.82)
Lag nond. consumption -0.162*** -0.175***
(-6.95) (-7.22)
Time effect significant**
Constant 0.040*** 1.478*** 1.578***
(4.40) (7.13) (7.40)
Observations 2346 2226 2226
F 7.839 19.941 8.322
R2within 0.017 0.065 0.096
R2between 0.001 0.016 0.011
R2overall 0.014 0.016 0.031
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Group nondurable consumption growth rate is the dependent variable.
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Table 4.6: Imputed Data: Durable Consumption Growth and Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σd 0.094 0.068 0.088
(0.54) (0.37) (0.49)
σ2d -0.190 -0.168 -0.172
(-0.93) (-0.80) (-0.84)
Lag dur. consumption -0.104*** -0.115***
(-3.96) (-3.90)
Time effect significant**
(2.49)
Constant -0.015 0.784*** 0.912***
(-1.07) (3.82) (4.04)
Observations 2567 2423 2423
F 0.892 6.262 8.261
R2within 0.025 0.039 0.081
R2between 0.006 0.241 0.250
R2overall 0.020 0.010 0.039
Inequality
∆d 0.108 0.112 0.140
(0.59) (0.61) (0.77)
∆2d -0.240 -0.245 -0.247
(-1.31) (-1.34) (-1.35)
Lag dur. consumption -0.089*** -0.091***
(-4.15) (-3.86)
Time effect significant**
Constant -0.011 0.674*** 0.727***
(-0.30) (3.98) (4.00)
Observations 2345 2225 2225
F 6.478 10.575 9.804
R2within 0.051 0.067 0.113
R2between 0.043 0.050 0.053
R2overall 0.047 0.027 0.063
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Group durable consumption growth rate is the dependent variable.
The groups are defined by households characteristics available for all waves; i.e., household
size, age of household head, occupation of household head, community size and the gender of
household head. The information on the nationality of household head only starts from 1988 and
the education (professional training) level starts from 1993, therefore they are not used for dividing
the groups. The exact grouping criteria are summarized in Table 4.3.
Though there is no direct micro information on households’ consumption growth, we can use
the difference of group average log consumption to approximate the average group consumption
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growth, because
1
J∑j
gij,t ≈ 1J∑j
(
cij,t − cij,t−1
)
=
1
J∑j
cij,t − 1J∑j
cij,t−1 = ci,t − ci,t−1.
The econometric framework would be:
ci,t − ci,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
gi,t
= α0 + α1SDt (4ci,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σi,t
+W ′i,tα2 + µi + δt + ei,t (4.14)
where SDt (4ci,t) denotes the standard deviation of consumption growth from mean12, and α1
and α2 are vectors of coefficients assumed common across groups. µi captures the time-invariant
group characteristics which are used to group the samples (fixed effect), δt is a time dummy and
the residual ei,t represents the deviation of growth from its predicted value. Wi,t is a vector of
controls for the group, a unique combination of which determines the group-specific parameters
βi and κi in the theoretical model.
Meanwhile, the data allows us to explore the relationship between consumption growth and the
change of within-group inequality. In the following regression equation, the main difference from
(4.14) is the ∆SDt (ci,t) term, representing the change of within-group standard deviation across
household observations at time t along the group-mean consumption growth. This serves as an
additional examination of the welfare effect of the consumption growth.
ci,t − ci,t−1 = α0 + α1∆SDt (ci,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆i
+W ′i,tα2 + µi + δt + ei,t. (4.15)
Table 4.7 provides some summary statistics for EVS on the cross-section and over time of con-
sumption growth gi, volatility σi and within-group inequality ∆i. The size of all groups over time
varies between 1 and 4864, with 210.7 as mean and 53 as median, showing a large variation be-
tween the groups. Unconditional correlation between group growth and its standard deviation
for each time period is negative while that between group growth and change in within-group
standard deviation is positive. These correlations between aggregated variables cannot tell much
since no group or time effect is taken into consideration.
The EVS, nonetheless, can only provide an approximation of the consumption growth due to
lack of panel structure. Since only limited household characteristics are available, sampled house-
holds in one group in different time period can bear large consumption variation due to unobserv-
able features, implying a time-variant household-specific residual (θij,t) and thus a varying σ2gi in
12Instead of variance, using standard deviation as control variable helps to interpret the result of the point
estimation as percentage to percentage change.
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Table 4.7: EVS: Summary Statistics of Per Capita Consumption
Mean Median Min Max Frequency
Nondurable consumption
gi 0.87% 0.74% -0.98 1.05 200
σi 0.13 0.09 0 0.62 200
∆i 0.011 0.008 -0.22 0.42 200
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.09
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.31
Durable consumption
gi -0.093% -0.062% -2.589 1.531 200
σi 0.474 0.317 0 2.959 200
∆i 0.003 0 -0.832 0.386 200
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.19
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.03
Total consumption
gi 0.023% 0.017% -0.714 0.955 200
σi 0.137 0.095 0 0.62 200
∆i 0.005 0.005 -0.234 0.312 200
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.12
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.14
equation (4.7). Moreover, the inclusion of various households in every wave naturally increases
the dispersion of the residuals, suggesting an overestimation of the σ2gi and thus σi,t in (4.14). Ad-
ditionally, since the EVS survey was carried out every five years, possibly each wave is at a similar
time point of the business cycle, say, in the extreme case, all above or all below the long-run trend
of output. The direct result, compared to a panel-structured study over the years, would be an
underestimation of the variation of θt. The impact on θi,t is more difficult to tell, which depends on
the distribution of the group-specific shocks. In all, the use of EVS data can only provide a rough
picture.
4.3.2 Imputation Using the SOEP
An alternative strategy is to borrow the panel structure from the SOEP and to match the two data
sets so that household consumption growth can be derived. Starting from 1984, SOEP data is based
on household interviews, and contains crucial questions on living and income. The sample used
in this chapter includes all West Germans from 1984, whereas immigrant households are added
starting in 1995. Considering the lower end of the income distribution, both EVS and SOEP do not
cover homeless households, while SOEP better covers households receiving social benefits. From
2002 onwards SOEP includes a subsample of high income households whose monthly income
exceeds 4,500 euro. But because EVS does not include high income households, I exclude these
high income household samples in SOEP for years 2002 and 2003.
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SOEP does not offer much information on consumption, and it is also unfeasible to construct
consumption from the available information on financial inflows and outflows because there is
little information on yearly credit or any other form of borrowing the households may have taken.
The forcible imputation of consumption would bear a large bias, which is especially serious for
low-income households who compose the fat left tail of the imputed consumption distribution.
Serving as basis for calculating group-specific consumption growth and volatility, household
consumption can be imputed in two ways from EVS and SOEP. The first method follows Skinner
(1987) and Fisher and Johnson (2006), and involves imputing consumption using EVS information
on household consumption, net income, and various household demographics for the available
six waves, namely 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003. It shows that,
ci,t = α0 + α1 · inc +W ′i,tα2 + ei,t. (4.16)
Interpolating the estimated coefficients for the intermediate years and applying the results to the
comparable13 SOEP samples (multiplying the household net income and demographics with re-
spective coefficients) yield the imputed household consumption.
Table 4.8 compares mean and median household income and consumption in EVS and the im-
puted data, where the imputed consumption appears to be lower than the EVS level, and the
imputation basis, net income, is substantially lower in SOEP than in the EVS.
Table 4.8: Comparison of SOEP and EVS Consumption by Year
1988 1993 1998 2003
SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS
Net Income 24114 33569 25745 36057 24395 38568 26240 38724
(22642) (31693) (24213) (33229) (22986) (35314) (24179) (35379)
Non. consumption 11898 14695 12572 15149 12351 15878 13446 16281
(11688) (14388) (12551) (14743) (12323) (15467) (13546) (16042)
(Original EVS) - 14721 - 15184 - 15895 - 16292
- (13851) - (14000) - (14545) - (14929)
Dur. consumption 4212 5596 4614 6000 3584 5024 3376 4475
(4202) (5665) (4605) (5895) (3657) (4993) (3356) (4394)
(Original EVS) - 5616 - 6022 - 5061 - 4518
- (3580) - (4017) - (2609) - (2590)
Tot. consumption 20459 25498 21791 26620 22224 28829 22971 28282
(20129) (25062) (21594) (25851) (22269) (28079) (22920) (27607)
(Original EVS) - 25540 - 26663 - 28968 - 28407
- (23813) - (24535) - (26005) - (25643)
Note: in euros, 1995 prices.
13Households in EVS and SOEP with the same demographics are compared, and households with insufficient
information are not included in the matching process.
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This observation is in line with Becker et al. (2002). The reasoning is manifold: (1) SOEP cov-
ers slightly more households receiving social benefits and many more households with foreign
heads. (2) Compared to EVS’ detailed recorded income and expenditure in diary, income infor-
mation in SOEP is an imputation of current monthly income and a rough estimation of income
from the previous year, therefore SOEP income is subject to underestimation. (3) Concerning the
tax issue, SOEP tax estimates are based on households’ account on the previous year tax payment
and exclude possible tax benefits; Therefore SOEP possibly overestimates tax payments and un-
derestimates household net income. (4) Concerning the demographics of the households in the
overlapping sample years (1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003), the EVS and SOEP bear strong similarities
in most characteristics, except the occupation distribution of the household heads. EVS includes
a much higher share of civil servants and the dependently employed, while the SOEP samples
include a larger portion of self-employed, workers, unemployed and inactive ones (Table 4.9).
This result is similar for the second imputation method, whose focus is on the consumption-
income ratio of each specific group in five waves (1983-2003). Small cells are formed according to
common households’ characteristics in the EVS and SOEP, including the residing federate state,
community size, type of household, the age and the occupation of household head14. Average
consumption-income ratios are calculated for EVS for available waves and linear interpolation
helps to fill in the gaps between the waves. Needless to say, in this data matching process the more
precise the criteria, the smaller the cells, and the better the match. This ideal match would be that
each single household in EVS can be matched to its SOEP counterpart, which is, however, impossi-
ble given the heterogeneity of the two data sets. Aggregation of the consumption-income ratio for
households sharing the same characteristics results in less variance among the households when
consumption growth is derived in SOEP, and reduces θij,t due to elimination of the household-
specific shocks. Consequently, volatility of the group consumption growth across time would be
underestimated. Such limitation requires that the results relating to the imputed data should be
very carefully interpreted. For the data matching purpose, I choose a relatively detailed definition
of the group (Table 4.10), which leads to altogether 43, 200 cells.
Interpolating this ratio between the observation years using a year trend and applying the esti-
mated propensities to those SOEP households in the same cells, one can impute the consumption
for SOEP samples between 1984 and 2003 and further calculate the corresponding consumption
growth rate. As a result, the imputed consumption growth rate would both reflect consumption,
income information in the EVS and pick up the income and time structure in the SOEP. Table 4.11
reports the average consumption-income ratios of all groups in each wave, where the consumption
is either nondurable, durable or total, and income is the net household income.
14Some other household characteristics such as education level or years are available either in the SOEP or in
the EVS but not simultaneously, thus they cannot be used to construct the cells.
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Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics: Comparison of SOEP and EVS Demographics by Year
1988 1993 1998 2003
SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS SOEP EVS
Household size (number) 2.710 2.696 2.630 2.601 2.519 2.597 2.407 2.441
Age of hh head (years) 48.159 48.369 48.488 48.347 48.999 48.209 51.966 50.080
Male head 75.5% 72.4% 71.3% 68.1% 66.2% 67.5% 64.0% 64.4%
Female head 24.5% 27.6% 28.7% 31.9% 33.8% 32.5% 36.0% 35.6%
Berlin west 3.9% 4.0% 3.6% 3.3% 3.4% 2.3% 3.1% 0.6%
Schl.-Holstein 3.4% 5.0% 3.3% 5.7% 3.3% 5.1% 3.8% 5.0%
Hamburg 2.5% 2.9% 1.9% 3.2% 1.8% 3.2% 2.0% 2.9%
Niedersachsen 10.3% 9.9% 10.7% 9.5% 11.5% 10.2% 11.2% 9.5%
Bremen 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.1% 1.5%
Nord.-Westfalen 27.0% 27.5% 27.0% 30.0% 27.0% 27.2% 28.3% 27.3%
Hessen 9.8% 8.8% 9.9% 8.6% 9.2% 8.5% 8.5% 9.9%
Rhein.-Pfalz 7.1% 7.9% 6.9% 8.3% 7.7% 7.7% 8.4% 8.0%
Baden-Württemberg 18.2% 14.5% 17.8% 13.9% 16.9% 15.4% 15.4% 15.7%
Bayern 16.7% 18.3% 17.5% 16.2% 18.0% 18.8% 18.2% 19.6%
Below 20,000 pop. 34.8% 40.2% 34.6% 38.6% 38.4% 40.3% 38.8% 42.3%
20,000-100,000 27.3% 25.9% 27.4% 25.7% 27.1% 25.4% 28.1% 26.0%
Over 100,000 38.0% 34.0% 37.9% 35.7% 34.5% 34.3% 33.1% 31.7%
Sing. women 13.4% 13.3% 14.1% 15.3% 15.2% 14.1% 16.1% 15.7%
Sing. men 9.1% 6.3% 9.3% 8.9% 9.4% 8.3% 11.1% 9.2%
Sing. par+1 kid 3.5% 2.6% 3.5% 2.8% 3.6% 2.8% 3.8% 3.0%
Sing. par+more kids 2.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 1.8%
Couple no kid 24.4% 26.0% 26.4% 28.5% 28.9% 29.8% 31.2% 33.6%
Couple+1 kid 17.5% 18.5% 17.7% 15.3% 16.1% 13.1% 13.7% 11.9%
Couple+more kids 25.8% 26.7% 22.8% 25.1% 21.2% 25.6% 19.9% 21.1%
Others 4.2% 5.3% 4.8% 2.7% 3.5% 4.1% 2.1% 3.7%
Farmer 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.0% 0.4%
Self-employed 6.0% 1.6% 6.3% 2.5% 2.1% 2.6% 0.5% 2.6%
Civil servant 6.4% 16.8% 6.1% 16.3% 5.6% 14.0% 5.6% 11.3%
Employed 22.4% 36.4% 20.3% 35.7% 24.1% 42.7% 26.7% 41.1%
Worker 32.4% 15.7% 29.9% 14.8% 24.3% 11.8% 20.4% 11.9%
Unempl./inactive 32.0% 28.9% 36.8% 30.2% 43.5% 28.3% 46.8% 32.6%
Sample size 4793 43803 4419 31497 5123 39060 7310 33818
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Table 4.10: Data Matching
Matching
Criteria
Communi-
ty Size
Federal
States
Age of
Household
Head
Occupation
of House-
hold Head
Household
Type
Survey
Years
Number
of Cate-
gories
3 10 6 6 8 5
Definition 1 if less
than 20000
residents, 2
if between
20000-
100000 res-
idents, 3 if
more than
100000
residents
“Old”
federal
states
incl.
West
Berlin
and
excl.
Saar-
land
1 if no
older than
25, 2 if
between
25-35, 3 if
between
35-45, 4 if
between
45-55, 5 if
between
55-65, and
6 if older
than 65
1 if self-
employed
farmer, 2 if
other self-
employed,
3 if civil
servants, 4
if dependent
employee,
5 if worker
and 6 if un-
employed or
inactive
1 if single
women, 2 if
single men,
3 if single
parent with
1 child, 4
if single
parent with
2 or more
children, 5
if pair with
no child, 6
if pair with
1 child, 7
if pair with
2 or more
children and
8 if others,
includ-
ing multi-
generation
households
1983,
1988,
1993,
1998,
2003
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Table 4.11: Consumption-Income Ratios over the Years
Year Mean (cnd) S. Dev. (cnd) Mean (cd) S. Dev. (cd) Mean (ct) S. Dev. (ct) Nr. of Obs
1985 0.492 0.086 0.162 0.059 0.820 0.121 3773
1986 0.486 0.079 0.163 0.058 0.817 0.114 3441
1987 0.481 0.082 0.164 0.068 0.817 0.128 3425
1988 0.476 0.096 0.164 0.078 0.817 0.147 3372
1989 0.474 0.085 0.167 0.065 0.816 0.132 3666
1990 0.473 0.085 0.169 0.064 0.817 0.134 3439
1991 0.474 0.084 0.169 0.062 0.817 0.129 3439
1992 0.471 0.083 0.171 0.064 0.816 0.126 3218
1993 0.471 0.097 0.174 0.084 0.820 0.154 3359
1994 0.471 0.091 0.171 0.084 0.829 0.150 3125
1995 0.470 0.090 0.165 0.073 0.834 0.144 3374
1996 0.473 0.097 0.160 0.086 0.847 0.158 3426
1997 0.476 0.109 0.156 0.096 0.860 0.185 3399
1998 0.473 0.109 0.151 0.114 0.864 0.183 3305
1999 0.478 0.100 0.148 0.095 0.866 0.176 3465
2000 0.478 0.087 0.147 0.091 0.860 0.158 3415
2001 0.483 0.097 0.140 0.078 0.858 0.159 5549
2002 0.484 0.111 0.137 0.085 0.853 0.176 5512
2003 0.485 0.089 0.134 0.091 0.845 0.154 5906
Over the waves, nondurable consumption is slightly less than half of the net income, and
durable consumption varies between 13.4− 17.4 percent of the income, indicating that nondurable
consumption is dominant and about three times of durable consumption. This is reasonable in the
sense that durable goods consumption, such as the purchase of TV sets and cars, is much less fre-
quent than nondurable consumption. Therefore reported durable consumption for the EVS sam-
ple years is less representative than reported nondurable consumption. Examining the ranks of
the groups in various consumption definitions displays that, compared to durable consumption,
groups’ positions in nondurable consumption distribution resemble their positions in total con-
sumption to a greater extent15. Consequently, the behavior and properties of total consumption is
more similar to nondurable consumption.
Both imputation methods have their advantages and disadvantages. In all, because the esti-
mated and imputed coefficients in the first method are the average of all EVS households in each
wave, the heterogeneity in the imputed SOEP consumption is even more underrepresented than in
the second method. Therefore, in the following I report consumption growth and volatility based
on imputed consumption with the second method.
Net income and nondurable consumption16 in the EVS are used to calculate the ratio, which
15In about 70 percent of the cases, group rank in total consumption is closer to its rank in nondurable con-
sumption than that in durable consumption.
16The inclusion of durable goods, especially real estate and automobiles, requires much information and
complex imputation. Neither the EVS nor the SOEP provides sufficient information for a sound imputa-
94
4.3 Bringing the Model to the Data
can be understood as the average propensity to consume. Since nondurable consumption is cal-
culated as above, net income is defined as the household gross income17 net of health insurance,
pension insurance, unemployment insurance, various income taxes, church tax as well as other
social contribution.
Complementary to the EVS data, the SOEP survey data includes important information on
the household members’ education level both in schooling years and according to the Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-1997). Moreover, occupation profiles are also
recorded in detail according to the Erikson Goldthorpe Classification (EGP) and the occupational
position (Stellung im Beruf, coded by Statistisches Bundesamt). I use the ISCED18 and EGP19 to
be in line with related literature when grouping the samples, even though an alternative estima-
tion using schooling years and occupational position does not show a significant difference. A
household is counted as higher educated if one has at least post-secondary non-tertiary education,
otherwise the household is classified as lower educated. Finally, I use the EGP to label the occu-
pation as of higher level if the index is less or equal to 8 (including high and low level service,
routine non-manual, self-employed, manual supervision, and skilled manual jobs), otherwise it is
considered as lower level.
As is shown in Table 4.4, other household characteristics used to group the households include
household size, community size, the age and nationality of household heads. The division of
household size, community size and age of household heads follow the same rule to that of EVS.
Regarding age particularly, suppose on average one person can work 40 years (between 25 and
65 years old), then the first 10 years (25-35) would be the phase of trying out and stabilizing, and
the last 10 years is the adjusting period before retirement, whereas the intermediate 20 years is
the most stable period regarding income and social status. Therefore, I consider the household
head to be young if she or he is under 35, middle aged if between 35 and 55, and old if older than
55. Finally, the households can be “German” or “Non-German” according to the nationality of the
household head. Altogether, these classifications divide the sample into 144 groups. Note that the
criteria and classifications used to group households are different from those in the data matching
process because they serve different purposes.
tion and therefore this chapter chooses to examine the nondurable consumption which is precise in both
data sets.
17Including wage income, freelancing income, financial income, public and non-public transfer and real es-
tate leasing income.
18Dividing levels of education into: Pre-Primary Education, Primary Education or First Stage of Basic Ed-
ucation, Lower Secondary or Secondary Stage of Basic Education, (Upper) Secondary Education, Post-
Secondary Non-Tertiary Education, First Stage of Tertiary Education, and Second Stage of Tertiary Educa-
tion.
19Dividing occupations into: High Service, Low Service, Routine Non Manual, Self-Employed with Employ-
ees, Self-Employed without Employees, Manual Supervise, Skilled Manual, Semi-Unskilled Manual, Farm
Labor, Self-Employed Farm, Unemployed, and Pensioner.
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The regression equation is similar to equation (4.14) and the main difference is how group av-
erage consumption growth is calculated. Because the imputed data allows calculating per capita
consumption growth directly, which avoids the missing link between the EVS households over
time, group average consumption growth is a mean of all group members’ consumption growth.
Since the imputed data presents a nonlinear relationship between group consumption growth and
volatility, a quadratic term σ2i,t is added to the right hand side of the regression equation. More-
over, the relevant household characteristics are also included, according to which households are
included in certain socioeconomic groups and bear group-specific preferences such as patience
and attitude toward the consumption benchmark in the theoretical model.
gi,t = α0 + α1SDt (gi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σi,t
+ α2σ
2
i,t +W
′
i,tα3 + µi + δt + ei,t (4.17)
where
gi,t =
1
J∑j
gij,t.
The data also allows studying the relationship between consumption growth and within-group
dispersion. The question is, do groups with average higher consumption growth rates also see
higher within-group differences? Again standard deviation and variance of consumption growth
within-group are included on the right-hand side to account for nonlinearity:
gi,t = α0 + α1∆t + α2∆2t +W
′
i,tα3 + µi + δt + ei,t (4.18)
where
∆2t =
1
J∑j
(
gij,t − gi,t
)2 .
Table 4.12 summarizes the key variables and correlations for the imputed data. Group-mean
growth rate, volatility and the unconditional correlations bear differences from those in the EVS
(Table 4.7). While the low group growth in EVS is due to the approximation method aiming at
constructing consumption growth by taking difference of the aggregated consumption, the higher
cross-sectional group average consumption growth rate and volatility in the imputed data may
result from both differences in household income (from SOEP) and the variation in consumption-
income ratio (from EVS). Regarding durable consumption, the unconditional correlations between
growth and volatility and between growth and standard deviation are shown as positive, while
these correlations concerning nondurable consumption are negative. These unconditional correla-
tions, however, cannot tell us much since many important issues such as group-specific effects and
time effects are not considered yet.
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Table 4.12: Imputed Data: Summary Statistics of Per Capita Consumption
Mean Median Min Max Nr. of HHs
Nondurable consumption
gij 0.98% 1.11% -2.19 2.96 11062
σij 0.17 0.14 0 2.25 11062
Correlation(gij, σij) = 0.008
gi 0.01 0.012 -0.134 0.165 144
σi 0.116 0.086 0.021 0.490 144
∆i 0.242 0.241 0.003 0.566 144
Correlation(gi, σi) = 0.09
Correlation(gi,∆i) = 0.07
Durable consumption
gij -0.51% -0.38% -3.52 4.22 11061
σij 0.248 0.194 0 2.88 11062
Correlation(gij, σij) = 0.009
gi -0.014 -0.017 -0.375 0.25 144
σi 0.202 0.140 0.034 1.00 144
∆i 0.385 0.392 0.032 0.809 144
Correlation(gi, σi) = −0.06
Correlation(gi,∆i) = −0.11
Total consumption
gij 1.04% 1.13% -2.19 2.9 11062
σij 0.169 0.143 0 2.25 11062
Correlation(gij, σij) = 0.015
gi 0.013 0.012 -0.112 0.186 144
σi 0.116 0.085 0.013 0.538 144
∆i 0.241 0.236 0.01 0.56 144
Correlation(gi, σi) = 0.15
Correlation(gi,∆i) = −0.02
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Due to the panel structure of the imputed consumption, it’s possible to obtain the direct rela-
tionship between individual consumption growth and its volatility, which share a slightly positive
unconditional correlation of 0.02. For a more direct view, Figure 4.2 plots the consumption growth
against its volatility for the 144 groups in the imputed data set, which are defined by household
size, community size, age, education level, occupational background and nationality of household
heads. The unconditional correlation is captured by the slightly non-linear curve, even though
when outliers are excluded the fitted line is not any more upward-sloping. A more sensible analy-
sis would go beyond the rough unconditional correlation, and explore the time structure and panel
structure of the data.
Figure 4.2: Group Nondurable Consumption Growth and Volatility, Imputed Data
4.4 Estimation Results
4.4.1 Different Patterns of the Groups
The positive and significant link suggested by the regression results can be interpreted as the wel-
fare price the groups have to pay when they experience high group average consumption growth.
And what are these fast-growing groups? In another word, what would be the important explana-
tory variables for per capita consumption growth? This question can be answered by the following
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regression equation:
gij,t = α0 +W ′ij,tα1 + eij,t (4.19)
with Wij,t denoting household-specific control variables including community size, household
size, household heads’ age, nationality, education level and job type. The OLS regression using
the imputed data controlling for heteroskedacity shows that these household characteristics as-
sociate similarly to the growth and volatility of nondurable and durable goods consumption. As
Table 4.2 shows, household size links negatively to the volatility of growth, indicating that larger
households turn to experience less volatility. This possibly results from better insurance among the
members in large households with more diverse income resources. The age of household heads
seem to relate significantly and slightly negatively to both growth and volatility, implying slower
growth and smaller volatility for older households. When the household heads are non-German,
the members turn to have slower growth and more volatility, suggesting an inferior position for
non-German households in welfare measures compared to their German counterparts. As higher
education and more skilled jobs appear to have positive though insignificant link to growth, they
are negatively associated with volatility, suggesting possible insurance from income associated
with higher education and more skilled jobs. Community size seems to be irrelevant to household
consumption growth and volatility.
More precisely, what are the groups with high consumption growth and high volatility? Among
all 144 groups in Figure 4.2, these are small foreign households with higher education and skilled
jobs. It is surprising to see that the groups at the weakest position from the welfare perspective (low
growth and high volatility) are households, be there foreign or native German, with high education
but unskilled jobs. Moreover, young and small families with higher vocational education tend to
have higher consumption growth.
Figure 4.1 shows in more detail the age effect of consumption growth inequality, where income
and consumption growth of the young, middle and old groups are compared. Just as shown in Fig-
ure 4.1, young households appear to have the highest and most volatile income and consumption
growth inequality, and old households the lowest and flattest growth inequality over the years.
Again, since a large part of the young population is still out of the labor force and has thus limited
income, consumption differences between them and young professionals are big. However, once
they start working, the sudden relaxation of their financial constraint boosts their consumption to
such a degree that the consumption growth of the young groups is higher than the growth of the
older groups. Contrary to the level case, where income variance dominates consumption variance,
consumption growth sometimes presents a higher variance than income growth, especially from
the late 1980s until the mid 1990s. Middle-aged and old households appear to have a much lower
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income and consumption growth variance than the younger ones, whereas it is almost always the
case that their consumption growth variance surpasses their income growth variance. This is also
the case for old households. This may reflect the different saving habits of households when they
are young or different credit constraints for older households which are based on their existing
wealth and credit history.
4.4.2 EVS
Table 4.13: EVS: Nondurable Consumption Growth and Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σnd -0.072 0.099 0.106
(-0.65) (1.24) (1.48)
Lag nond. consumption -1.180*** -1.211***
(-21.09) (-20.65)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.013 10.691*** 10.993***
(1.07) (21.27) (20.76)
Observations 935 935 935
F 0.421 287.443 140.395
R2within 0.002 0.576 0.628
R2between 0.009 0.006 0.007
R2overall 0.003 0.091 0.103
Inequality
∆nd 0.061 0.079 0.101
(0.48) (1.22) (1.64)
Lag nond. consumption -1.170*** -1.205***
(-22.52) (-21.13)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.004*** 10.614*** 10.948***
(2.79) (22.53) (21.13)
Observations 935 935 935
F 0.234 253.687 135.238
R2within 0.001 0.575 0.628
R2between 0.096 0.007 0.008
R2overall 0.004 0.094 0.106
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is gi,t, and the time period is from 1984-2003. (1) is the result of a cross-sectional regression of group
nondurable consumption growth on its volatility. The lagged group nondurable consumption is added in (2) and (3), while time
dummies are included in (3).
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Table 4.14: EVS: Durable Consumption Growth and Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σd 0.229 -0.087 -0.155*
(0.57) (-1.07) (-1.73)
Lag dur. consumption -1.324*** -1.389***
(-10.85) (-10.24)
Time effect significant***
Constant -0.162 9.999*** 10.216***
(-1.05) (10.86) (10.13)
Observations 935 935 935
F 0.324 62.920 185.051
R2within 0.011 0.660 0.742
R2between 0.041 0.102 0.124
R2overall 0.000 0.333 0.383
Inequality
∆d -0.545*** -0.183*** -0.106**
(-7.54) (-3.37) (-2.23)
Lag dur. consumption -1.272*** -1.336***
(-9.63) (-11.04)
Time effect significant***
Constant -0.068*** 9.575*** 9.771***
(-85.18) (9.56) (10.98)
Observations 935 935 935
F 56.864 170.629 223.625
R2within 0.088 0.668 0.741
R2between 0.001 0.086 0.098
R2overall 0.081 0.339 0.376
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is gi,t, and the time period is from 1984-2003. (1) is the result of a cross-sectional regression of group durable
consumption growth on its volatility. The lagged group durable consumption is added in (2) and (3), while time dummies are included
in (3).
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Table 4.15: EVS: Total Consumption Growth and Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σt -0.234 0.041 0.109
(-1.04) (0.36) (1.04)
Lag total cons. -0.986*** -1.159***
(-18.67) (-22.53)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.046*** 9.490*** 11.210***
(3.53) (18.82) (22.73)
Observations 935 935 935
F 4.178 186.012 182.866
R2within 0.014 0.491 0.622
R2between 0.017 0.002 0.002
R2overall 0.011 0.099 0.118
Inequality
∆t 0.348** 0.177** 0.158**
(2.60) (2.17) (2.13)
Lag total cons. -0.961*** -1.121***
(-17.74) (-22.08)
Time effect significant***
Constant 0.017*** 9.251*** 10.853***
(16.73) (17.76) (22.06)
Observations 935 935 935
F 6.746 186.423 194.739
R2within 0.038 0.501 0.627
R2between 0.020 0.002 0.003
R2overall 0.034 0.108 0.128
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is gi,t, and the time period is from 1984-2003. (1) is the result of a cross-sectional regression of group total
consumption growth on its volatility. The lagged group total consumption is added in (2) and (3), while time dummies are included in
(3).
The upper panels of Table 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 present cross-sectional fixed effect estimations of
group nondurable consumption growth on volatility (equation (4.14) and (4.17)) for nondurable,
durable and total consumption, respectively. The estimators are cluster robust. To exclude the
effect of household size, per capita consumption growth is the key variable in both the current
and next subsection, where OECD defined equivalent scale is employed. Group fixed effects are
considered for all regressions and one extreme outlier is excluded. Column (1) is the result of
a cross-sectional regression of group consumption growth on the volatility. The lagged group
consumption is added in (2) and (3), while time dummies are included in (3). Neither durable,
nondurable or total consumption shows a significant relation between consumption growth and
volatility, and the signs of the estimated coefficient concerning volatility are also mixed.
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The data also allows studying the welfare effect of consumption growth. The key question lies in
the evolution of the within-group standard deviation along with the group average growth, as are
summarized by equation (4.15) and (4.18). Regression results are summarized in the lower panels
of Tables 4.13-4.15. The relationship between growth and inequality is positive but insignificant for
nondurable consumption, while durable consumption growth appears to negatively relate to the
within-group inequality. This implies that groups with higher durable goods consumption also
appear to be more equal. In the “keeping up with the Joneses” context and especially regarding
the conventional hypothesis on positional goods, this makes sense since groups with high durable
consumption growth may be those signaling strongly with the purchase of positional goods, where
the average will to keep up with others is also strong. The growth-inequality relationship reverses
when it comes to total consumption. Also significant is that, groups with high total consumption
growth also appear to have within-group inequality. This result is not controversial to the previous
one because the high-growing groups here are not the same as in the durable consumption case.
They can be described as rather young, small households who are at the start of their careers
and subject to more diverse income and other shocks. Nondurable consumption grows fast while
durables still pick up slowly due to their budget constraint. The positive regression results thus
reflect the dominant nondurable share in total consumption.
4.4.3 Imputed Consumption
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 vaguely display nonlinear growth-volatility associations for durable and non-
durable consumption with a 95 percent confidence interval. The U-shaped relationships for non-
durable and total consumption (negative coefficient for standard deviation and positive coefficient
for its square) are confirmed in cross-sectional fixed effect regressions (Table 4.5 and 4.16). Similar
to the regressions for EVS consumption, group fixed effect and time effect are considered, whereas
lagged consumption and time effect are gradually added to the right hand side of the equation.
Perhaps due to the unrepresentative information on durable consumption, there is no significant
growth-volatility relation reported.
Let’s focus on the nondurable and total consumption. For groups with consumption growth
under a threshold growth rate g¯, the growth is accompanied by diminishing volatility; Above
g¯, faster growing groups witness higher volatility. This threshold growth rate can be calculated
using the estimates of the coefficients (− α̂12α̂2 ). Recall the results presented in Table 4.2. The groups
with high nondurable consumption growth and high volatility are the young households, who
are mapped at the upper right area in Figure 4.2. Those with relatively low growth and medium
volatility are the older and/or foreign head households, located at the middle of the fitted line.
A large number of groups gather at the left end of Figure 4.2. This majority of households with
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Table 4.16: Imputed Data: Total Consumption Growth and Volatility / Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
Volatility
σ -0.378*** -0.362*** -0.349***
(-5.07) (-4.93) (-4.73)
σ2 0.765*** 0.751*** 0.749***
(4.61) (4.76) (4.74)
Lag total cons. -0.198*** -0.215***
(-7.03) (-6.58)
Time effect significant**
(2.49)
Constant 0.031*** 1.887*** 2.021***
(6.70) (7.16) (6.61)
Observations 2567 2423 2423
F 13.901 38.348 11.649
R2within 0.074 0.136 0.150
R2between 0.096 0.014 0.011
R2overall 0.074 0.065 0.072
Inequality
∆ -0.070 -0.096 -0.092
(-1.12) (-1.46) (-1.41)
∆2 0.156 0.177* 0.179*
(1.48) (1.70) (1.73)
Lag total cons. -0.159*** -0.174***
(-6.53) (-6.35)
Time effect significant**
Constant 0.017* 1.521*** 1.652***
(1.84) (6.60) (6.44)
Observations 2346 2226 2226
F 1.167 14.431 4.828
R2within 0.008 0.056 0.076
R2between 0.000 0.028 0.028
R2overall 0.008 0.009 0.016
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Group total consumption growth rate is the dependent variable.
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Figure 4.3: Group Durable Consumption Growth and Volatility, Imputed Data
medium growth and low volatility may be described as, among others, older, large in number,
well educated and as having skilled jobs. Nonetheless, as mentioned before, the interpretation
of the imputed data should be very careful due to the over- and underestimation problem of the
volatility. In the process of matching, the underestimation of personal shocks θij,t may differ at a
group consumption level and is possibly particularly serious in the lower end of the distribution
(assuming poorer households usually have higher consumption volatility due to a tighter credit
constraint). Consequently, the difference in growth-volatility relationships for households with
faster and slower consumption growth may partly result from the data imputation process.
Similar to the nondurable growth-volatility distribution, a large number of the groups are ac-
cumulated at the left end where both nondurable consumption growth and inequality are low
(Figure 4.4). The distribution of durable consumption inequality is more dispersed, with the con-
centration of the groups spanning a wider area than the nondurable case. The lower panels of
Tables 4.5-4.16 report the regression results of group growth on within-group inequality, where
the U-shaped relationship also holds but is only significant for nondurable consumption. Groups
with very low inequality can be those with older age and with stable occupation, who are rather
subject to similar income and preference shocks. Such stability consequently allows for stable
consumption growth. At the other end, highly unequal groups are subject to remarkably varied
idiosyncratic shocks, where the high group growth rate could be a result of those households with
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Figure 4.4: Group Nondurable Consumption Growth and Inequality, Imputed Data
extremely large positive shocks.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter explores the link between household consumption growth and volatility from both
theoretical and empirical perspectives. Heterogeneous households transfer resources intertempo-
rally via trading one type of asset, which helps to store value and insure against income shocks.
Contrary to typical neoclassical models, households incorporate group average consumption as
reference, so that the relative standard of living becomes relevant besides the absolute level. The
degree of (im)patience is another important group-specific parameter influencing households’ de-
cision on security holding v.s. current consumption.
The incomplete market setup, among other traits, offers partial insurance against income shocks
and contributes to consumption smoothing. Still, the general model equilibrium predicts a posi-
tive link between consumption growth and volatility, implying unstable growth over time. More-
over, consumption dynamics vary among households with different preferences, especially when
group average consumption serves as external benchmark. While more patient groups experience
smaller volatility, household eagerness to keep up with group mean intensifies the volatility of the
whole group. In a business cycle context, dominant positive income shocks and preference on con-
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sumption smoothing drive up the security price, and further strengthens the power of household
preferences.
I further use German data to construct household consumption growth in order to test the hy-
pothesis on the positive link between growth and volatility of durable, nondurable and total con-
sumption. A look at individual level consumption growth, volatility and the households’ charac-
teristics helps to identify the controls that have an important economic impact. Household size,
the age and nationality of household heads are relevant to growth and volatility, whereas heads’
education levels do not seem important. Community size and heads’ job profiles are positively
associated with consumption volatility. The most unfavorable households in the imputed data are
those have high education but unskilled jobs, whose low growth and high volatility may come
from low income and frequent job changing. Households with foreign heads also often find them-
selves in the category of low consumption growth and high volatility.
As EVS cannot provide significant evidence on the link, the imputed data reveals a U-shaped
relationship in nondurable consumption growth and volatility. At the right end are those young
households who experience both high growth and high volatility, at the left end are the house-
holds with older age, large in number, well educated and/or with skilled jobs, whereas those
with relatively low growth and medium volatility are the older and/or foreign head households.
From another perspective of welfare cost, also in the EVS, the link between group growth and
within-group inequality is found positive for nondurable consumption but negative for durable
consumption. The results suggest that lower income households, mostly young and small-sized,
are experiencing higher growth in nondurable consumption and subject to more diverse shocks;
Higher income households with faster growing purchase of positional goods are more similar in
the case of durable consumption.
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If firms foresee that wages are dependent on labor and capital employment, firms’ decisions for
job opening and capital employment are slightly different. The profit maximization is additionally
subject to the wage curves, which are functions of other input choices of the firms and are formed
through bargaining:
wit = w
i (nst−1, nut−1, kt−1, At, Bt) .
As capital is concerned, the perceivable firms would make the following choice:
∂yt
∂kt−1
= rt +
∂wut
∂kt−1
nut−1 +
∂wst
∂kt−1
nst−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
additional payment
to workers
. (20)
The right hand side is the price the firm has to pay: Market rent for capital as well as the other
parts paid out as wages through wage bargaining. This is because households have double roles
as both capital holders and workers. As a result, the firm finds it optimal to take less capital than
what would be efficient.
The Euler equations concerning the labor demand are:
κs
qst
= δ˜Et
{
∂yt+1
∂nst
− wst+1 −
∂wst+1
∂nst
nst −
∂wut+1
∂nst
nut + (1− χs)
κs
qst+1
}
, (21)
κu
qut
= δ˜Et
{
∂yt+1
∂nut
− wut+1 −
∂wut+1
∂nut
nut −
∂wst+1
∂nut
nst + (1− χu)
κu
qut+1
}
. (22)
Consequently the marginal value of a skilled worker is
∂Vt
∂nst−1
=
∂yt
∂nst−1
− wst −
(
∂wst
∂nst−1
nst−1 +
∂wut
∂nst−1
nut−1
)
+ (1− χs) κ
s
qst
, (23)
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and that of an unskilled worker is
∂Vt
∂nut−1
=
∂yt
∂nut−1
− wut −
∂wut
∂nut−1
nut−1 −
∂wst
∂nut−1
nst−1 + (1− χu)
κu
qut
. (24)
Note that the marginal value created by a worker is different from equation (23) in the way that
both types of wages are affected by the amount of labor input.
The solutions to wage bargaining are
wst = η
[
∂yt
∂nst−1
− ∂w
s
t
∂nst−1
nst−1 −
∂wut
∂nst−1
nut−1 + (1− χs)
κs
qst
]
+ (1− η) [− (1− χs − pst sst) δ˜EtΩst+1] ,
wut = η
[
∂yt
∂nut−1
− ∂w
s
t
∂nut−1
nst−1 −
∂wut
∂nut−1
nut−1 + (1− χu)
κu
qut
]
+ (1− η) [− (1− χu − put sut ) δ˜EtΩut+1] .
I can use the method of undetermined coefficients to solve the system of partial differential
equations in order to obtain the bargained wages. The “constant terms” that do not contain wst
or wut are excluded first and will be added back later. Therefore, the critical system I am solving
becomes
wst = η
[
∂yt
∂nst−1
− ∂w
s
t
∂nst−1
nst−1 −
∂wut
∂nst−1
nut−1
]
,
wut = η
[
∂yt
∂nut−1
− ∂w
u
t
∂nut−1
nut−1 −
∂wst
∂nut−1
nst−1
]
.
From the model setup I can guess that the wages are proportional to the respective marginal
products of labor, where the portions of skilled and unskilled are X and Y, separately:
wst = X · Aβt k1−at−1
[
α
(
nst−1
) σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut−1) σ−1σ ] σaσ−1−1 (nst−1)− 1σ ,
wut = Y · Aat k1−at−1
[
α
(
nst−1
) σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut−1) σ−1σ ] σaσ−1−1 (nut−1)− 1σ .
Taking derivatives of them both and plugging them into the critical system yield:
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η
α (Bt)
σ−1
σ (nst)
σ−1
σ +
X
η
(1− α) (nut )
σ−1
σ
=
[
αa (Bt)
σ−1
σ − X (a− 1)
]
α (Bt)
σ−1
σ (nst)
σ−1
σ
+
[
(1− α) aα (Bt)
σ−1
σ − α
(
a− 1+ 1
σ
)
(Bt)
σ−1
σ Y + X
1
σ
(1− α)
]
(nut )
σ−1
σ ,
and as well
Y
η
α (Bt)
σ−1
σ (nst)
σ−1
σ +
Y
η
(1− α) (nut )
σ−1
σ
=
[
a (1− α) α (Bt)
σ−1
σ +Y
1
σ
α (Bt)
σ−1
σ − X
(
a− 1+ 1
σ
)
(1− α)
]
(nst)
σ−1
σ
+ [a (1− α) (1− α)−Y (a− 1) (1− α)] (nut )
σ−1
σ .
By comparing the parameters of left- and right-hand sides of the equations I can solve for X and
Y:
X =
αaη (Bt)
σ−1
σ
1+ ηa− η ,
Y =
(1− α) aη
1+ ηa− η ,
and thus
wst =
αaη (Bt)
σ−1
σ
1+ ηa− η A
a
t k
1−a
t−1
[
α (Btnst)
σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut )
σ−1
σ
] σa
σ−1−1
(nst)
− 1σ ,
wut =
(1− α) aη
1+ ηa− η A
a
t k
1−a
t−1
[
α (Btnst)
σ−1
σ + (1− α) (nut )
σ−1
σ
] σa
σ−1−1
(nut )
− 1σ .
Adding back the constant terms yields
wst = η
[
1
1− η (1− a)
∂yt
∂nst
+ θstκ
s
]
+ (1− η) bs,
wut = η
[
1
1− η (1− a)
∂yt
∂nut
+ θut κ
u
]
+ (1− η) bu.
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Taylor Approximation of the Group Average Euler Equation
According to second order Taylor approximation,
ln Gi,t+1 ≈ ln Gi + 1Gi (Gi,t+1 − Gi)−
1
2G2i
(Gi,t+1 − Gi)2 .
Since EGi,t+1 = Gi, taking unconditional mean of both sides yields
E ln Gi,t+1 = ln EGi,t+1 +
1
Gi
E (Gi,t+1 − Gi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
− 1
2G2i
E (Gi,t+1 − Gi)2 .
Rearrange it, we have
ln EGi,t+1 = E ln Gi,t+1 +
1
2
E
[(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2]
, (25)
or,
E [Gi,t+1] ≈ exp
{
E ln Gi,t+1 +
1
2
E
[(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2]}
.
Similarly according to Taylor approximation,
G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i,t+1 ≈ G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i + (−γ− (1− γ) κi)G(−γ−(1−γ)κi−1)i (Gi,t+1 − Gi)
+
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) (−γ− (1− γ) κi − 1)
2
G(−γ−(1−γ)κi−2)i (Gi,t+1 − Gi)2 ,
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and
EG(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i,t+1
≈ G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i + (−γ− (1− γ) κi)G(−γ−(1−γ)κi−1)i E (Gi,t+1 − Gi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) (−γ− (1− γ) κi − 1)
2
G(−γ−(1−γ)κi−2)i E (Gi,t+1 − Gi)2 ,
EG(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i,t+1
≈ G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i
[
1+
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) (−γ− (1− γ) κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2]
Taking log of both sides yields
ln EG(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i,t+1
≈ ln G(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i
+ ln
[
1+
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) (−γ− (1− γ) κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2]
.
Since E
(
Gi,t+1−Gi
Gi
)2
is very small,
ln
[
1+
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) (−γ− (1− γ) κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2]
≈ (−γ− (1− γ) κi) (−γ− (1− γ) κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2
.
Using the result from (25),
ln EG(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i,t+1 ≈ (−γ− (1− γ) κi)
[
E ln Gi,t+1 +
1
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2]
+
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) (−γ− (1− γ) κi − 1)
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2
= (−γ− (1− γ) κi) E ln Gi,t+1 + (−γ− (1− γ) κi)
2
2
E
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2
,
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where E ln Gi,t+1 = E ln (1+ gi,t+1) ≈ Egi,t+1 = gi, and
E
[(
Gi,t+1 − Gi
Gi
)2]
≈ E
[
ln
(
Gi,t+1 − Gi,t
Gi
+ 1
)]2
= E
[
ln
(
Gi,t+1
Gi
)]2
= E [ln Gi,t+1 − ln Gi]2 = E [ln (1+ gi,t+1)− ln (1+ gi)]2 ≈ E
[
(gi,t+1 − gi)2
]
= σ2gi .
Therefore
ln EG(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i,t+1 = (−γ− (1− γ) κi) gi +
(−γ− (1− γ) κi)2
2
σ2gi ,
or,
EG(−γ−(1−γ)κi)i,t+1 = exp
[
(−γ− (1− γ) κi) gi + (−γ− (1− γ) κi)
2
2
σ2gi
]
.
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Chapter 2 (i = s, u)
Variable Explanation
Mit the matching function
mi efficiency of matching
θit market tightness
vit vacancies
uit−1 unemployment stocks
sit search intensity
pit probability of finding jobs
qit probability of filling vacancies
∆ share of skilled population
1− ∆ share of unskilled population
rt capital rental rate
ct consumption
kt−1 physical capital
it physical capital investment
nit−1 labor supply
1− nst−1/∆ unemployment rate of skilled workers
1− nut−1/(1− ∆) unemployment rate of unskilled workers
wit wage
Lt−1 aggregate labor input
yt output
Πt firm profit
Vit value of a vacancy
At skill-neutral technology shift
Bt skill-biased technology shift
et skill-neutral technology shock
ωt skill-biased technology shock
ΩE,it dynamic surplus of current employment
ΩU,it dynamic surplus of current unemployment
Ωit expected gain from the change of current employment state
$ matching elasticity
χ˜i probability of worker’s losing her previous job
κ probability of firm’s exit
χi probability of job destruction
ψ Frisch elasticity of labor supply
bi value from non-market activities
τ physical capital depreciation rate
β common discount factor
β˜t stochastic discount factor
a output elasticity of labor
α share parameter in production function
σ elasticity of substitution
κi vacancy posting cost
η bargaining power of the worker
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Variable Explanation
mi efficiency of matching
θit market tightness
vit vacancies
uit unemployment stocks
pit probability of finding jobs
qit probability of filling vacancies
∆t−1 share of skilled population
1− ∆t−1 share of unskilled population
ct consumption
lit leisure
nit−1 labor stock
xt human capital investment
wit wage
ξt shift in human capital level
et human capital shock
F(nst−1) human capital formation through learning by doing
kt−1 physical capital
it physical capital investment
yt output
zt technology shift
et exogenous technology shock
Πt firm profit
Vit value of a vacancy
ΩE,it dynamic surplus of current employment
ΩU,it dynamic surplus of current unemployment
Ωit expected gain from the change of current employment state
$ matching elasticity
χ˜i probability of worker’s losing her previous job
κ probability of firm’s exit
χi probability of job destruction
ψi Frisch elasticity of labor supply
ςi weight of leisure in utility
bi value from home production
δ human capital depreciation rate
τ physical capital depreciation rate
β common discount factor
β˜t stochastic discount factor
ρξ persistence of human capital shock
ρ persistence of technology shock
a output elasticity of labor
α share parameter in production function
σ elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor
κi vacancy posting cost
η bargaining power of the worker
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Chapter 4
Variable Explanation
Υt economy-wide income endowment
Υi,t group-specific income endowment
yt idiosyncratic endowment component
yt history of endowment shock
qt asset price
αij,t household initial asset holdings
Aij,t household-specific debt limit
cij,t household consumption
Xi,t group average consumption
gij,t consumption growth rate
ηt economy-wide shock to consumption growth
ηi,t group-specific shock
ηij,t household-specific shock
θt variance of ηt
θi,t variance of ηi,t
θij,t variance of ηij,t
βi group-specific discount factor
κi attitude toward group average consumption
pi number of households in group i
γ risk aversion parameter
$ij mean of consumption growth
SDt(4ci,t) standard deviation of consumption growth
µi group dummy
δt time dummy
ei,t residual
Wi,t a vector of group-specific control variables
Wij,t a vector of household-specific control variables
σi consumption growth volatility
∆i within-group standard deviation
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